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Abstract 
 
 
In this thesis I discuss three normative claims that I take to be central elements of Charles 
Taylor’s political thought. The first of these is Taylor’s contention that, in contemporary 
pluralistic societies, justifying socially prevailing norms by appealing to universally binding 
moral values is unlikely to promote social solidarity. Because this approach tends to downplay 
the goods that people realise through membership in particular associations, Taylor believes 
we must adopt a model of justification that does not prioritise universal over particular goods 
if we are to further social co-operation. A second claim Taylor defends is that commitment to 
the liberal value of collective self-rule implies treating patriotically motivated public service as 
a non-instrumental good. We should not, Taylor argues, regard collective association as 
nothing more than a means to satisfying private goals. Taylor advances a third claim, that is, 
he maintains that liberal toleration for diverse ways of life may require a perfectionist state 
that supports particularistic ways of life when they are threatened by decline.  
 I offer a qualified defence of the first two claims, but suggest that the third is less 
compelling. I attempt to do this by evaluating Taylor’s claims against the standards of lucid 
argumentation that he himself lays down. In discussing social and political norms, which he 
describes as “advocacy” issues, Taylor argues that our normative commitments necessarily 
rely on an underlying social ontology. More specifically, Taylor argues that the political 
values we defend are those that enable us to secure the interests we have as the bearers of an 
identity possessing both individual and collective dimensions. In setting out the conditions that 
favour integrated and free identity formation we may thereby reach a clearer understanding of 
the political norms that we wish to endorse. I argue that, while Taylor’s ontological reflections 
might well incline us to accept his model of justification and his account of patriotic social 
commitment, they do not of themselves dispose us to accept state perfectionism.  
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Introduction 
 
 
The political uses of ontological reflection 
Stephen K. White, in the essay “Weak Ontology and Liberal Political Reflection”, discusses 
what he calls the recent “ontological drift” in political theory (White, 1997: 503). White 
argues that political theory, and the social sciences more generally, have in recent years 
demonstrated a renewed interest in ontological issues. Accompanying this development has 
been a shift away from ontological problems configured as the logical commitments attendant 
upon theorising activity to more practical critical reflections upon the make-up of the human 
subject that social science theory presupposes and the manner in which this subject negotiates 
concrete practices. This renewed interest in the human subject White traces to a waning of the 
self-assuredness of theory in Western modernity, which is accompanied by a sense of the 
contingency and uncertainty of modern life and a corresponding desire to return to questions 
of a broadly “metaphysical” nature. I believe that this search for metaphysical guidance in a 
complex and indeterminate present inspires Charles Taylor’s inquiries in moral and political 
philosophy; his work cannot, at any rate, be fully appreciated without also considering his 
attempt to underscore the historically specific framework of reference within which the 
ontological questions that concern him arise. This ontological project is given its fullest 
working-out in Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (SS), where Taylor 
attempts to work toward an understanding of “what it is to be a human agent, a person, or a 
self” by exploring “the background picture of our spiritual nature and predicament which lies 
behind some of the moral and spiritual intuitions of our contemporaries” (1989: 3-4).  
 White distinguishes between “strong” and “weak” ontological reflection in political 
theory. Both approaches draw attention to basic existential realities, but differ about the 
conclusions that can be drawn from acknowledging them. Strong ontologists attempt to 
establish a framework for moral and political principles rooted in apodictic truth-claims. Weak 
ontologists, by contrast, believe that deriving practical principles from ontological reflection is 
a contestable and historically dynamic interpretive process (White, 1997: 506-07). Although 
White suspects that Taylor’s political work slides between strong and weak ontology, he takes 
as a paradigm of weak ontological reflection Taylor’s discussion in SS of the interplay of 
discovery and creation entailed in articulating the shared “frameworks” of meaning that, for 
Taylor, we all require not only as social science theorists but in order to lead our everyday 
lives. 
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Throughout the discussion that follows I aim to embellish White’s argument1 by 
illustrating how it is precisely as such an attempt to bring important ontological considerations 
to bear on political debates that Taylor’s political writing must be understood. I do this by 
showing how the challenges to mainstream understandings of liberalism that Taylor offers – 
and particularly the formalistic normative accounts of liberal politics that he refers to as 
“procedural liberalism” – invariably proceed through a consideration of the manner in which a 
philosophically articulate and historically sensitive conceptualisation of the ontological 
background of liberal political theorising as well as the practice of liberal politics provides a 
framework for criticising the normative positions and political choices of the actors involved.  
It is above all this attempt to reframe important political questions in a rich 
philosophical idiom that registers a range of moral issues not commonly encountered in 
mainstream liberal debate that constitutes the critical enterprise of Taylor’s political thought. 
Accordingly, in the two chapters that make up Section One I discuss Taylor’s ontological 
reflections on human identity and social science methodology, while in the three chapters 
constituting Section Two I then consider the political theses that he draws from these 
reflections. I focus throughout on the works that have helped establish his reputation as a 
political philosopher. These include the essays appearing in Philosophy and the Human 
Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 (1985b; PHS), the influential long essay “Multiculturalism 
and ‘The Politics of Recognition’” (1992; MPR) and The Ethics of Authenticity (1991a; EA). 
Because of my interest in tracing the connections between Taylor’s ontological and advocacy 
views, I endeavour to situate the political arguments found in these works alongside those 
found in the works that have built Taylor’s reputation as an important moral thinker, namely 
the essays comprising Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 (1985a; HAL) 
and SS (1989). I also draw extensively on the mix of moral and political essays collected in 
Philosophical Arguments (1995a; PA),2 as well as a number of occasional essays not found in 
these works, where this has been helpful in clarifying Taylor’s views.  
                                                
1 White only considers Taylor’s philosophy parenthetically in this essay, and is himself more concerned with 
sketching what he believes is a general trend in contemporary social science theory while demonstrating how the 
work of George Kateb exemplifies this ontological drift in liberal theory (White, 1997).  
2 Taylor has been and still is an exceptionally prolific writer. His earliest publications appear in 1957 and he 
continues to publish into the present, the most significant recent work being A Secular Age (2007). For my 
selective choice of works I therefore hope to plead necessity, and the list I present here is nothing other than a 
body of writing that approximates what I consider a sort of canon of essays and books published in the decade 
between 1985 and 1995 (although the essays selected for these works date as far back as 1971) and most 
commonly taken up in the expansive secondary literature on Taylor. While I offer the briefest of side-glances at 
Hegel and Modern Society (1979, rev. 1988a) and at the essays on Canadian politics collected in Reconciling the 
Solitudes (1993, rev. 2005a), my relative neglect of the interesting political ideas contained in these works and 
my total neglect of Taylor’s recent Modern Social Imaginaries (2004) is undeniably a shortcoming of the present 
study.  
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While I believe White is correct to portray Taylor as “a border runner between strong 
and weak ontology”, moving from ontological to advocacy positions in a manner that is at 
times question-begging, I attempt to provide a detailed discussion of where these transitions 
occur and offer, where necessary, a defence of Taylor’s views against criticisms that 
misconstrue or inadvertently misrepresent his views (1997: 506). I present, in other words, an 
immanent critique of Taylor’s political philosophy, where the burden of argumentation falls 
on situating Taylor’s political thought within the broader context of his moral philosophy – 
and, more particularly, aligning it with the anthropological reflections on human identity that I 
consider to be the focal point of this latter body of work – while attempting to assess the 
internal coherence of this project. This does not mean that I will not consider important 
external criticisms of Taylor’s work, but that I will only do so peripherally or where this helps 
to clarify, through contrast with alternative outlooks, Taylor’s moral and political arguments. 
For all the unresolved difficulties that his work throws up, I believe Taylor succeeds in 
presenting a range of compelling arguments that show how deciding important philosophical 
questions concerning the nature of human identity and communal belonging might be of 
relevance to coming to a better understanding of the political conflicts and social malaises that 
haunt our Western modernity, while also offering valuable insights concerning how best we 
might forge ahead.   
 
Beyond advocacy issues 
In Taylor’s important essay “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate” he draws a 
distinction between what he calls “advocacy” and “ontological” issues (1995a: 181, 182). 
Advocacy issues are raised when attempting to resolve moral questions that inform normative 
discussions of social practices. One’s stand on specific advocacy issues will determine where 
one lies on a continuum stretching from individualism to collectivism, in accordance with 
whether one assigns greater priority to individual rights and freedoms or to the demands of 
communal solidarity and collective goals in matters pertaining to public policy (Taylor, 1995a: 
182). Taylor’s political thought typically proceeds by assessing the viability of advocacy 
positions in accordance with whether they are sufficiently heedful of essential ontological 
features of all human life or of the historically-constituted form of life definitive of a particular 
cultural or national group. Where a political orientation runs up against the norms endorsed by 
a particular community, political debate has to weigh the competing goods of each in reasoned 
discussion and there will be no simple or uncontroversial solutions. Where, however, an 
advocacy position defines a mode of practice that fails to accommodate some fundamental 
condition of human existence, it cannot but be rejected. There will, of course, always be 
4 !
 
controversy about how we arrive at an understanding of the ontological constants of human 
life but, granted such an understanding, we will be provided a set of criteria for ruling out 
certain advocacy positions in principle.   
Taylor believes that it is essential for political theory to define its ontological 
commitments because it is these that determine the fundamental units of analysis employed in 
conceptualising the essential principles of social life. Any discussion of social practices, as 
well as the nature of social goods, presupposes some sort of social ontology, and places one on 
one side or another of the longstanding dispute between atomists and holists. Atomists hope to 
explain social action and social structures in relation to the properties of the individuals 
participating in these collective endeavours, and hope to understand public or common goods 
by decomposing them into individual goods (Taylor, 1995a). Taylor usually also associates 
atomism with the view that all goods, private and public, are those of an evaluating subject 
who is radically free, and that the inter-personal relationships, roles and commitments that 
such a view of goods allows for possess whatever value they do for us solely in accordance 
with their ability to facilitate the pursuit of our individual goods (1985a, 1985b, 1989, 1995a). 
Holists, by contrast, perceive a certain reductionism in this atomistic outlook and are 
committed to the notion that society cannot be exhaustively understood by describing the 
properties of individuals and outlining the causal principles governing social intercourse 
between these conceptually isolated subjects (Taylor, 1995a). In contradistinction to atomists, 
holists hold that many of our shared goods are, in Taylor’s idiom, “irreducibly social” (1995a). 
These goods would not be what they are if they were not shared, and so they necessarily 
belong to a group. Holists usually, though not invariably, also differ from atomists in holding 
to some version of value realism which sets limits on our freedom of choice and conceive of 
social participation as an essential condition of the full realisation of our human potentialities, 
however unique these potentialities may be (1985a, 1985b, 1989, 1995a).  
While one’s ontological commitments do not tie one to the advocacy of any specific 
practice, Taylor contends that they help to generate normative content by defining a broadly 
congruent range of meaningful moral choices that lie open when selecting from among 
divergent practical political possibilities. Likewise, the reverse relation is true, insofar as 
endorsing certain practices commits one to accepting an underlying ontology that makes sense 
of these normative recommendations. That is, the formation of an advocacy position will 
invariably invoke what, employing Taylor’s lexicon, we can call a background of 
intelligibility. Such an ontological framework can be more or less articulate but it cannot 
possibly be absent (Taylor, 1995a: 68).  
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The correct relation between these two levels of argument is, Taylor believes, either 
ignored or confused in much contemporary political debate. The fundamental problem here 
lies in the tendency of liberal thought to ignore ontological questions altogether, dismissing 
them as empty metaphysical speculations of little relevance to pragmatic political debates. 
This virtual “eclipse of ontological thinking in social theory” is behind the almost exclusive 
preoccupation of mainstream liberal thought in the Anglophone world with the attempt to 
derive generally acceptable and uncontroversial norms of acceptable political practice (Taylor, 
1995a: 185). It is chiefly Taylor’s concern to broaden the parameters of the discussion 
concerning justice and the ends of the liberal democratic state that surfaces in these debates by 
drawing attention to the ontological questions they too easily elide.  
Where there is an appreciation that such ontological issues are germane to debates at 
the advocacy level, there is nonetheless plenty of room for confusion. This confusion comes 
from the belief that there is a straightforward relationship between these two sets of issues, 
with critics almost invariably lumping atomists with individualists and holists with 
collectivists, whereas either commitment on the ontological level is combinable with either 
advocacy position (Taylor, 1995: 185). For this reason, the belief that a solid ontological 
argument can put issues arising at the advocacy level beyond dispute is mistaken (Taylor, 
1995: 183). It is the mark of a good ontological thesis that it purports 
 
to structure the field of possibilities in a more perspicuous way. But this does leave us with choices, 
which we need some normative, deliberative arguments to resolve….Taking an ontological position 
doesn’t amount to advocating something; but at the same time, the ontological does help to define the 
options it is meaningful to support by advocacy (1995a: 183). 
 
As we shall see, for Taylor it is precisely the disjunction between these two levels of 
enquiry that leaves room for reasoned debate, and it is here that philosophical investigation 
and argumentation has the most to offer political theory. Taylor places great value on such 
debate, hoping that through practical reason we can move toward a resolution of some of the 
more intractable dilemmas internal to Western modernity. What follows is essentially an 
attempt to assess, in terms of the standards of lucid argumentation he himself lays down, 
Taylor’s contribution to such debates.   
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Three failures of democracy in the procedural republic  
While in Section Two I try to reproduce in broad outline the contours of Taylor’s engagement 
with specific liberal theorists, my discussion of his political thought in Chapters Four and Five 
takes as its point of departure the diffuse empirical concerns informing his political theory. 
This I do only obliquely, and I make little attempt to challenge the sweeping historical 
generalisations that necessarily inhere in this ambitious project. The relative neglect of 
empirical concerns owes to the fact that this aspect of Taylor’s thought is pitched at a high 
level of abstraction and is often avowedly speculative. Nonetheless, it will be helpful to 
outline here three recurring observations that form the explicit or implied backdrop of Taylor’s 
theoretical engagement with procedural liberalism. Taylor fears that procedural liberalism 
serves, even if unwittingly, to normatively endorse a model of political life that leads to the 
centralisation of political power, the exclusion of certain cultural groups from democratic 
debate, and the splintering or dissolution of politically effective and socially responsible 
coalitions within a political society.  
In EA Taylor, developing a theme from Tocqueville, raises the concern that a form of 
uniquely modern despotism is now being realised in many modern Western societies. This 
“soft despotism” is not overtly oppressive; protest and criticism are tolerated, periodic 
elections and other basic procedures commonly associated with democracy are encouraged, 
and state intervention in the workings of society is relatively selective and restrained (Taylor, 
1991a: 9, 112). The despotic character of these societies resides rather in the fact that most 
important political procedures are guided by an impersonal and inflexible system of legal 
procedures, and all major decisions are made by the officials and specialists of a state 
bureaucracy which is largely impervious to the needs and aspirations of the citizenry (Taylor, 
1991a: 10, 113-15). Taylor believes that this mode of despotism creeps into a society as the 
foundations for collective self-rule are undermined and the society moves away from 
functioning as what Taylor calls a “civic republic” to what he, following Michael Sandel, 
refers to as a “procedural republic” (Taylor, 1992: 58; 1995a: 201, n.21; 1998b: 146; Sandel, 
1984: 91).   
The discussion in EA connects with Taylor’s isolation of three major threats to modern 
democracies in the essay “Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere” (1995a). The first of these, 
discussed in Chapter Four, is widespread citizen alienation from the mechanisms of self-rule 
in the climate of centralisation and bureaucratisation typical of societies where participation at 
many decentralised levels of government and in free civil society initiatives is not vigorously 
encouraged. Where most import political decisions lie exclusively in the hands of a central 
government responsive, at best, to influential elitist lobbies and media interests, the average 
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citizen rightly considers him/herself to be incapable of exerting any leverage over broader 
social processes. The members of such a society, left with a negligibly small sphere of 
influence over their own affairs, become demotivated by a sense of impotence that inclines 
them to retreat into private life (Taylor, 1991a: 9-10; 1995a: 278-80).  
A second failure of modern democracies – one that becomes increasingly threatening 
in contemporary conditions of pluralism – arises when the members of a minority or excluded 
cultural group within a political society believe that their shared interests have not been 
granted a fair hearing in the deliberative processes of the broader society. As we shall see in 
Chapter Five, this sense of exclusion is often tied up with the ignored group failing to be 
considered an integral part of such a society. When denied recognition in this manner, such 
groups tend to grow disaffected and may, in extreme cases, attempt to secede from the 
national community. At the very least, this decline in social solidarity is likely to promote a 
thoroughly conflictual mode of politics where all outcomes are understood in a zero-sum 
fashion (Taylor, 1995a: 281; 1998b: 144). In such conditions any productive form of conflict 
resolution is stymied because excluded or ignored groups are only likely to resign themselves 
to unfavourable political outcomes if they feel that they have been accommodated by, or at 
least respectfully incorporated in, democratic decision-making procedures (Taylor, 1998b).  
 These two failures of democracy frequently spill over into a third when they impact on 
a society’s political life profoundly enough to generate what Taylor refers to as “political 
fragmentation” (1995a: 281). A political society becomes fragmented when groups begin to 
practise a form of politics that mobilises support around narrow agendas that do not conform 
with a vision of the shared good of all in society. In such conditions it is extremely difficult to 
build majorities that can shape public policy on important issues (1991a: 112-13, 115-17). 
What Taylor refers to as soft despotism is the outcome of political fragmentation and 
the dissolution of ties between individuals and groups that feed it. In a fragmented society 
there exists a vicious cycle where the mechanisms of citizen control over governmental 
decisions, as well as those promoting participation in free civil society initiatives, atrophy to 
the point of near total ineffectuality and, along with them, the confidence in success and unity 
of purpose that these initiatives require (Taylor, 1991: 112-13). With the dissolution of 
participatory democratic will-formation and the vehicles of association that facilitate it, what 
little collective political organisation survives the alienation and depoliticisation of the 
individual fractures into mutually estranged associative groups organised around local 
community, ethnic, religious, ideological or special interest identifications, with no underlying, 
society-wide identifications or allegiances that can transcend these group divisions (Taylor, 
1991a: 112-13). As Taylor explains,  
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fragmentation comes about partly through a weakening of the bonds of sympathy, partly in a self-
feeding way, through the failure of democratic initiative itself. Because the more fragmented an 
electorate is in this sense, the more they transfer their political energies to promoting their partial 
groupings…and the less possible it is to mobilize democratic majorities around commonly understood 
programs and policies. A sense grows that the electorate as a whole is defenceless against the leviathan 
state (1991a: 113). 
 
It is fair to say that a concern with the danger of fragmentation for the moral life of the 
individuals and groups composing modern societies is a problem with regard to which all of 
Taylor’s political writing can be read as offering an interpretation and, albeit tersely and 
suggestively, recommending partial solutions.  
 
Taylor’s ontological critique of procedural liberalism 
The central concern of this thesis is to consider Taylor’s belief that the empirical failures he 
identifies in the political life of contemporary procedural republics must be interpreted as, in 
large measure, caused or perpetuated by an inability to correctly conceptualise the moral 
foundations of modern political association. This is not an exclusively theoretical issue, but 
Taylor believes it can be most lucidly debated by engaging with the theoretical positions that 
may offer the most articulate formulations of the various advocacy positions in contestation. 
Accordingly, in his attempt to expose the failures of democratic practice that give rise to 
bureaucratic centralisation, misrecognition of disadvantaged cultural groups and political 
fragmentation, Taylor repeatedly leads us back to the theoretical shortcomings attending some 
of the most influential articulations of contemporary liberal democratic practice.3 But these 
                                                
3 Contrary to his own wishes, Taylor is almost invariably labelled a “communitarian” critic of liberalism in the 
literature (Taylor in Tully ed., 1995b: 250; Taylor in Laitinen & Smith eds., 2002b: 169-70; Paul, E., Miller & 
Paul, J. eds., 1996; Buchanan, 1989; Kymlicka, 1989a; Carse, 1994; Mulhall & Swift, 2003; Mulhall in Abbey 
ed., 2004: 113). This appellation is probably more misleading than it is helpful, and below I make no detailed 
attempt to situate Taylor within the so-called “liberal-communitarian debate” except where this is necessary to 
highlight the background of his arguments. While intervening very influentially in a number of issues that have 
arisen in this debate over the years, Taylor submits that “the portmanteau terms ‘liberal’ and ‘communitarian’ 
will probably have to be scrapped” because of the tendency that has arisen with this crude schema to classify 
thinkers according to their advocacy positions alone (1995a: 185). The true differences between “liberals” and 
“communitarians”, Taylor believes, often pertain to the ontological positions that they endorse (or are committed 
to endorsing), and failure to attend to these has resulted in a great deal of “cross-purposes” (1995a).  
Nonetheless, within this more ontologically sensitive frame of reference, Taylor does offer many 
explicit interventions supporting the political theories advocated by thinkers like Michael Sandel and Alasdair 
MacIntyre that are generally viewed in the literature as communitarian stalwarts and criticising thinkers 
(frequently expressly referred to by Taylor as liberals or procedural liberals) like John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin 
and Robert Nozick, and there is some sense in situating him on what is conventionally considered the 
communitarian side of this divide (Taylor, 1985b: 1989: 1993: 345; 1995a; 1998b; 1998c; Paul, E. et al., 1996; 
Buchanan, 1989; Kymlicka, 1989a; Carse, 1994; Mulhall & Swift, 2003). This is especially true when discussing 
liberal theories of justice, and I draw out some of these important connections in Chapter Three.  
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individual thinkers he takes to be implicated – part articulators and part innovators – in a far 
broader understanding of the ends of human life and of political association that are so much a 
part of the self-understanding of modern Westerns that they frequently pass for common sense. 
It is this more general, frequently inarticulate or pre-theoretical, grasp of social reality that 
these and other theorists reproduce, obfuscate or illuminate (Taylor, 1985b; 1989; 1991c: 
308).4 It is also, importantly, this understanding of social reality that concrete political actors 
draw on in their quotidian engagement in political practices as a necessary condition of 
successfully negotiating the roles, relationships and evaluative languages through which these 
practices co-ordinate collective action. It is to this far larger and frequently inarticulate 
background set of beliefs and assumptions that Taylor’s criticisms of liberalism are frequently 
directed.  
If this approach seems misguided, it helps to appreciate that social and political theory 
is, for Taylor, seldom “innocent” (1985b). While natural science purports to offer a neutral 
description of the objects it studies by formulating hypotheses and testing how they measure 
up to the facts, social science cannot hope to successfully imitate this procedure. This is 
because the common-sense understanding that social theory extends does not relate to objects 
that exist in complete independence of our theorising activity concerning them (Taylor, 1985b: 
91-96). Instead, social theory usually extends, through articulation, our pre-theoretical grasp of 
the constitutive understandings and norms that inhere in the practices and institutions of 
society. In the process, social theory usually normatively reinforces or weakens these bodies 
and procedures by fortifying or undermining the credibility of the understandings that they 
ride on (Taylor, 1985b: 91-98). For this reason there can be a more or less good fit between a 
practice and the theory informing it, with potentially detrimental consequences to the practice 
if the fit is poor and beneficial outcomes if it is good. In this sense social theories, as opposed 
to natural science theories, may contribute to a transformation of their objects by revealing the 
coherence or the contradictions between the avowed purposes of a practice and the outcomes 
that eventuate from it, and it is precisely such connections that Taylor, as a political theorist, 
hopes to expose (Taylor, 1985b: 98, 101, 248). 
 As we shall see in Chapter One, Taylor believes that any cogent account of human 
behaviour must acknowledge that individual persons act in a purposive fashion that accords 
with how we interpret ourselves and our surroundings. It is a feature of all persons, that is, that 
we act out of a certain self-understanding or identity. Moreover, because the terms in which 
                                                
4 Taylor takes this pre-theoretical mode of understanding to be more fundamental to that which we have through 
explicit representations in that it is always present, whereas we only intermittently form representations of our 
experience, and because it functions as a background in relation to which our explicit formulations make sense 
(Taylor, 1991c: 308).  
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we form our identities are inescapably given to us from the cultural systems in which we have 
been reared, we will share to some extent a common cultural stratum of identity. Taylor also 
holds that political institutions and practices are developed and sustained through co-ordinated 
action that is dependent on shared understandings forged in a dynamic interchange between 
persons. Because these understandings help to further define our identities, woven into our 
self-understandings will be a minimally shared set of political commitments – a claim which I 
discuss further in Chapter Two. Accepting this timeless truth, for Taylor, entails accepting 
holism and abandoning atomism.   
 While some of these claims may be difficult to accept, the question I raise throughout 
Section Two concerns whether, granted these ontological views about human identity and 
communal belonging, we will also wish to credit Taylor’s constructive political project. This 
project is worked out in large part through a sustained polemic against procedural liberalism; a 
creed which, Taylor believes, has at least three distinct elements. In Chapter Three I assess 
Taylor’s claim that procedural liberalism aspires to a universalistic impartiality in the 
justification of the political principles it deems permissible that is either conceptually 
misguided or else too remote from the concerns of most persons to motivate their allegiance. I 
argue that the former claim is not a real problem for procedural liberals but that the latter does 
raise some concerns for our understanding of how social solidarity is to be promoted in 
pluralistic societies, to which procedural liberals may be insensitive. I then consider Taylor’s 
recommendation for overcoming this difficulty through a model of open-ended deliberative 
exchange between members of distinct cultures.  
 In Chapter Four I discuss another of Taylor’s dissatisfactions with procedural 
liberalism, which is that it tends to regard political participation as a human good that is 
largely up for grabs. This, for Taylor, is because procedural liberals understand the value of 
public service in instrumental terms, as a means to protecting our individual freedoms, 
whereas Taylor believes that it has an inherent value that can only be overlooked at the cost of 
disregarding the indispensability of collective self-rule as a guarantor of human freedom and 
dignity. I outline three distinct arguments that Taylor offers for this position, only one of 
which points to a strong disagreement between him and procedural liberals. Taylor argues, 
however, that procedural liberals can get round this problem by endorsing a holistic ontology 
that is better able to account for the essentially participatory requirements of freedom and 
which will, at an advocacy level, incline them to accept the inherent value of patriotic 
commitment. Taylor’s real argument, then, is not with procedural liberalism but rather with an 
atomistic understanding of society that procedural liberals may or may not endorse.  
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 Taylor believes, however, that placing procedural liberalism on a holistic ontological 
footing is not without some further difficulties. While it may point the way toward 
overcoming bureaucratic centralisation, this solution also suggests that the systematic 
marginalisation of disadvantaged cultural groups and the attendant political fragmentation may 
be difficult to escape. This is because Taylor believes that patriotism, holistically understood, 
requires that we affirm a common good that encompasses the entire political community. But, 
as we shall see in Chapter Five, it is for this reason likely to push toward political exclusion of 
members of disadvantaged communities that are unable to democratically secure their group 
interests. For Taylor this is not an insurmountable difficulty, but it does mean that we must do 
away with the procedural ideal of a neutral state that refrains from publicly endorsing the 
inherent value of particular ways of life and which is blind to cultural differences when 
interpreting the law. In order to make this move, however, Taylor argues that we will first 
have to understand the intimate connection between freedom and cultural belonging – a move 
which again requires that we step outside of atomism at the ontological level. I argue that, 
whatever its appeal, Taylor’s solution nonetheless doesn’t follow on unproblematically from 
his ontological commitments; here, far more than elsewhere, Taylor slides between strong and 
weak ontology a little too unhesitatingly. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
1. Taylor as a theorist of identity 
Alessandro Ferrara has written that  
 
The only imperatives which in our times are acknowledged as unconditional, and thus as a possible basis 
for universally valid claims, are the requirements of the well-being of a concrete identity, individual or 
collective….This is the basis on which to build an universalistic position that does not sacrifice 
individuality to universality, and retains the possibility of criticizing the existent in the name of its own 
unfulfilled potentials (Ferrara in Rasmussen ed., 1990: 12). 
 
Whether or not we agree with Ferrara, the question of what constitutes human identity, and 
what moral commitments attach to this understanding, is undoubtedly a central preoccupation 
in Charles Taylor’s moral and political writing. Indeed, it is probably not an exaggeration to 
say that identity is the central descriptive category to be found in this body of work. At any 
rate, I hope to argue that coming to a clear understanding of Taylor’s views on identity is 
indispensable to appreciating his normative political philosophy and the critique of procedural 
liberalism that is central to it.  
Taylor approaches the theme of identity from two complementary perspectives. The 
first of these frames the problem in absolute, trans-historical terms as a question about the 
transcendental conditions of personhood. This, for Taylor, is an issue that philosophical 
anthropology – which he (citing Axel Honneth and Hans Joas) understands as the study of 
“the unchanging preconditions of human changeableness” – most directly addresses (Taylor in 
Honneth & Joas, 1988b: vii). Philosophical anthropology probes the timeless question of 
“human nature”, hoping to place the social sciences on a secure theoretical footing by 
examining the continuities and differences obtaining between the human and non-human 
worlds. As such it is “the study of the basic categories in which man and his behaviour is to be 
described and explained” (Taylor, 1965: 4). 
In SS, as well as in the essays collected in HAL, PHS and PA, Taylor works out a 
philosophical anthropology by seeking to establish constants of human existence, but he 
brings to the task an erudite historical sensitivity in order to avoid the pitfalls of anachronism 
and cultural parochialism that universalistic claims about human nature are prone to. A 
fundamental problem addressed by Taylor’s philosophy, beyond exploring the boundaries 
between the human and non-human worlds, is therefore the historical question of how changes 
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arise within the human world. This requires dissociating the historically contingent and 
culturally variable elements of human behaviour from those that appear to be rooted in 
immutable features of human nature. Taylor’s concern with sifting the mutable from the 
constant arises as part of the more ambitious task, carried to completion most fully in SS, of 
providing a genealogy of the modern Western identity in order to throw into historical relief 
the major moral conflicts that afflict contemporary Western modernity. 
 
1.1 Compound identities 
Any discussion of identity is at the very least an examination of perceived relationships of 
similarity or difference between objects or beings. In Taylor’s discussions of human identity, 
as we shall see in more detail below, people develop a sense of self by identifying both with 
certain admirable aspects of themselves – those achievements and aspirations that they invest 
with greatest moral significance and which define their central existential purposes – and with 
certain of the values and purposes that they share with others through their participation in 
joint enterprises. This is not just a cognitive issue but also a question of motivation, in that 
Taylor thinks our identities are most fundamentally constituted by our concerns and 
commitments. I believe that Taylor consistently considers two basic identity-constituting 
relationships – an introspective self-interpretation and an outward-looking sense of cultural 
belonging – to be essential components of any fully-developed, coherent or healthy identity, 
and he takes the development of these to be inseparable from the exercise of “full, normal 
human agency” and the attribution of “integral…undamaged human personhood” (1985a: 3; 
1989: 27). This account of identity, which is at the heart of Taylor’s moral philosophy, is 
supplemented in his political writing with a consideration of a third identity-constituting 
relationship obtaining between the individual and the members of the political community in 
which she5 is embedded.  
The first of these relationships concerns how individuals relate to themselves. The 
monomania that Taylor attributes to his own projects in HAL and PHS, and which continues 
to inform his contributions to philosophical anthropology up to the present, arises out of his 
desire to highlight the importance of self-understanding in human life (1985a/b: 1). Taylor 
believes that we are not self-transparent, and that to understand ourselves we have to interpret 
ourselves.6  
                                                
5 Throughout this chapter I employ the female personal pronoun, and thereafter I alternate between the female 
and the male usages across successive chapters.  
6 It is above all the capacity for interpreting ourselves and our worlds that, for Taylor, sets humans apart from the 
natural world, and the oversight or misunderstanding of this capacity in the “naturalist” accounts of human life 
that have come to dominate the mainstream of natural science and social science explanation since the early 
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Discussing self-understanding in terms of self-interpretation makes sense, for Taylor, 
only because our self-understanding is mediated by an understanding of the objects and people 
we are brought into contact with in the course of our socialisation. Personhood is not given us 
by nature but is rather an accomplishment, the result of immersion in an extensive nexus of 
human relationships as well as the modes of thought and feeling of a given culture.7 Taylor 
believes that our self-understanding necessarily appeals to a shared cultural background of 
thought and experience, and this constitutes the second relationship that he argues is an 
inescapable feature of peculiarly human life. Very little human experience is immediate; upon 
examination, even the responses and intuitions that constitute our emotional lives appear to be 
inescapably structured by the way that we represent events to ourselves and others. While this 
representation is also an act of interpretation that can, and frequently does, assume a form 
unique to an individual, it does not exist even as a possibility without mastery of certain 
culturally inculcated competencies and participation in a minimally rule-governed network of 
personal and impersonal exchanges (Taylor, 1985a; 1989; 1991c). This is one sense in which 
                                                                                                                                                    
Seventeenth Century provides a constant temptation to error and confusion in the social sciences. An essential 
part of escaping the “great epistemological cloud” thrown up by naturalist-inspired theories is therefore to 
emphasise that, simply as humans, we necessarily act in a purposive fashion that accords with our self-
understanding, and that where this understanding is absent or undeveloped our capacity for exercising our agency 
in ways that appear non-pathological or recognisably human is jeopardised (Taylor, 1985a; 1989: 5). 
7 The use of these terms clearly is not without some associated difficulties. The first, and possibly most 
devastating, of these concerns the argument that the use of “culture” as a descriptive concept is more 
epistemologically unstable and/or politically determined than is commonly acknowledged by both liberals and 
liberal critics like Taylor (Rorty, A., 1994; Benhabib, 2002; Kukathas in Paul, E., Miller & Paul, J. eds., 1996). I 
will overlook this “external” criticism, which leads far beyond the scope of the present study, almost entirely, 
touching on it only briefly in Chapter Five. For a response to this type of accusation see Taylor 1994a. 
There remains, however, a purely “internal” difficulty with Taylor’s choice of terminology: Taylor 
frequently uses the terms “form of life”, “way of life” and “society” interchangeably with the term “culture”, and 
moreover often refers to rather different objects when doing so. In “Irreducibly Social Goods”, for example, 
Taylor defines culture as a common “background of practices, institutions and understandings” through 
individual action becomes intelligible and is co-ordinated (Taylor, 1995a: 136). Here Taylor appeals to the idea 
that social and political practices are culturally and linguistically coded, with each serving to sustain the other 
(Taylor, 1995a: 138). This stronger definition of culture, which includes both a common moral outlook and social 
and political practices, is useful in highlighting the fact that social institutions and practices may be the bearers of 
a certain culturally partial value orientation (a theme I take further in Chapter Five). It is, however, important to 
note that Taylor’s work on multiculturalism employs only a weaker sense of the term, where it refers more 
narrowly to a community of some description united by shared moral frameworks and expressive languages. In 
this weaker sense, as Amélie O. Rorty points out, “culture” refers to the intellectual and spiritual achievements of 
a community as these are reflected in its language, literature and art (1994: 156).  
Even in this limited usage, however, the term seems uncommonly inflated. In MPR, for example, Taylor 
discusses the condition of contemporary ethnic or linguistic groups alongside that of feminist, religious, civil 
rights, and gay rights groups, employing the same analytic lexicon of cultural identity and struggle throughout 
(1992: 25-26). To head off confusion here, I believe that it is worth noting that in every case what Taylor means 
is a group that shares a common identity, where this identity is shared in virtue of, at the very least, commonly 
held values expressed in an evaluative language or languages that are subject to common or commensurable laws 
of intelligibility. The common social and political practices of a given community frequently also enter into the 
meaning of these terms as Taylor uses them, but I attempt to give some indication of this important distinction 
throughout by referring to the former unit of association as a “culture” and the latter as a “society” or a “political 
society”, while taking all of these to be forms of “community”. 
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Taylor believes that identities are, by their very nature, partially formed through what he calls 
“dialogical” exchange and can never be constituted purely “monologically” (1991c; 1992). 
This second aspect of identity, binding the individual to a larger cultural life, is 
analytically distinct from a third set of relationships linking the individual with a political 
society of some description. Through common participation in a polity people are brought into 
association for the pursuit of goods that are secured by the normatively defined forms of 
collective action that this political community sustains. This is another sense in which Taylor 
believes that people reside throughout their lives within a dialogical setting, and his account of 
the dialogical dimension of human life can therefore be said to possess both a cultural and a 
political dimension. By considering the nature of the goods pursued through political action 
Taylor hopes to come to a better normative understanding of the value of political association. 
In this chapter I discuss Taylor’s treatment of the first two identity-constituting 
relationships mentioned above in detail, in order to explicate the trans-historical aspect of 
Taylor’s account of human identity formation. I then go on to consider, in Chapter Two, 
Taylor’s discussion of the third, political dimension of identity formation. There we shall see 
that the indispensability of participation in the political contexts of identity formation to the 
full realisation of the individual informs Taylor’s attempt to demonstrate the methodological 
necessity of framing social science inquiry within the philosophical limits of a holistic social 
ontology. This will enable us, in the chapters that comprise Section Two, to demonstrate how 
Taylor attempts to intervene in advocacy debates concerning the desired form of liberal 
political society by considering the normative political possibilities admitted by accepting 
holism.  
 
1.2 Personhood and moral subjectivity 
An important point of entry into Taylor’s many complex contributions to philosophical 
anthropology can be found in the essay “The Concept of a Person”, where he discusses the 
concept of personhood as it is commonly employed in moral and legal discourse that attempts 
to establish philosophically the grounds upon which we owe respect to others through the 
attribution of moral status or rights (1985a). In its more common usage, Taylor argues, it is 
taken as relatively uncontroversial that a “person”, where the term indicates something more 
than the biological category of human being, must possess certain faculties that enable her to 
formulate an original outlook on the world and behave as an agent possessing freedom.8 
                                                
8 Despite the distinction between humans and persons that Taylor acknowledges, he usually follows the common 
habit of using these terms interchangeably. This is presumably because he believes that we tend to treat those 
who have lost, or not yet acquired, the capacities associated with personhood as persons in most important moral 
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Entailed in this is the idea that “a person is a being who has a sense of self, has a notion of the 
future and the past, can hold values, make choices; in short, can adopt life-plans” (Taylor, 
1985a: 97). Taylor speculates that, where these faculties have not developed or have been 
rendered inoperative, the person in question will experience something resembling the 
crippling disorientation that recent psychoanalytic literature describes in terms of crises of 
identity, ego loss, and other pathologies forming around the inability to register meaning or a 
lack of self-esteem (Taylor, 1985a: 34-35; 1989: 18-19, 27-28, 31).  
Taylor doesn’t call this basic set of presuppositions into question, but he does believe 
that within this broad understanding of the person there is plenty of room for meaningful 
debate about the specific human capacities required for exercising our agency in this minimal 
sense. In developing his position on this issue, Taylor takes it as ontologically basic that 
people exercise their agency by answering questions that, simply as people, we all have to 
resolve in order to live humanly fulfilling and healthy lives (1989: 29). For this reason humans 
are of necessity committed to the perennially engaging task of self-interpretation. In HAL and 
SS Taylor develops this self-interpretation thesis by arguing that the minimally coherent sense 
of self that we attribute to persons is a unity that is, and can only be, established through moral 
reasoning that serves to establish an individuated identity in the course of engagement with 
other people in the dialogical contexts of life. Taylor’s basic thesis, with which SS opens, is 
that “[s]elfhood and the good, or in another way selfhood and morality, turn out to be 
inextricably intertwined themes” (1989: 3). To see why this is so, it is necessary to bring to 
light the “inescapable structural requirements” or transcendental conditions of human identity 
formation and the exercise of human agency (Taylor, 1989: 38, 52). Taylor does this by 
arguing that “strong evaluation” and narrative reasoning, which in SS he takes to be two basic 
faculties through which identity is formed and sustained, are criterial for personhood. In the 
interests of brevity, however, I will focus only on the first of these below.  
 
1.2.1 Taylor’s strongly evaluating moral subject  
Taylor’s account of strong evaluation must be understood in the context of his perennial effort 
to undermine the reductionism that derives from naturalist explanation in the social sciences. 
People, in exercising their agency, are not the “simple weighers of alternatives” that naturalist-
inspired understandings of human nature, which attempt to explain all human motivations as 
qualitatively of a piece with animal drives, depict us to be (Taylor, 1985a: 23). On these 
naturalist accounts, which Taylor believes dominate the mainstream of social science 
                                                                                                                                                    
respects, investing the potential possession more than the actualisation of these capacities with moral significance 
(1985a; 1992). Unless otherwise indicated, I will follow Taylor’s usages.  
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explanation, human behaviour is explained in terms of the desires (as well as the inclinations 
or needs) that motivate it, with moral reflection and deliberation functioning only 
instrumentally, as an aid in furthering goals, ambitions and aspirations that aim at some greater 
desire-consummation or avoiding pain or harm (1985a; 1989). 
In articulating his dissatisfaction with this understanding of practical reason9 Taylor 
makes the ontological claim that “it belongs to human agency to exist in a space of questions 
about strongly valued goods, prior to all choice or adventitious cultural change” (1989: 31). 
By this he means that, in exercising our agency, we find ourselves engaged with the world in 
such a way that only by exercising the capacity for strong evaluation, which is a form of 
practical reasoning, can we find our bearings within it (1989: 30-31). It is not possible here to 
offer an account of strong evaluation that does justice to the complexity and originality of 
Taylor’s treatment of this concept.10 Basically, Taylor believes that strong evaluation is a 
mode of “second-order” desire formation, through which agents form relatively enduring 
preferences that determine which of their most immediate, or “first-order”, desires they seek to 
fulfil. But unlike Harry Frankfurt, from whom he borrows these terms, Taylor does not believe 
that we form second-order desires with a view to attaining some long-term maximisation of 
first-order desire satisfaction (Taylor, 1985a: 16). In strong evaluation we judge our first-order 
desires in accordance with standards of value that register a range of peculiarly human 
concerns that are irreducible to desire, in the sense that they are employed to accept or reject 
desires (Taylor, 1989: 20).11  
Strong evaluation is a form of moral reasoning that we employ when considering how 
to accommodate the well-being of other persons, determining how to live a fulfilled and 
meaningful life, and when regarding the attainments that make us fit objects of respect for 
other persons (Taylor, 1989: 4). By referring to morality in this sense Taylor stretches the 
concept beyond its received usage in mainstream moral philosophy and political theory, which 
typically deals with only the first of these three concerns, to include the broader gamut of what 
might be called “ethical”, “aesthetic” or “spiritual” issues which touch on the latter two axes 
of moral reasoning and which also influence our understanding of the first axis (Taylor, 1985b; 
1989: 4; Laitinen, 2003: 36-37). These moral issues, Taylor believes, are perennial human 
concerns through which all persons distinguish between what Aristotle called mere life and the 
                                                
9 I discuss Taylor’s understanding of practical reason in greater detail in Chapter Three. Here I simply mean by 
“practical reason” that form of deliberation we use when reaching decisions that, whatever their complexity, 
answer the basic existential question: “What should I do?” or “What is right for me?” (Habermas, 1993: 2, 116). 
10 Taylor’s most extended discussions of strong evaluation are to be found in “What Is Human Agency?” and 
“Self-interpreting Animals” (both collected in HAL) and throughout Part I of SS.  
11 A more sophisticated discussion of the relationship between Taylor’s and Frankfurt’s accounts of personhood 
than I offer here can be found in Laitinen, 2003: 20-24.  
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good life (1989: 211-12). When strongly evaluating, our deliberation proceeds by assessing 
possible actions, not only in light of their immediate or delayed outcomes, but also by 
regarding our motivations for engaging in them; we choose between competing desires and 
purposes in accordance with our perception of their relative worth and our understanding of 
their appropriateness as a response to the situation that has occasioned them. These 
judgements may differ from group to group and, within these groups, individual to individual, 
as they are always the product of contestable interpretation, but in every case what makes 
them the sort of judgements they are is that they enable us to distinguish a class of ends or 
goods that matter deeply to us, in that we take them to be categorically, unconditionally 
valuable. A corollary of this is that, in deeming certain weakly valued ends undesirable, these 
are rejected on principle and not on contingent grounds like expediency. Strong evaluation 
entails making judgements12 about how to live in accordance with, or in pursuit of, an 
esteemed or virtuous mode of being which will often rule out certain behaviours altogether 
(Taylor, 1985a: 23-26).  
Because strong evaluation involves selection and principled discrimination between 
desires, feelings or motivations, it is also that by which we give shape to our selves and 
construct our identities. This is not just a case of choosing from among a given set of desires, 
but also characterising and interpreting these desires in the light of our understanding of 
ourselves and our relationships with others. This Taylor takes to be a uniquely human faculty, 
which entails situating our motivations within an inherently contrastive linguistic framework 
(1985a: 19, 24, 48; 1989: 35-39). In so doing we effect a differentiation between otherwise 
indistinct experiences. Both humans and animals experience anger, for instance, but it would 
be wildly anthropocentric to attribute indignation to an animal. While both are responses to 
aversive situations, experiencing indignation requires that we possess a sense of justice, which 
allows us to distinguish between right and wrong, as opposed to 
advantageous/disadvantageous or helpful/hurtful, when evaluating the situation in question 
(Taylor, 1985a: 261). To take another of Taylor’s examples, the distinctions that we draw 
between various forms of attraction, by dissociating love from admiration or fascination, are 
the sorts of thing that only linguistic animals could make, and in drawing the distinction we 
                                                
12 The correct term here may not be “judgement”, as Taylor is in fact concerned with what he refers to as our 
uniquely human moral responses, which are given to us not just through cerebration but also in a broad range of 
feeling and emotion that together Taylor calls our “moral and spiritual intuitions” (1989: 4). The term nonetheless 
seems a useful makeshift, both as a shorthand for this broader range of responses and because Taylor believes 
that where all but a very narrow, visceral range of reactions are concerned our responses are inextricably 
connected to some understanding of human nature or “ontology of the human”, however implicit or inarticulate 
this understanding may be (1989: 5).  
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alter our emotional experience (1985a: 70).13 This is the sense of Taylor’s claim that “the 
whole notion of our identity, whereby we recognize that some goals, desires, allegiances are 
central to what we are, while others are not or are less so, can make sense only against a 
background of desires and feelings which are not brute” (1985b: 224). Taylor is not making a 
normative claim about what people should do in order to live a fulfilled life, but rather what all 
competent persons in fact do in all but the most prosaic of lived situations.14 If we lacked the 
sense of self that we derive from strong evaluation we would, Taylor argues, suffer a paralysis 
of the will when engaging in practical reason with our environments. It is in this sense that 
Taylor believes strong evaluation to be a transcendental condition of personhood (1985a; 
1989).15 
 
1.2.2 Strong evaluation and hermeneutic universalism 
One useful way of conceptually situating Taylor’s discussion of strong evaluation is to view it 
as an account of human agency and language use that argues both for what might be called 
“hermeneutic universalism” for a “hermeneutic contextualism” (Hiley, Bohman & Shusterman 
eds., 1991: 7).16 The former is based upon the claim that self-interpretation is a universal, 
perennial feature of human agency, while the latter emphasises that interpretation necessarily 
presupposes a context or background such as a system of belief, a nexus of social relationships, 
or a given tradition (Bohman et al., 1991: 7). These are, however, enormously controversial 
claims. Considering the first of these (I consider the second in the following section and in the 
discussion of value realism in Chapter Three), Taylor maintains that self-interpretation is a 
universal feature of all non-pathological human agency in order to describe what he believes is 
peculiar about humans or persons as objects of study that require conceptual categories not 
found in naturalistic thought. This might, however, be considered a too narrowly 
                                                
13 I discuss this claim further below, but here it might be noted that Taylor uses such examples to demonstrate 
that our motivations are only fully intelligible as reasoned responses to certain situations, and where we arrive at 
a different construal of our situation our desires will alter accordingly. The desire may still retain some of its 
original flavour and vigour but, if judged to be inappropriate to the situation that occasioned it, it will appear 
misplaced, inconsistent, mistaken, irrational, or something of the sort, and in virtue of this assume a different 
place in our affective experience (Taylor, 1985a). 
14 There are passages where Taylor suggests that strong evaluation is a capacity that can be more or less 
developed, and that the mere potential for strong evaluation is a sufficient criterion of personhood (Taylor, 1985a: 
103; 1985b: 196). I do not defend this weaker claim, which is inconsistent with much of what Taylor writes on 
the topic and which, in those of his works that have appeared subsequent to HAL and PHS, Taylor drops.  
15 For a consideration of narrative reasoning, which Taylor believes is another transcendental condition of 
personhood, see my Appendix 1.  
16 Nicholas H. Smith, in his “Taylor and the Hermeneutic Tradition”, discusses the use of the hermeneutic 
tradition in Taylor’s work, which has relatively few points of contact with hermeneutic philosophy associated 
with biblical or legal textual exegesis, poetics, literary hermeneutics or questions of interpretative methodology 
(Smith in Abbey ed., 2004: 29-32, 37-38). Taylor’s distinctive contribution to this hermeneutic tradition, argues 
Smith, comes from his concern to demonstrate how reflection on language and ethics can be incorporated into a 
project of philosophical anthropology. 
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“intellectualist” account of moral agency (Flanagan in Rorty, A. & Flanagan eds., 1990: 47; 
Smith, 2002). Because people may, and for the most part do, hold moral standards without 
reflecting upon them, we might find it difficult to credit the idea that the ability to strongly 
evaluate is implicit in the attribution of personhood (Flanagan in Rorty, A. & Flanagan eds., 
1990; Weinstock in Tully ed., 1995b).17 But this criticism loses its bite when we observe that, 
for Taylor, we needn’t strongly evaluate in explicit formulations to be related to the good and 
possess an identity. Responding to such criticisms, Taylor has explained that, while his use of 
the term “evaluation” may mislead by implying an act of reflection and deliberate choice, we 
can strongly evaluate implicitly or passively (Tully ed., 1995b: 249; Smith, 2002).  
Because strong values can influence us even pre-theoretically and inarticulately, prior 
to the moral deliberation that usually brings them into play, Nicholas H. Smith emphasises that, 
properly speaking, Taylor must be understood to be more concerned with the place of strong 
value in human life than with strong evaluation (Smith, 2002: 91, 94-95). It is more important, 
for Taylor, that we have the ability to recognise strong value than that we actively do so in 
explicit formulations (Smith, 2002; Laitinen, 2003: 29-30). Taylor has readily conceded that 
for this reason strong evaluation, which may suggest active, theoretical judgement, may be a 
misleading term (Tully ed., 1995b: 249). He is primarily concerned with the ineradicable 
“‘sense’ of qualitative distinction” that is the foundation of fully human identity and agency 
(1989: 21).  
Taylor has also been accused of offering an excessively “moralist” account of moral 
deliberation (Flanagan in Rorty, A. & Flanagan eds., 1990: 42). Owen Flanagan argues that 
any plausible philosophical psychology or philosophical anthropology must acknowledge at a 
descriptive level that selves are formed inter-subjectively 18  and that we are “self-
comprehending creatures”19 (Rorty, A. & Flanagan eds., 1990: 44). Flanagan maintains that, 
while Taylor rightly defends these theses, neither entails that all persons consistently function 
as strong evaluators. Rather, it would appear to suffice for persons that they identify 
powerfully with their desires, whatever these may be or, at a second-order level, with even a 
superficial or non-ethical scheme of evaluation, for them to possess a stable sense of self 
                                                
17 In this connection Owen Flanagan claims that Taylor “overstates the degree to which rich and effective identity, 
as well as moral decency, are tied to articulate self-comprehension and evaluation” (1990: 37). Similarly, Daniel 
M. Weinstock maintains that Taylor’s account of strong evaluation “[raises] the entry conditions for personhood 
to an impossibly high level, since it is not at all clear that people generally engage in the fairly sophisticated 
exercise in reflexive self-understanding and self-constitution which strong evaluation involves” (Weinstock in 
Tully ed., 1995: 174).    
18 This is to claim that “identity is invariably created in the context of some social relations or other and is formed 
or constituted from the cloth of prior social forms and the possibilities available therein” (Flanagan in Rorty, A. 
& Flanagan eds., 1990: 43-44). We may modify these forms but we are not in the first instance their creators.  
19 On this view, “[s]ome minimal form of self-awareness is criterial for being a person” (Flanagan in Rorty, A. & 
Flanagan eds., 1990: 44).  
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(Rorty, A. & Flanagan eds., 1990: 49). Whether or not we agree with Flanagan, however, it is 
important to note that he appears to construe Taylor’s account of moral judgement too 
narrowly (Smith, 2002; Laitinen, 2003: 36, n.29). Taylor, as we saw above, applies this term 
in an exceedingly expansive fashion, so that moral concerns come to include not only our 
obligations to respect the welfare of others but also conceptions about the nature of a fulfilled 
life and about the respect that others owe us (1989: 4). It is our inability to evaluate on any of 
these scales – and not just the first, as Flanagan appears to assume – that threatens to 
undermine our sense of identity because it renders us incapable of drawing the distinction 
between mere life and the good life that we require to function in the world as competent 
agents (Smith, 2002; Laitinen, 2003: 36, n.29). 
A more challenging criticism of Taylor’s account of strong evaluation comes from 
Amélie O. Rorty and David Wong, who argue that our identities are not exhausted by our 
ideals (in Rorty, A. & Flanagan eds., 1990). Taylor believes that Herbert Dreyfus is correct to 
maintain that humans are “interpretation all the way down” (Dreyfus, cited in Taylor, 1985a: 
191). Taylor does allow that certain visceral responses, such as experiences of bodily pain, 
affect us prior to any interpretive figuration on our part (1989: 6), but this approach fails to 
consider the extent to which temperamental traits like aggression or friendliness, shyness or 
gregariousness, trust or distrust and the like shape our deliberation in ways that may frustrate 
or constrain our ideals of character (Rorty, A. & Wong in Rorty, A. & Flanagan eds., 1990).20 
Our practical deliberations may go better to the extent that we factor these temperamental 
traits into our sense of self, but Taylor’s “ideal” or “top-down” model of deliberation leaves 
little room for this (Rorty, A. & Wong in Rorty, A. & Flanagan eds., 2002: 31; Smith, 2002). 
While Taylor’s top-down conception of practical reasoning may hold up as a normative model, 
it seems descriptively misleading to the extent that persons do not in fact demonstrate any 
overwhelming need to prioritise their ideal over their temperamental identifications in order to 
possess a stable sense of identity (Rorty, A. & Wong in Rorty, A. & Flanagan eds., 2002). 
                                                
20 Rorty and Wong also criticize Taylor for failing to consider the influence of somatic dispositions on identity. 
Despite recent attempts to conceptualise the influence of physical embodiment on identity, this aspect of Taylor’s 
thought has yet to be rigorously formulated by him (Taylor, 1995a). Where Taylor does discuss embodiment in 
detail (in “Overcoming Epistemology” and “To Follow a Rule”, both collected in PA), he does relatively little to 
connect it with the questions of identity that are so central to his earlier work. As Jussi Kotkavirta observes, the 
importance of embodiment in constituting identity may be strongly implied in the importance that Taylor places 
on the emotional life in constituting the experience of persons, but Taylor does not draw out these connections 
and doing so would lead beyond the scope of this assignment (Kotkavirta in Laitinen & Smith eds., 2002: 69). 
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1.3 Personhood and language  
We should now be in a better position to see how Taylor can claim that strong evaluation is an 
essential feature of persons. If our deliberations were not informed by strong evaluations we 
would, Taylor claims, be unable to exercise our agency in a recognisably non-pathological 
form; in determining how to act we would appeal to an array of desires that could only be 
distinguished by contingent criteria like degrees of expediency, which Taylor believes would 
not suffice to create a stable sense of self by consistently ruling some choices in and others out. 
This may well, as Rorty and Wong contend, be more compelling as a normative rather than a 
descriptive claim. But even if we are willing to grant Taylor’s hermeneutic claim that all 
people are constitutively self-interpreting animals, Taylor also owes it to us to establish how 
this is possible. This can best be explained, I believe, by considering some important features 
of Taylor’s philosophy of language. Taylor points out that in articulating our self-
understandings we speak in “languages of qualitative contrast” that register, even if only 
implicitly, the qualitative distinctions expressed in strong values (1985a: 24). He believes that 
this is not just a matter of inclination or cultural habituation but of universal human necessity.  
Attending to this point draws our attention to another important feature of Taylor’s 
account of strong evaluation which informs his hermeneutic contextualism. Taylor argues that 
our individual self-understandings are necessarily related to a subject-transcending 
background of moral self-interpretation that is, in a meaningful sense, the possession of 
cultural communities. Understanding the contextual dimension of Taylor’s hermeneutics helps 
to clarify the interplay between the first two identity-defining relationships that we isolated at 
the outset of this chapter, where we considered how, for Taylor, human identity formation is 
constitutively reliant upon both monological self-interpretation and culturally mediated 
exchange between persons. 
I believe that we can best understand Taylor’s position by discussing in broad outline 
his account of what he calls the “Herder-Humboldt” tradition of linguistic thought (1985a: 10). 
These are the “Romantic”, “expressive” or “expressive-constitutive” theories of language first 
propounded by Herder, Humboldt and Hamann, which are extended in important ways more 
recently by Heidegger and in Wittgenstein’s later writings (1985a; 1995a). Taylor believes 
that these thinkers draw attention to aspects of language use that are misunderstood or 
overlooked in “empiricist” or “designative” theories of meaning originating in the work of 
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Hobbes, Locke and Condillac and extending to the recent philosophy of language of W. V. 
Quine, Donald Davidson, John McDowell, Mark Platts and their followers.21 
 
1.3.1 Language as an expressive medium  
For Taylor, human language use is “expressive” in three senses. Firstly, language is not only a 
medium for communicating states of affairs in the world taken to exist independently of us but 
that through which we experience our selves and our environments in a recognisably human 
form at all (1985a: 227-29). Taylor wishes to argue that language is not, as it were, a screen 
between the individual and her environment, or a tool used by individuals for planning ends 
that could be pre-linguistically conceived, but a constitutive feature of our most basic mode of 
engagement with the world.  
Secondly, while this means that language is expressive of a peculiar quality of 
subjectivity or consciousness, it does not follow that we should espouse a “subjectivistic” 
theory of knowledge and meaning, where this is taken as the thesis that what language 
expresses is exclusively the self of the individual articulator (Taylor, 1985a; 1995a). Given 
that it is only through speech acts that the capacity for reflective awareness latent in the 
possession of language is actualised, thought and speech are internally related. Moreover, if 
the better part of speech acts are conducted in dialogue with others, then it is possible to see 
the subject of language as, in a certain sense, the speech community (1985a: 234). “Language 
is shaped by speech”, writes Taylor, “and so can only grow up in a speech community. The 
language I speak, the web which I can never fully dominate and oversee, can never be just my 
language, it is always largely our language” (1985a: 234; emphasis in original). Taylor’s point 
here does not only apply to our induction into language but also to our continued reliance upon 
it throughout our lives; through shared languages “we are aware of a world through a ‘we’ 
                                                
21 Taylor’s criteria for isolating these two traditions concern their respective accounts of the functions of language 
and the significance that they assign to language in the constitution of personhood. It is worth noting, however, 
that his treatment of these themes is entirely schematic. He doesn’t claim that all of the views he outlines are 
found in any single thinker in each tradition, but that, read together, these writers provide insights that converge 
on two quite different construals of human agency and lend force to similarly divergent social ontologies. 
Endorsing the Herder-Humboldt tradition is, for Taylor, to portray language as fundamentally an expressive 
medium that is also constitutive of our personhood and our human associations in many important regards. 
Taylor views language holistically, as an interconnected lexical web with the individual parts conveying meaning 
in virtue of their connection to the whole and the whole registering the modifications to its parts as innovation 
becomes standardised (1985a: 230-31). In its uniquely human uses, language functions as a medium of 
consciousness, thought or reflection of a sort that is unavailable to animals. In this it is not merely an instrument 
for formulating and communicating thoughts or planning strategically; language is above all a vehicle of meaning, 
through which we receive, express and create a world of thought, feeling and emotion structured by uniquely 
human significances. Taylor discusses his understanding of language at greatest length in “Language and Human 
Nature” and “Theories of Meaning”, both appearing in HAL, but the distinction he draws between the expressive 
and designative traditions and his endorsement of the former is something of a constant in his moral philosophy 
and is encountered throughout PHS, SS and PA.  
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before we are through an ‘I’”, and we can never wholly abscond from this ontologically basic 
or “primitive” orientation to the world (Taylor, 1985b: 40; 1989: 38). This reliance needn’t 
express itself in conversations with concretely present others, but in the continuing imagined 
dialogues that we maintain with the opinions of others in thought throughout our lives, 
through which we construct and modify our own value orientations (Taylor, 1989: 38).22 This 
is the sense of Taylor’s oft-quoted claim that “[a] self exists only within what I call ‘webs of 
interlocution’” (1989: 36).23  
  Taken together, these two claims are meant to establish that, underlying the uniqueness 
of our individual speech acts there is necessarily a more basic commonality, where this is 
discernible both between people taken as individuals and between people insofar as they are 
members of particular cultures. In addition, Taylor effects a third departure from the 
designative tradition by widening the range of media that we understand to constitute language. 
Because language expresses not only thought but feeling and emotion too, limiting our 
understanding of language to prose proves too constraining and Taylor believes that we do 
well to conceptualise prose speech, in its expressive aspect, as functioning on a continuum 
with poetry, music, dance, art and other symbolic media (1985a: 216, 232-33).24   
 
1.3.2 Language as a constitutive medium 
In discussing the expressive functions of language Taylor is concerned with what (properly 
speaking) language is and who its subject is. But Taylor is also, and more fundamentally, 
interested in establishing the role language plays in the constitution of personhood and in 
                                                
22 “[T]hrough language”, writes Taylor, “we remain related to partners of discourse, either in real, live exchanges, 
or in indirect confrontations. The nature of language and the fundamental dependence of our thought on language 
makes interlocution in one or other of these forms inescapable for us” (1989: 38).  
23 Taylor’s intention is to emphasise the co-dependence of individual language use and the linguistic resources of 
communities. He does not want to advocate the (broadly speaking) structuralist position that the agent of 
language is the linguistic structure itself: “To give an absolute priority to the structure [of collective action and 
language practices] makes exactly as little sense as the equal and opposite error of subjectivism” (Taylor, 1985b: 
173-74; emphasis in original). While this second claim might been seen as narrowing the scope of individual 
freedom of belief and choice, Taylor only intends to argue that there is a dynamic push-and-pull between 
individual linguistic innovation and a limiting set of conditions of linguistic intelligibility. These conditions are 
normative for individual expressive activity insofar as localised speech acts, however novel, must draw on the 
whole pre-existing structure of language if they are to be at all meaningful. Thus Taylor describes language as a 
“pattern of activity, by which we express/realize a certain way of being in the world…but a pattern which can 
only be employed against a background which we can never fully dominate; and yet a background that we are 
never fully dominated by, because we are constantly reshaping it” (1985a: 232). Nonetheless, it is possible that 
Taylor does in practice over-emphasise the extent to which individual subjectivity is constrained by the structure 
of language and that this leads him to stress our need to belong to particular cultural communities. I address these 
criticisms in Chapters Three and Five.  
24 Taylor sometimes also holds that this analysis can be extended further, into gesture and bodily comportment, 
which express the embodied understanding of a pre-theoretical awareness analogous to what Pierre Bourdieu has 
referred to as the “habitus” (1991c: 308-09; 1995a: 110, 178). But because this is a relatively recent and under-
theorised contribution to Taylor’s philosophical anthropology, and because it has few points of connection with 
his political thought, I have chosen to omit it.  
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maintaining inter-personal relationships. Taylor employs the term “constitutive” in 
contradistinction to “causal”, “instrumental” or “contingent”, to refer to relationships 
obtaining between things that are internally, indissociably related to one another, not only in 
practice but due to conceptual necessity. The Herder-Humboldt tradition explicates three basic 
ways in which the capacities we associate most closely with persons necessarily draw on a 
background of linguistic competency, and discussions of human agency that omit or occlude 
this background lack an essential condition of their own intelligibility. I discuss the first two of 
these below and the third in the following chapter.  
The first sense in which, for Taylor, language is constitutive of personhood is that 
language is that which enables us to effect a differentiation between both our internal states 
and the people and objects in our environments (1985a: 256-58, 269-70). Language is 
therefore what allows persons to assume a reflective and discriminatory attitude toward the 
world about them and towards their own motivations for action, which we have said is integral 
to strong evaluation. The relationship between language and thought that Taylor envisages is 
the dynamic relationship underscored by the expressivist view of language as speech activity, 
in that formulation in language is partially responsible for what is revealed or experienced 
through thought. This helps to explain why, for Taylor, self-awareness is also self-
interpretation. Through articulation in speech we come to some understanding of ourselves 
and our worlds, but in so doing we also alter the way that these things appear related to one 
another or to us. This alteration in turn calls for another articulation, and so on, in a 
hermeneutic circle of interpretation that Taylor believes has no conceivable point of 
termination in an absolute account of things (1985a: 45; 1985b: 15).  
Language, then, enables (indeed compels) us to make crucial distinctions between 
otherwise indistinct facets of experience, reconstituting the experience in the process. But 
Taylor also wishes to emphasise that the change here is not purely analytical; language also 
shapes our affective experience and thereby alters the feelings, desires and emotions that 
together constitute our motivations, opening us to concerns of a sort that could not arise for 
animals (1985a: 47). This we touched on above; humans are not alone in experiencing anger 
but we cannot intelligibly say that animals experience indignation, or that one animal is 
affectively tied to another out of fascination or admiration as opposed to love. To do so would 
be to slide into anthropocentrism by attributing a motivational state to an animal that only a 
human could, as a language-using animal, possess.25 These linguistic distinctions and others 
                                                
25 I do not wish, and am unable, to defend Taylor’s position here. These are clearly complex, and possibly 
controversial, claims, a consideration of which would lead far beyond the confines of the present study. We might, 
however, note that it would be no less anthropocentric of Taylor to presume that animals do not experience a rich 
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like them, which inform our strong evaluations, provide reasons for action by shaping our 
motivations. For this reason Taylor believes that our human behaviour is only intelligible if it 
is assumed to be that of strong evaluators. This transformative power of language is a second 
constitutive function of language that Taylor considers, and it is this that he is pointing to 
when he writes that “self-understanding is constitutive of feeling” (1985a: 270).26  
 
1.3.3 Strong evaluation, language use and cultural belonging  
We must now return to the question, posed above, of how people strongly evaluate. In the 
discussion of human language use above, we saw that strong evaluation typically comes to 
expression in “languages of qualitative contrast”. Taylor also refers to this as a “language of 
evaluative distinctions” or a “language of contrastive characterisation”, which reflects his 
interest in providing a phenomenological account of how moral evaluation enters into our 
commonplace thinking and quotidian speech acts (1985a: 19, 24, 48). Taylor employs these 
terms of art to underscore the manner in which strong evaluations draw on a range of other 
terms in language to give them their meaning, and arise out of the attempt to establish 
commensurability of value between experiences that are differentiated and drawn into 
                                                                                                                                                    
emotional world of their own, but he does not mean to imply this; nor does Taylor make the obvious error of 
claiming that all non-human animals do not possess language. Rather, he simply wishes to argue that the ends 
humans seek are, for the most part, of a sort that animals lacking our human languages couldn’t intentionally 
pursue. As Nicholas H. Smith explains, Taylor believes we can account for animal behaviour as purposive action 
directed toward physical survival, reproduction, primitive socialisation or some other ultimately biologically 
defined goal in terms that need make no appeal to their languages because these are ends that can be achieved 
without language. A description of their language use might enrich our explanation of their behaviour where in 
practice it is used to achieve these goals, but such an account would be quite intelligible without this description 
as for the purposes of explanation there is no conceptually necessary or constitutive relationship between their 
behaviour and their language (Smith, 2002: 76-77).    
26 In discussing this second constitutive function of language, Taylor wishes to establish that most of our 
motivational states (our feelings, desires, emotions etc.) are “import-attributing” and “subject-referring” (1985a: 
48, 54). To assign an import to something is to make a judgement that confers meaning on it by bringing it into a 
linguistically defined relationship with our motivational states. “By ‘import’”, explains Taylor, “I mean a way in 
which something can be relevant or of importance to the desires or purposes or aspirations or feelings of a subject; 
or otherwise put, a property of something whereby it is a matter of non-indifference to a subject” (1985a: 48). 
Taylor’s  discussion of the human emotions and feelings has in mind a broad and loosely defined set of 
characteristically human affects: shame, humiliation, outrage, dismay, exhilaration, wonderment, dignity, pride, 
admiration, contempt, moral obligation, remorse, unworthiness, self-hatred, self-acceptance, etc. (1985a: 48, 58). 
He distinguishes these from purely physiological sensations like pain, heat or nausea, as well as apparently 
instinctual feelings like the fear of physical harm (Taylor, 1985a: 50-52, 260; 1989: 5). While the latter range of 
experiences affects us quite immediately and pre-linguistically – as brute realities that play the role they do in our 
experience prior to our assigning any meaning to them – the former presupposes some construal of the 
relationship between self and world. Shame, for instance, would have no meaning if there weren’t a subject that 
aspired to dignity, honour, or some such value (however she might understand the practical demands required for 
realising these values) placed in a situation that thwarted these aspirations (Taylor, 1985a: 52-56). The point of 
drawing these distinctions is to demonstrate that there are conditions of intelligibility that govern not only claims 
about the world but also motivational states and to establish that these conditions are partly constituted both by 
the structure of what can be coherently figured in language and by certain properties of the situation in which the 
motivations are experienced. We will not experience indignation unless our sense of justice is outraged, nor will 
we feel shamed unless our dignity is compromised. In these and other situations our motivational states reflect a 
certain interpretation of events and would alter were that interpretation to change.  
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comparison in language. This differentiating function of language creates a need for us to 
order and discriminate; Taylor implies that linguistic activity that aims at ever-more authentic 
modes of expression is in a sense the solution to a dilemma that our induction into language 
has itself already posed.  
At its most rudimentary level, the sense of strong value is just that our experience, no 
matter how inchoate or confusing, and precisely because it is experienced as confusing at all, 
is amenable to ordering in language; that in articulating our experience we will be in a better 
position to fix upon those features of our engaged situation in the world that are in some sense 
more important or valuable than others and respond accordingly. Taylor explains: 
 
as language animals…we have already incorporated into our language an interpretation of what is really 
important. And it is this articulation…which makes our inarticulate feelings into questions. Without 
language we could not have a sense of [the] distinction between what is really important and what we 
just from time to time desire (1985a: 74). 
 
Taylor believes that the apparent presence of virtue terms in all human languages is not 
fortuitous but rather evidence of an inescapably moral mode of engagement with the world. 
Whatever their cultural affiliations, people invariably apply “desirability characterizations” (in 
the coinage that Taylor borrows from Elizabeth Anscombe) to their behaviour and that of 
others (1985a: 119). When employing this register  
 
our desires are classified in such categories as higher and lower, virtuous and vicious, more and less 
fulfilling, more and less refined, profound and superficial, noble and base. They are judged as belonging 
to qualitatively different modes of life: fragmented or integrated, alienated or free, saintly, or merely 
human, courageous or pusillanimous and so on (Taylor, 1985a: 16). 
 
The upshot of the above-mentioned arguments, which is given its fullest explication in 
SS, is that our necessary reliance upon strongly valued goods for the formation of identity 
means that we are, simply as persons, reliant upon inherited “frameworks” of qualitative 
contrast that register the strong values informing our moral judgement. It is on this basis that 
Taylor’s contextualist claims are built. Frameworks, as Taylor conceives them, are more or 
less abiding and internally coherent (though also ever-evolving and plastic) constellations of 
moral judgement common to cultural communities.27 As Taylor explains,  
                                                
27 In SS Taylor discusses in detail a number of frameworks that have been especially influential in the West. 
Influential pre-modern frameworks include the Homeric honour ethic, Platonic or Stoic rational self-mastery and 
the Christian transformation of the will through grace, while underlying the plethora of ethical outlooks that 
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a framework incorporates a crucial set of qualitative distinctions. To think, feel, judge within such a 
framework is to function with the sense that some action, or mode of life, or mode of feeling is 
incomparably higher than the others which are more readily available to us….One form of life may be 
seen as fuller, another way of feeling and acting as purer, a mode of feeling or living as deeper, a style of 
life as more admirable, a given demand as making an absolute claim as against other merely relative 
ones, and so on (1989: 19-20).  
 
The judgements that make up our individual moral responses, however singular they may be, 
draw on such frameworks as a precondition of their being intelligible at all. This is not 
contingently true but rather conceptually necessary; because humans cannot but be concerned 
with strong value, these frameworks offer “contestable answers to inescapable questions” 
(Taylor, 1989: 41). An agent lacking any orientation toward the strong values that these 
frameworks of meaning make accessible 
 
wouldn’t know where he stood on issues of fundamental importance, would have no orientation in these 
issues whatever, wouldn’t be able to answer for himself on them....In practice we should see such a 
person as deeply disturbed....[A] person without a framework altogether would be outside our space of 
interlocution; he wouldn’t have a stand in the space where the rest of us are. We would see this as 
pathological (Taylor, 1989: 31). 
 
For this reason Taylor holds that our identities are always dependent on complex repositories 
of historically accumulated meaning existing in the language and thought of a cultural 
community (1989: 26). 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
In the discussion of moral discrimination and language use above I have tried to outline 
Taylor’s understanding of the necessarily dialogical context of individual identity formation, 
which he commonly refers to as the “background” of human behaviour. This background 
consists of those features of human life that we must appeal to, either explicitly or implicitly, 
as conceptually necessary postulates when attempting to account for other components of 
human experience that presuppose such a set of background conditions. For this reason Taylor 
refers to the background as a “context conferring intelligibility” (1995a: 68). 
 We have seen that this background includes a set of moral frameworks that all persons 
possessed of a minimally coherent identity will grasp, as well as a language of strongly 
                                                                                                                                                    
modernity has produced, we find inter alia the familiar ideals of artistic expressivism, individual freedom, and 
the valorisation of work and family life (1989). 
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evaluative terms that carries these concepts. These claims are best understood, we have also 
said, in the context of Taylor’s dissatisfaction with naturalism. In the following chapter we 
will further see that Taylor’s attempt to outline a philosophical alternative to the naturalistic 
“simple weigher” view of the agent is tied up with his criticism of “atomism”, which is the 
methodological approach to social science inquiry that Taylor believes has grown out of 
naturalism. More importantly, strong evaluation finds its way into our common social and 
political action, imbuing shared practices with an “expressive” dimension in virtue of which 
they function as carriers of a certain shared identity. By getting clearer about this third 
constitutive function of language we will be better placed to appreciate the force of Taylor’s 
critique of atomism in the social sciences and his endorsement of a holistic method of inquiry 
into human behaviour. 
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Chapter Two 
 
 
2. The dialogical in human life: Taylor’s holism  
I have attempted above to portray Taylor’s discussions of identity or personhood as 
contributions to an argument for the necessarily dialogical nature of all human life and that, in 
substantiating this claim, Taylor underscores the necessity of accessing the moral frameworks 
and languages of a shared culture for sustaining a minimally ordered, non-pathological sense 
of self. But, in addition to this cultural aspect of the shared “background” of human life, there 
is also a social and political dimension of commonality between persons. Taylor argues that, 
while participation in a common culture is a necessary condition of personhood, we can only 
aspire to the full realisation of our human potential insofar as we also participate in common 
social and political practices that allow us to attain vital human goods that couldn’t be 
otherwise secured. Failure to participate in these institutions does not eventuate in an identity-
crisis, but it does stifle our self-development. I argue, in Section Two, that Taylor understands 
social and political participation to be an essential condition of human freedom; here I discuss 
Taylor’s belief that if we adopt a naturalistic understanding of human agency then we will 
misrepresent, and fail to appreciate, the value of participation in collective initiatives.  
Granted the indispensability of strong evaluation to healthy personhood that we 
considered in Chapter One, and given also the importance of expressive languages for our 
self-understanding as discussed there, Taylor believes we must appreciate that an individual’s 
self-understanding or identity, however original it may be, draws heavily on the resources 
provided by some or other community, and is consequently likely to overlap quite strongly 
with the self-understandings of others embedded within the same “webs of interlocution”, 
which Taylor also calls “webs of birth and history” (Taylor, 1989: 36). Taylor’s paradigm of 
such communities would appear to be cultural communities associated through shared 
linguistic practices, where these practices are understood as the speech activities of a pre-
politically defined nation, but, as we shall see below and in Section Two, he often extends this 
analysis to other forms of community that cohere around common social and political 
institutions and a history of common association. While Taylor often refers to “cultural” 
communities in both these narrower and broader senses, I will, unless otherwise indicated, 
refer to cultures only in the narrower sense and distinguish these from “social” or “political” 
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associations.28 Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise that both of these are forms of 
dialogical association aiming at the definition and realisation of common goods, with political 
participation constituting the third element of individual identity formation that we discussed 
in Chapter One.  
 One of the central issues in dispute in recent debates in political theory is the nature of 
communal belonging. As Chandran Kukathas explains, all agree that a community is an 
association of individuals, but  
 
the centrally important point of contention is the relationship between the individual and the community 
and, more specifically, the question of whether the individual is shaped or constituted by the community, 
or whether the community is something to which individuals merely belong or are attached. The issue 
here is one of identity (in Paul, E. et al., 1996: 82).   
 
Taylor argues that, because of the dialogical dimension of identity formation, individual 
persons are embedded in communities prior to choice, from which they cannot too easily 
detach. This is the sense in which we must understand Taylor’s assertion that  
 
[t]he community is not simply an aggregation of individuals; nor is there simply a causal interaction 
between the two. The community is also constitutive of the individual, in the sense that the self-
interpretations which define him are drawn from the interchange which the community carries on (1985a: 
8). 
 
This is an ontological thesis about personhood, and it provides the essential support for what 
Taylor calls elsewhere the “social perspective” (1995a: 135). The social perspective raises an 
important challenge to understandings of human subjectivity that remain within the limits of 
individual psychology, which is committed to describing the manner in which people interpret 
their environments and form moral judgements as the actions of isolated agents that may share 
values and co-ordinate activities with others but can never in any meaningful sense also 
function together as a collective agent (Taylor, 1985b: 40, 51).  
In Section Two I consider the manner in which, according to Taylor, liberal political 
theorists and political actors in contemporary society more generally tend to disregard the 
                                                
28 Will Kymlicka’s reproach against communitarians for too easily eliding social and political modes of 
association seems fair as a criticism of Taylor’s work in general (1989a). In “Atomism” (1985b) Taylor 
speculates that social structures must be more or less politically regulated to survive over time, but it is only in 
later essays like “Invoking Civil Society” and “Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere” (1995a) that he does much 
to discuss the conceptual relationship between political and extra-political forms of association. In order to avoid 
confusion I will nonetheless follow Taylor and use the terms “social” and “political” in a broadly similar sense, 
though I will generally opt for the latter, where this is understood to be a sub-category of the social. I deviate 
from Taylor’s use of these terms by strictly separating these off from discussions of “culture”.  
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social perspective. My aim below is somewhat different, and I focus in what follows on 
explicating Taylor’s belief that the social perspective offers a methodological approach to 
social inquiry that is a necessary extension of the dialogical account of identity formation 
considered in Chapter One. There we said that Taylor’s dissatisfaction with naturalist thought 
centres on its failure to differentiate between human and animal subjectivity and agency. Here 
I argue that Taylor is also dissatisfied with naturalist thought because of a methodological 
“ideal of disengagement” that has evolved in tandem with this tradition (Taylor, 1985a: 5). 
Taylor argues that as a normative standard for scientific enquiry into the inanimate natural 
world this ideal has plenty to recommend it, but it holds up poorly under philosophical 
scrutiny when taken as a thesis describing the way in which people exist in the world and 
applied to the social sciences. “Atomism” is the catch-all term Taylor employs to describe the 
worldview that emerges from reifying the normative ideal of disengagement into an 
ontological thesis about human subjectivity and personhood. Taylor argues that atomist 
explanation prioritises individual choice and action while bypassing an account of how 
common understandings are formed when explaining political action, and that in doing so it 
forsakes methodological coherence. For this reason, Taylor believes, we have to opt for holism 
over atomism at the ontological level of explanation.   
 
2.1 The social perspective  
Taylor understands atomism to be definitive of a diffuse range of elements within the self-
understanding of modern Westerns. Perhaps for this reason, his use of the term tends to be 
inconsistent. Below I isolate three conceptually distinct, if in practice usually overlapping, 
components of atomistic thought as Taylor understands it. Atomism, I argue, entails a 
commitment to methodological individualism, moral subjectivism and an instrumental account 
of common goods. At the same time, I set out Taylor’s attempt to provide a non-atomistic or 
holistic account of political association that avoids the theoretical pitfalls of atomism. 
Throughout I hope to demonstrate that an appreciation of the (as yet undiscussed) third 
constitutive function of human language – its ability to co-ordinate collective action by 
forming common understandings – helps to explicate Taylor’s endorsement of a holistic social 
ontology.  
 
2.1.1 Public space and language: against methodological individualism 
The common ground of atomistic beliefs, as Taylor variously portrays them, is the notion that 
the individual can, in principle, be described independently of her communal embedding 
(Taylor, 1985a: 8). For those who adopt this ontological outlook there is nothing in the very 
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idea of what it means to be human that necessitates reference to any sort of encompassing 
social environment. People may, of course, be influenced by their social environments in any 
number of important ways, and may themselves effect changes upon this environment, but 
conceptualising their actions is always a matter of describing interchanges between practically 
and conceptually distinct entities (Taylor, 1985a: 8; 1995a). Otherwise put, people exist in 
dynamic interchange with their social environments, but this relationship is causal; it has a 
bearing purely on the choices that lie open to the individuals concerned. Thus whatever the 
manner in which people are embedded in community, this will always be a matter of 
contingent concern for understanding their personhood, and a certain form of communal 
exchange can never be understood as establishing a limiting set of preconditions for healthy 
identity. For atomists, understanding the individual is a question for individual psychology, 
while understanding society is in the last analysis just a matter of understanding the 
aggregated preferences and co-ordinated actions of its composite individuals. This is precisely 
the premise of social science explanation that has come to be known as “methodological 
individualism”, which Taylor also calls “philosophical atomism” in order to highlight the debt 
that it owes to atomistic modes of thought (Taylor, 1995a: 129-30).  
Taylor believes that philosophical atomism or methodological individualism runs 
against the social perspective and in doing so misconstrues the nature of collective action. 
From the atomistic perspective all knowledge states and actions are those of a single agent, or 
groups of agents co-ordinating their activities but understanding themselves as “I”s from the 
first-person singular perspective (1995a: 171-73). Taylor believes this is excessively reductive; 
atomism has no place for a common agent who also necessarily understands and acts from a 
“we” perspective, and whose very sense of self would disintegrate if completely dislodged 
from this communal background.  
One way of escaping the analytical reductionism that inheres in the atomistic outlook 
is by considering what Taylor calls the semantic dimension or the “dimension of meaning” 
that all action presumes (Taylor, 1995a: 135). When considering collective action, attention to 
the semantic dimension allows us to appreciate that the network of institutions and practices – 
common “roles, offices, statuses, rules, laws, customs” – within which collective social and 
political action is exercised is necessarily sustained by certain shared meanings or self-
descriptions, without which the practices and institutions in question could not function 
(Taylor, 1985b: 93; 1995a: 130). As Taylor explains:  
 
There is always a pre-theoretical understanding of what is going on among the members of a society, 
which is formulated in the descriptions of self and other which are involved in the institutions and 
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practices of that society. A society is among other things a set of institutions and practices, and these 
cannot exist and be carried on without certain self-understandings (1985b: 93).   
 
These understandings needn’t be expressly formulated, but are no less essential to the 
sustenance of the practice for this reason: 
 
[T]he practices which make up a society require certain self-descriptions on the part of the participants. 
These self-descriptions can be called constitutive. And the understanding formulated in these can be 
called pre-theoretical, not in the sense that it is necessarily uninfluenced by theory, but in that it does not 
rely on theory. There may be no systematic formulation of the norms, and the conception of man and 
society which underlies them. The understanding is implicit in our ability to apply the appropriate 
descriptions to particular situations and actions (1985b: 93). 
 
Voting practices, for instance, rely on a norm of individual independence that stipulates that 
votes must be cast in uncoerced conditions if they are to be legitimate (Taylor, 1985b: 93). 
Voters must be able to comprehend this norm and apply it to their own behaviour:  
 
As they vote, they will generally be capable of describing what is going on in terms like these: ‘this is a 
valid vote’, or ‘there is something dubious about that’, or ‘that’s foul play’….If no one involved had any 
sense of how their behaviour checked out in this dimension, they would not be engaged in voting 
(Taylor, 1985b: 93; emphasis in original).   
 
Taylor’s objection to methodological individualism proceeds on the assumption that 
collective action requires not just that we do something together but also that we are 
theoretically or pre-theoretically aware of our doing it in this fashion, where this awareness 
needn’t go beyond knowing which self-descriptions are appropriate to the actions we perform 
(and, conversely, which actions take us beyond the range of the self-descriptions we adhere to) 
(Taylor, 1985b; 1995a). Society therefore cannot subsist without some degree of common 
understandings, and any account of collective action that considers common understanding to 
be dispensable to such action lacks an essential condition of its own intelligibility (Taylor, 
1985b; 1995a). To establish this point, Taylor argues that collective political action is 
analogous to, or a species of, linguistic action insofar as both individual speech acts and other 
social and political actions performed in accordance with, or defiance of, a society’s inherited 
institutions and practices are governed by interpretive norms in virtue of which they are 
intelligible (Taylor, 1995a: 132, 135). Individual particiption in political life requires a 
mastery of these meanings, which are sustained within a speech community and are embodied 
in its language (Taylor, 1995a: 134).  
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To better understand these claims, which are not a little contentious, we can reconsider 
what was said above about the constitutive functions of language. We discussed, in Chapter 
One, two senses in which Taylor understands language to be constitutive of human life: 
language use defines a peculiarly human mode of engagement with the world and enables us 
to experience the differentiated conceptual and emotional life that we associate with 
personhood, while also altering our experience of self and world in both thought and emotion 
through articulation and expression. But Taylor also discusses a third constitutive function of 
language which we have not yet encountered: the ability to establish common spaces of 
awareness and dialogue or “public space” (1985a: 259). “That something emerges into...public 
space”, writes Taylor, “means that it is no longer just a matter for me, or for you, or for both 
us of severally, but is now something for us, that is for us together” (1985a: 259). 
 Taylor’s conception of public space, which he refers to interchangeably as “common 
space”,29 differs from what is often referred to as the “public domain” in sociology and 
political science in two ways (1985a: 260; 1995a: 262). Firstly, Taylor conceptualises the 
institutional space created through association and debate in social and political life as 
continuous with the more intimate spaces of dialogical interaction that are established between 
smaller groups or individuals in intimate relationships of love and friendship, as in every case 
we co-ordinate our action through invoking and creating shared meanings in a shared language. 
“We can speak of ‘common space’”, writes Taylor, “when people come together in one act of 
focus for whatever purpose, be it ritual, the enjoyment of a play, conversation, the celebration 
of a major event” (1995a: 262).  
Secondly, Taylor wants to stress the importance of what he refers to as “common”, as 
opposed to “convergent”, understandings in normatively regulating action in social institutions 
and practices (Taylor, 1995a: 139). Most discussions of collective action understand the 
shared or inter-subjective meaning required to co-ordinate it as a form of convergent 
understanding, where something is understood in a similar way by many isolated parties but 
where there is no necessary common acknowledgement of this. Taylor believes that this 
portrayal of collective action overlooks another qualitatively different mode of common 
association, and that this oversight derives from adherence to the disengaged epistemology, 
which holds all knowledge states to be, in the last analysis, those of individuals (1985b; 
1995a). He therefore prefers to speak of “common understanding” to conceptually 
differentiate from this scenario the state of affairs that arises when people act collectively on 
                                                
29 In what follows I stick to the second usage. Not only is this in keeping with Taylor’s more general reliance on 
the term, but I believe it also helps highlight the continuities in his arguments for the inter-dependence of 
common space and common understandings.  
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the basis of shared understandings that not only overlap in content but are the result of a 
common outlook dynamically developed in common space through the acknowledgement of 
all parties. “We can speak of ‘common space’”, writes Taylor,  
 
when people come together in one act of focus for whatever purpose….Their focus is common, as 
against merely convergent, because it is part of what is commonly understood that they are attending to 
the common object, or purpose, together, as against each person just happening, on his or her own, to be 
concerned with the same thing (1995a: 262). 
 
Taylor’s point is that establishing public or common space needn’t necessarily be 
premised on transmitting new information. One of the essential insights of the Herder-
Humboldt tradition is that “the content of my assertion may be secondary to the enterprise” 
(Taylor, 1985a: 264). We establish common space in speech and dialogue in interpersonal 
settings of friendship and love, public gatherings and in the printed and electronic 
communicative media of society at large, where this may simply entail collectively 
acknowledging something that all people concerned already know, thereby making it an object 
of common awareness (Taylor, 1995a: 190).30 
While convergent understanding builds on contingently shared knowledge, and may 
therefore quite correctly be attributed to isolated individuals, common understanding is 
irreducibly the possession of groups: 
 
Common understandings are undecomposable. This is because…it is essential to their being what they 
are that they be not just for me and for you, but for us. That we have a common understanding 
presupposes that we have formed a unit, a “we” who understand together, which is by definition 
analytically undecomposable (Taylor, 1995a: 139). 
 
Taylor believes that it is meaningful to speak of common understanding, which is also that by 
which we come to a “common mind”, without postulating the existence of any metaphysically 
dubious entities like a “mysterious collective consciousness” or some “strange, mystical entity, 
a ghostly spirit of the collectivity” encountered in the “Hegelian mists” (Taylor, 1995a: 130, 
135, 263). To speak of a supra-individual subject as, for instance, Hegel does in his portrayal 
                                                
30 Taylor stresses that the shift from private or individual space to common space is not to be understood as 
effecting the concatenation of monological knowledge states, where by acknowledging some matter partner A 
knows that B knows, and (possibly) B that A knows that he now knows, etc. This view of collective action 
unjustifiably collapses what is really a dialogical situation into what comes to be viewed, despite its complexity, 
as at bottom a monological one (Taylor, 1985b; 1995a). Rather, a qualitatively different mode of awareness and 
understanding is opened up in dialogue, which is of great significance in any account of human association: 
“[t]he move from the for-me-and-you to the for-us, the move into public space, is one of the most important 
things we can bring about in language, and any theory of language has to take account of it” (Taylor, 1995a: 190).  
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of the human community as the vehicle for the realisation of divine spirit, is to invoke a 
metaphysics that, to contemporary, disenchanted Westerns cannot really be taken seriously 
(Taylor, 1988a; 1995b; Descombes in Tully ed., 1995). If forced to choose between 
methodological individualism and the view that social action is best explained as the activity 
of a collective super-subject Taylor would doubtless opt for the former, which he believes is, 
up to a point, perfectly coherent. But Taylor believes there is a third option – a sort of 
sociological31 reconstruction of Hegel’s account of objective spirit in terms made available by 
an expressive-constitutive account of language (Taylor, 1988a; 1995b: 237; Descombes in 
Tully ed., 1995). 
Drawing out the conceptual limitations of methodological individualism, for Taylor, 
involves showing how collective action is rule-governed to the extent that it is reliant upon 
common understandings forged through the shared practices of a community. Inter-subjective 
relationships of love and friendship, and exchanges within the institutions and practices of 
social and political life, are regulated by shared meanings. These meanings, formulated in a 
common language, give expression to norms governing the actions of individuals living and 
operating within these dialogical spaces. To grasp these meanings is to master a common 
mode of evaluation, which the competent individual choices and actions of the individual 
agents involved in any collective act must appeal to. Thus it is not only true, as we have seen 
above, that common understandings are indispensable to the functioning of social practices 
and institutions; Taylor argues that the constitutive bond obtaining between social structures 
and common understandings means that the reverse relationship also obtains, and these 
structures serve, in a sense, to inculcate a certain identity within their participants.  
This point is implicit in the discussion of the second expressive function of language 
discussed in Chapter One, where we said that, in a certain sense, the subject of language is the 
speech community. But it is also significant for our concerns here because by means of it 
Taylor hopes to show how linguistic action facilitates the development not only of a cultural 
but also a social or political dimension of individual identity, through which we come to 
understand ourselves in relation to others with whom we participate in common practices. In 
this vein, he writes that  
 
language itself serves to set up spaces of common action, on a number of levels, intimate and public. 
This means that our identity is never simply defined in terms of our individual properties. It also places 
                                                
31 Taylor uses the term “sociological” here very loosely to cover “the generic sense of any study of society” 
(1995b: 237).   
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us in some social space. We define ourselves partly in terms of what we come to accept as our 
appropriate place within dialogical actions (1995a: 173).  
 
The theorist attempting to explain collective action cannot therefore reduce his explanatory 
terms to a causal account of how individual choices are formed and concatenate. Taylor’s 
point is not that the consideration of individual choice is ever irrelevant to social science 
explanation, but rather that in doing so one is forced to also acknowledge the constitutive role 
that an ideal entity – a culture or society, as well as the languages it employs – plays in making 
such choice what it is: an intelligible response to a situation that is mediated by some 
dialogically formed self-understanding. The locus of this ideal entity in virtue of which these 
choices are meaningful is not in individual minds, as the dovetailing understandings of a 
contingently associated collection of individuals, but rather in the ongoing symbolic 
exchanges of a speech community (Taylor, 1995a; 1995b).   
Taylor develops the thesis that social and political action participates in the semantic 
dimension by drawing an analogy between speech acts and other forms of action within public 
space. For Taylor, reducing communal accretions of symbolic meaning within a language to 
individual speech acts overlooks the complex, inextricably interconnected nature of linguistic 
terms which compels each speech act to be in some measure compatible with pre-established 
meanings. Taylor believes that this is an important theme found in expressive accounts of 
language and takes it to be axiomatic to linguistic thought in the wake of Ferdinand de 
Saussure (Taylor, 1995a: 134). The distinction that Taylor draws between individual speech 
acts and the broader linguistic framework that these acts draw on and modify appeals to the 
sort of distinction made famous in Saussure’s Cours de linguistique générale, which 
distinguishes between language as a code or pre-established structure (langue) and language as 
speech activity (parole) (1985a: 240; 1995a: 134). Acts of parole necessarily appeal to langue, 
and whatever innovations they contain, by mistake or by design, are constrained at the outer 
limits by what langue renders intelligible.  
Collective action within the institutions and practices of a society is similarly bounded 
by “constitutive norms” that govern their functioning and make possible co-ordinated action of 
a particular sort (Taylor, 1985b: 98). This whole approach is perhaps easier to grasp when we 
consider that Taylor defines a practice in the most general terms, as 
 
more or less any stable configuration of shared activity, whose shape is defined by a certain pattern of 
dos and don’ts….The way we discipline our children, greet each other in the street, determine group 
decisions through voting in elections, and exchange things through markets are all practices. And there 
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are practices at all levels of human social life: family, village, national politics, rituals of religious 
communities and so on (Taylor, 1989: 204).  
 
In this sense social structures and the practices they sustain function as carriers of certain 
value orientations, demanding of their participants a grasp of the vision of the good that 
animates them, which, for Taylor, is the same as saying that they help to inculcate a certain 
identity.32 Just as langue establishes validity conditions for acts of speech, so too shared 
meanings and predefined roles proscribe and regulate the choices and actions that agents make 
in public space. Thus Taylor says that “[e]ach individual filling of a role is an act of parole 
which presupposes a background langue; and this in turn is sustained through constantly 
renewed acts” (1995a: 135). This is not to deny that social action, like speech activity, may 
deviate from accepted practice and in so doing help to reconstitute the background conditions 
of its intelligibility if these deviations become standardised over time: “Structures of action or 
languages are only maintained by being renewed constantly in action/speech. And it is in 
action/speech that they also fail to be maintained, that they are altered” (Taylor, 1985b: 173). 
What is important in both cases, however, is just that individual actions in common space 
participate in the semantic dimension and as such are not wholly explicable on their own terms. 
While methodological individualism allows that this background of practices and 
understandings influences individual choice, it cannot allow that this background is 
indispensable to choice as a condition of its very intelligibility.  
 
2.1.2 Shared meanings: against moral subjectivism  
Granting common or public space premised on common understandings validity as a 
descriptive category distinct from convergent space helps to undermine atomistic beliefs as 
these find expression in methodological individualism and promises to open up what Taylor 
believes to be a very important normative range of issues pertinent to debates concerning the 
nature of human interests or the good, as well as the meta-ethical debates about how we decide 
upon these goods in practical reason. At an elementary level, these debates question what the 
                                                
32 Taylor believes that modern social science owes a debt to Hegel, not as a metaphysician but for first 
articulating this important insight in his historical and political writing. It is Hegel who first gives a meaningful 
sense to the idea that “we can think of the institutions and practices of a society as a kind of language in which its 
fundamental ideas are expressed. But what is ‘said’ in this language is not ideas which could be in the minds of 
certain individuals only; they are rather common to a society, because embedded in its collective life, in practices 
and institutions which are of the society indivisibly….Certain norms are implicit in [these practices and 
institutions], which they demand to be maintained and properly lived out” (Taylor, 1988a: 89). More recently, 
Taylor credits Wittgenstein, in his celebrated arguments against the possibility of a private language, with 
providing an understanding of language that lends force to this thesis: “[w]here for the classical theories public 
language was only a convergence of private lexica, Wittgenstein shows the status of privately invented meanings 
as parasitic on public language” (1995a: 135, n.7). 
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good is and to whom it belongs. But Taylor believes that atomistic beliefs have drawn strength 
from another quarter in the form of philosophical theories that endorse some version of moral 
subjectivism, and this functions as another obstacle to non-reductive social science 
explanation.  
 Taylor has argued that moral subjectivism – the notion that moral values are in some 
sense illusory, or irreducibly historically or culturally contingent, or possess whatever value 
they do exclusively in virtue of individual desire or choice – struggles to accommodate a 
conception of morality that appeals to a minimally fixed conception of human nature or the 
good life; nor is it willing to allow for extensive, reasoned debate on moral questions, as all 
moral argumentation appears on its terms to be either objectless cant or ultimately a 
contestation of individual and group preference that can only be resolved by fiat (Taylor, 
1991a: 18). Whether arising from moral scepticism, cultural relativism or theories of self-
determining freedom and radical choice, subjectivism is a cause of inarticulacy about the good 
(Taylor, 1989; 1995a).33  
With regard to the first moral question mentioned above, concerning what the good is, 
Taylor believes atomist premises conspire to nullify moral debate or divert it from following a 
constructive course. Taylor has argued that, historically, the political thought of Hobbes and 
the Eighteenth Century utilitarian tradition marks the original point of convergence between 
naturalism and atomism in the human sciences (1988a: 69-75; 1985b: 319). In these doctrines, 
humans are seen as essentially desiring subjects, and practical reason is properly concerned 
only with calculating the most expedient mode of fulfilling these desires; people are, in the 
terms introduced in Chapter One, “simple weighers” of desire. Whatever the degree to which 
such desires may differ between individuals or members of distinct groups, people are 
universally motivated by a form of self-love into the pursuit of “happiness”, understood 
simply as the fulfilment of desire (Taylor, 1985b: 319; 1988a: 74-75). As Taylor explains: 
“Reason now comes to mean ‘reckoning’ and practical reason is the intelligent calculation of 
how to encompass ends which are beyond the arbitration of reason” (1988a: 74). The yardstick 
of value for such theories is happiness, and goods are defined and ranked in relation to 
whether, or to what degree, they grant satisfaction (Taylor, 1995a: 128). What all such theories 
share is a commitment to “subjectivism” and, more generally, to atomism (in the narrow sense 
of methodological individualism):  
                                                
33 It is not possible here to do justice to the complexity of Taylor’s ongoing engagement with these issues. He has 
criticised the moral scepticism that comes of subscribing to an is/ought or fact/value cleavage for failing to 
appreciate the ineradicable value-saturation of all human languages (1985a; 1989: 68). Taylor also takes issue 
with theories of freedom which see value as purely a function of individual choice (1985a; 1989: 68; 1991a). A 
potted version of Taylor’s views on moral subjectivism and practical reason can be found in the essay 
“Explanation and Practical Reason”, which is included in PA (1995a). A lengthier account appears in SS, ch.3. 
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[Subjectivism] is implicit in the utilitarian conception of happiness, which…is deliberately non-critical. 
Happiness, and thus the good, is measured in terms of what makes people feel happy. We are ultimately 
referred to subjective feelings, or satisfactions; in terms of a more up-to-date version of utilitarianism, to 
preferences. The good, or the objects of value, is ultimately determined by what goes on in people’s 
minds or feelings. But then the atomist understanding seems all the more appropriate, since no one 
supposes that there is a locus of thought or feeling other than the minds of individuals. Unless one takes 
refuge in a group mind of some strange sort, it simply appears evident that the good so understood must 
be ultimately decomposable into states of individuals. Subjectivism adds force to atomism in 
contributing to the unshakeable force of this thesis (Taylor, 1995a: 130). 
 
All this does not mean that, for utilitarian subjectivists, individuals cannot be mistaken 
about the good. What it does mean though, is that the only acknowledged criteria for 
determining the good are individual feelings, and in this way answering the first moral 
question above, concerning what the good is, also forces a position on the second, which 
concerns whose good it is (Taylor, 1985b). Taylor believes that this whole approach to 
morality is appealing because, by taking all human motivation to be of a piece, it comports 
comfortably with a desire to avoid complex “metaphysical” issues that raise much vexed 
questions concerning the quality of desire or motivation, or the nature of the human good, 
while it can also fit with a desire to discredit certain forms of political paternalism that 
presume to prescribe to individuals what the good is for them (Taylor, 1985b: 319; 1995a: 
128). In mistaking the good, utilitarians will claim, people may fail to perceive correctly what 
will best satisfy their desires but they cannot be said to misperceive which desires they should 
have, as determined by some independent moral order. This subjectivist position, however, 
runs counter to the logic of strong evaluation. As we said in Chapter One, the hermeneutic 
contextualism that Taylor endorses holds that we necessarily engage with our worlds by 
forming identities that incorporate strongly valued goods expressed in the moral frameworks 
of certain cultural communities and carried in some expressive language (Taylor, 1995a: 36-
38). If we accept Taylor’s arguments for the identity-defining function of strong evaluation 
and human language use, then utilitarian subjectivism is not an option for persons and the 
truncated view of practical reason that it sanctions is a formula for pathological disorientation.  
 
2.1.3 Shared goods: against instrumentalism  
Taylor’s concern with factoring common space into the descriptive terms of social science 
explanation and his dissatisfaction with reductive, subjectivist accounts of the human good 
feeds directly into his dissatisfaction with instrumental reason and the “eclipse of ends” that 
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typifies modern moral debate in the social sciences (Taylor, 1991a: 10). Taylor believes that 
the differentiated, non-reductive articulation of the goods people collectively pursue that 
comes of rejecting methodological individualism and moral subjectivism also allows us to 
assign different qualitative values to these goods. This is a necessary point to make because 
Taylor believes that atomism also gains in plausibility from adopting a reductive view of 
shared or public goods which portrays them to be only contingently valuable, while Taylor 
believes that certain public goods – or at least a certain mode of deliberating over and pursuing 
public goods – are constitutive of healthy identity and therefore indispensable to persons.   
Taylor questions the instrumentalist view of goods by inquiring whether it is the case, 
as atomists (methodological individualists and subjectivists) believe, that the pursuit of the 
good is in every case ultimately a pursuit of some individual good, regardless of whether 
people are best able to encompass their ends in isolation or through co-operative social action. 
If this is so, then, while the empirical conditions governing the collaborative provision of the 
good may differ, the good will be in every case conceptually identical insofar as the locus of 
the good will be the individual that benefits from the fruits of this collaboration (Taylor, 
1995a). But, given Taylor’s arguments for rejecting any atomistic social ontology based upon 
methodological individualism and subjectivism, we already have reason to discern a class of 
goods that are by their very definition only realisable through collective action. Moreover, 
Taylor believes that atomists do and must always adopt an instrumental account of the value 
of shared goods, which leads them to misrepresent and undervalue the moral worth of certain 
forms of social co-operation and common political action.  
 To better appreciate Taylor’s position, it is important to note that he believes 
something analogous to the monological/dialogical or convergent/common distinction 
between modes of understanding and action also holds true of goods (1995a: 190). By this he 
means that there are some goods that by definition can only be appreciated and practically 
realised by a collective agent of some sort. His philosophical defence of this position proceeds, 
I believe, by arguing two basic positions: firstly, that shared goods are not always merely 
compound individual goods. In examining collectively pursued goods we can distinguish 
between at least two distinct categories: on the one hand, there are “decomposable” or 
“convergent” goods, which are analytically reducible to the several individual goods that make 
them up, but, on the other hand, we can identify a category of goods that are undecomposable 
and “irreducibly social” (Taylor, 1995a: 127, 129, 191). These latter can only be properly 
understood as the shared goods of a community, because part of what constitutes their value is 
the fact of their being shared. Secondly, beyond claiming that irreducibly social goods are the 
possession of communities, Taylor also argues that they are of inherent value to the 
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individuals within these communities in the sense that they are not valued as the means to 
some other good end, but are valuable as ends in themselves. In both these regards they differ 
from decomposable goods.  
In defending the first of these claims, Taylor argues that those goods commonly 
referred to by utilitarian-inspired disciplines such as welfare economics as “public” or 
“common” goods are frequently of a purely functional or instrumental value; a dam built to 
prevent flooding, an army trained for national defence, or local police and fire services, are of 
this sort (Taylor, 1995a: 190-91). These things are not, strictly speaking, goods in themselves, 
but make possible a range of individual goods by proffering similar benefits upon all those 
affected by them; in these examples, the physical security of all the individuals in the group 
whose interests these objects and services satisfy. As a matter of empirical likelihood these 
objects and services could not be funded and maintained by individuals, and so their provision 
to one requires their provision to all (Taylor, 1995a: 129, 138). But here their “public” or 
“common” nature refers only to the circumstances of their provision and says nothing about 
what, in strictly moral terms, makes them the goods they are, which is why Taylor prefers to 
refer to them as “convergent” goods (1995a: 191).34  
In positively valuing security as a good we may, and usually do, also value as goods 
the commonly possessed instruments like a dam or defence force that make it possible, but 
there is nothing in the nature of security as a good that requires any necessary appeal to 
common enterprises like these. However difficult it may be in practice, it is quite conceivable 
that individuals could find ways of independently ensuring their security, without the security 
for that reason being practically undermined or diminished in value (Taylor, 1995a: 137). Our 
interest in security bears no essential, conceptually necessary connection to our holding 
common understandings and engaging in collaborative efforts in common space. The dam or 
defence force, then, are only causally, externally related to the good that they make available – 
physical security, in these examples – and this security is indeed best described in atomistic 
terms as the composite good of each member of the group benefiting severally from these 
public enterprises (Taylor, 1995a: 137). In this sense, the dam, the defence force and the 
                                                
34 For a similar distinction between “public” and “common” goods see John Haldane’s “The Individual, the Sate, 
and the Common Good” (in Paul, E. et al., 1996: 72-73). Haldane argues that the former can be thought of as 
“distributive” goods while the latter are “communicable”. Distributive goods such as laws promoting civil order 
and public health are “social means to individual ends” because they are conditions for the benefit of individuals 
taken in isolation, and the public nature of these goods resides simply in their being the objects of convergent 
interests (Haldane in Paul, E. et al., 1996: 72). Endeavours to comprehend and communicate political, moral and 
spiritual ideas and virtues can be viewed, by contrast, as common or communicable goods because they 
contribute to the advancement and enrichment of the shared self-understanding or sensibility of an entire society. 
Taylor articulates a similar distinction between goods while, as we shall see below, valuing not only certain 
forms of common understanding as common goods but also forms of action that necessarily rely upon common 
understandings. 
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municipal services are only of instrumental value, as means to the end of security, and this end 
itself can only lucidly be described as a good insofar as it fulfils the interests of individuals.   
Taylor does not dispute the instrumental view of many public goods that surfaces in 
atomistic social theories, provided such accounts describe what he prefers to call convergent 
goods. He does, however, insist that there is a class of public goods that are irreducibly social 
in the sense that they cannot be conceptually assimilated to convergent goods. These 
irreducibly social goods, for which he reserves the title of “common” goods, are not 
decomposable into the several goods of individuals because part of what makes them good is 
that they are appreciated and pursued in common. Their being shared is not a matter of 
contingency, pertaining only to their provision, but is an essential feature of what it is that we 
value about them (or, properly speaking, what we should value about them). “Some things 
have value to me and to you”, explains Taylor, “and some things essentially have value to us. 
That is, their being for us enters into and constitutes their value for us” (1995a: 190).  
Taylor identifies two, usually overlapping, sub-categories of common goods: 
“mediately” common or “culturally conditioned” goods, and “immediately” common goods 
(1995a: 138, 190). The former are “the goods of a culture that makes conceivable actions, 
feelings, valued ways of life” (1995: 140). If, for example, we value authentic self-expression, 
the experiences that come of appreciating certain works of art or selfless acts of heroism, we 
must, in the name of self-awareness and self-consistency, acknowledge a debt to the culture 
that makes these appear as valuable objects at all (Taylor, 1995a: 136-37). To value these 
goods is to value the culture – or certain aspects of the culture, as we may consistently object 
to some aspects of the culture in question while esteeming others – which is constitutive of the 
goods in the sense that we could not appreciate their moral worth were it not for the common 
understandings that the culture provides us (Taylor, 1995a: 136-37).  
Where direct relationships between people are concerned (as opposed to experiences 
that involve indirect, unacknowledged interactions between people mediated through appeal to 
common cultural artefacts), Taylor believes that we are justified in speaking of another, 
compatible sort of irreducibly social good. He calls these “immediately common” goods when 
distinguishing them from the mediately common, culturally conditioned goods mentioned 
above (Taylor, 1995a: 190). Immediately common goods rely by definition on common 
understandings and actions and exist in common space through acts of collective focus, as in 
the case of open and equal public relations between people, or, at the intimate level, in 
relations of friendship and love (Taylor, 1995a: 138-39). Where these relationships are 
concerned, “what matters to us is just that there are common actions and meanings” (1995a: 
190). In practice, however, the common understanding involved here is usually not just that 
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the relationship is of a certain sort, but also entails the further mutual acknowledgement of the 
relationship’s goodness, because where this is lacking the relationship is unlikely to prove 
durable (Taylor, 1995a: 138-39, 190).  
Thus far, we have seen how Taylor substantiates the first of the two claims that we 
identified above, to the effect that we can analytically isolate two distinct categories of goods 
by distinguishing between common and convergent goods. The second claim, concerning the 
inherent value of these goods, will be explored throughout Section Two. This is because 
Taylor’s arguments for the intrinsic value of these goods are arguments about practical reason 
and human freedom, and these take us far into a consideration of his social and political 
philosophy and the critique of procedural liberalism that runs through it. But already, I hope, 
the substance of the second claim should be apparent. In terms of the discussion of layered 
identities above, we can see that the mediately common goods of which Taylor speaks are 
what we have referred to as the cultural elements of the background of human agency, which 
function as a precondition of us esteeming certain achievements, lifestyles, legal relationships 
and the like. Taylor’s contention appears to be that were it not for the existence of cultural 
frameworks of meaning these goods could not move us; they are the sort of goods that could 
not make motivational claims upon us if we lacked the ability to frame the value distinctions 
by which they are identified and articulated, and as such we could not be driven to pursue 
them without first having familiarised ourselves with the languages and values of some culture. 
Assuming that we accept Taylor’s thesis about the moral constitution of personhood or healthy 
identity, then in identifying these cultural common goods as good we are also committed to 
seeing the culture in question as intrinsically, non-contingently valuable to us; by providing a 
common background of meaning, the culture is as much a part of the experiences it makes 
possible as langue is a condition of acts of parole conveying meaning. In Taylor’s terminology, 
we could say that the culture is constitutive of these moral experiences, which are essential to 
us insofar as they help to form our identities.  
Similarly, the second sub-class of common goods – the immediately common goods – 
are constitutive of the political dimension of identity that we discussed in Chapter One. An 
important question that recurs throughout the chapters that make up Section Two is whether, 
even accepting Taylor’s claims about human identity formation, these immediately common 
goods are also necessary to the maintenance of a healthy identity, as Taylor claims they are. If 
Taylor’s claims are to be reckoned convincing, judged by the standards internal to his own 
thought, they must gain credibility from the contributions to philosophical anthropology that 
we have discussed thus far. Then, as will be discussed further, he might also be seen to 
credibly establish a second contention, central to his political philosophy, which is that 
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versions of liberal thought that are demonstrably committed to endorsing the atomistic 
misperceptions that we identify here, and which consider either or both of these background 
elements (i.e. cultural and political identity-defining goods) dispensable to the goods affirmed 
by the theory, are theoretically incoherent and, in all likelihood, also promote models of 
society that are inimical to freedom and human flourishing.  
 
2.2 Conclusion 
Whatever we think of Taylor’s account of personhood and identity it should, in light of the 
above, now be clear how Taylor attempts to redeem the claim that human identity is 
necessarily formed within both monological and dialogical contexts of thought and action. For 
Taylor, we all possess a self-understanding which is at the same time a self-interpretation in 
the light of dialogically formed values and exchanges within the cultural and political settings 
in which we live. This means that humans are not contingently but essentially sociable 
creatures that can only hope to realise their potentials within a community of some sort that 
makes certain cultural and political goods available to us that would not otherwise be. 
Accepting this, for Taylor, means accepting that human behaviour needs to be explained in 
conceptual categories that include but exceed those found in atomistic theories. As social 
scientists we opt for atomism over holism at the cost of reductionism.  
The co-dependence of these monological and dialogical dimensions of identity 
formation does not, however, necessitate that they exist harmoniously. Taylor believes that, 
within the necessary interdependence of individual and communal identifications, serious 
tensions can exist. Indeed, Taylor believes that philosophically explicating these tensions and 
their political ramifications is an indispensable key to understanding the historical meaning of 
Western modernity. Post-Romantic Western moderns possess a “complex and many-tiered” 
sense of self constituted by both particular and universal identifications or commitments 
(Taylor, 1989: 29). Moreover, the plurality of substantive cultural and political sources of 
value we acknowledge have come to rely on understandings of the good that exist in often 
unacknowledged tension and provide an endless source of confusion and conflict. For both 
these reasons we are drawn toward a range of goods which are at times terribly difficult to 
practically reconcile (1989: 29). Taylor agrees with his former teacher Isaiah Berlin that  
 
human beings are always in a situation of conflict between moral demands, which seem to them to be 
irrecusable, but at the same time uncombinable. If this conflict is not felt, it is because our sympathies or 
horizons are too narrow, or we have been too easily satisfied with pseudo-solutions (Taylor in Tully ed., 
1995b: 213).   
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It is to this most elementary problem, which is of particular concern for our understanding of 
social solidarity in the pluralistic political societies of the contemporary West, that we must 
now turn.  
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Section Two 
 
 
From ontological to advocacy issues  
In Section One we considered a number of interconnected themes pertaining to Taylor’s 
understanding of human identity. A healthy or non-pathological identity, we said in Chapter 
One, coheres through a sense of strong value and is ordered in language. Taylor argues from 
this ontological grounding that identity, in all human cultures, is constructed not only 
monologically but also dialogically, through immersion in a cultural structure that offers us the 
expressive languages in which we frame our self-understandings. In Chapter Two we saw that 
Taylor extends his understanding of the dialogical conditions of identity formation to include 
common political practices. Participation in these practices is not a transcendental condition of 
personhood but it is a prerequisite of full self-development insofar as it allows us to realise the 
immediately common goods that we cannot realise in isolation. For this reason the social 
sciences must steer clear of atomistic reductionism and instead appeal to a philosophical 
anthropology that acknowledges the essentially social constitution of all individual identity. 
Social science theories that draw on atomistic premises are at best one-sided and reductive and 
will therefore fail to account for the value of political participation. A more rewarding 
approach to explaining human behaviour is to adopt a holistic methodology which possesses 
the differentiated conceptual resources required to factor common understandings and 
common space, as well as common or irreducibly social goods and a realist account of value, 
into its explanatory lexicon.  
 In the chapters appearing in this section I explore Taylor’s contention, discussed in the 
Introduction, that ontological reflection upon the shared background of human life has 
something important to contribute to political thought insofar as it helps delimit the range of 
defensible alternatives when debating “advocacy issues”. These, we said, are moral-political 
principles concerning the manner in which individuals are integrated into a social collective. 
Taylor believes that normative debates concerning the proper relationship between individual 
freedoms and obligations toward community, which are central to much social and political 
thought, and especially to recent debates concerning social justice, must steer free of 
confusion and error by avoiding the atomistic reductions underscored by his philosophical 
anthropology.  
Taylor’s arguments have a strongly polemical thrust. One recurring target of Taylor’s 
perennial dissatisfaction with atomistic social theories is the family of political thought that he 
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calls “procedural liberalism”, which he believes does, though needn’t, rely on atomistic 
premises. Throughout this section I attempt to delineate some of the most important features 
of Taylor’s political theory by explicating how it is formulated, in large part, as an 
ontologically informed critique of procedural liberalism. In so doing we will see how Taylor 
bears out his contention that debates over advocacy issues can be reframed and refined by 
appeal to ontological reflection. Where an advocacy position held by procedural liberals can 
be demonstrated to rely on the atomistic reductions that Taylor associates with atomism, he 
believes it is open to the charge of overlooking or misconceiving fundamental features of 
human existence. Conceptual confusion of this sort does not of necessity undermine the 
political practices informed by procedural liberal theories, but it may go a long way toward 
explaining the empirically identifiable failings of these practices within procedural republics. 
The task Taylor sets himself is to identify the self-understandings upon which such practices 
proceed, while suggesting how they could fare better when informed by a holistically 
grounded self-understanding.  
 
Freedom as a normative category 
Beyond the polemical, there is also a constructive element of Taylor’s political thought and 
this can best be understood as an attempt to define the fullest freedom available to 
contemporary Westerns and to suggest how best our political practices can allow us to realise 
such freedom. Recall that in Chapter One we said that, within the transcendental conditions of 
identity formation that Taylor sets out, which posit a necessary individual reliance on 
communal frameworks of meaning, Taylor contends that identity is also shaped by historical 
developments within particular communities. This is, I believe, already implicit in Taylor’s 
understanding of the dialogically constituted framework of human life, but it requires further 
discussion. If people necessarily co-exist in common spaces structured by ever-evolving 
common understandings and common practices and institutions, and if doing so is integral to 
their identities because it is a condition of realising the goods through which they define and 
actively realise their most basic purposes, then changes in collective understandings will be 
significant for the identities of the individuals thus associated. Taylor’s various contributions 
to political thought attempt to take cognisance of such shifts and are best understood as part of 
a broader normative critique of Western modernity. Taylor attempts to isolate architectonic 
shifts in the collective self-understanding of modern Westerns in order to perceive how these 
changes intrude upon our political thought and practice, giving rise to a set of dilemmas and 
conflicts that go a long way toward explaining the historical trajectory of our societies.  
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Central to Taylor’s discussions of Western modernity is a portrait of the West as a 
civilisation that aspires above all to release individuals from their communal embedding to as 
great an extent as is consistent with the maintenance of a just and equal society, where this 
exertion is best conceptualised as at bottom a demand for individual freedom (1985b). To 
understand the motivational appeal of this demand for freedom Taylor believes we have to 
view it as, in part, an expression of the increasingly individuated nature of our identities, 
where universal commitments hang in a precarious balance with both particularistic group 
identifications and with the peculiarly modern striving for individual self-reliance and 
authentic self-contact and expression. 
 I argue in this section that Taylor’s diverse contributions to this immense theme, 
insofar as they are relevant to his political philosophy, can be read together as an attempt to 
work out the moral foundations of social solidarity in liberal conditions of freedom. For the 
complexity of Taylor’s political thought to be fully appreciated it is, firstly, necessary to 
understand how he believes democratic agreement can best be reached, and conflict resolved, 
in modern, liberal democratic societies that strive toward maximal political inclusion and 
toleration of cultural difference. It is also necessary to, secondly, conceptualise what Taylor 
believes human freedom and dignity to consist in, and which practical social and political 
measures he considers indispensable to its exercise in contemporary Western societies where 
individual freedoms are taken to be inviolable. These turn out to be different aspects of the 
same problematic, however, as Taylor understands the pursuit of individual freedom and 
social solidarity to be mutually reinforcing ends that are promoted or retarded by the political 
norms prevailing within a given society. The first issue, which concerns the justification of 
political principles in liberal theory, is the focus of Chapter Three, while the second theme, 
dealing with the interplay of justification and the practical application of liberal norms within 
procedural republics, will be explored in Chapters Four and Five. 
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Chapter Three 
 
 
3. Justification 
One of the most widely debated issues in the social, political and legal theory of recent years 
concerns the nature of social solidarity (Rehg, 1994: 1-3). While there is nothing new about 
this concern as such, many contemporary scholars have come to believe that this question best 
admits of a moral answer. Where this is accepted, a theory of practical reason will offer 
important insights into how and why people co-operate socially, as well as how breakdowns in 
such co-operation can be overcome or avoided (Rehg, 1994: 1-3). One pivotal reference point 
for these discussions is John Rawls’s enormously influential A Theory of Justice (1971, rev. 
1991), which sought to derive a decision-making procedure for reaching consensus about 
principles of social organisation able to command the assent of all rational persons regardless 
of their religious, cultural, lifestyle and other commitments through a remodelling of Kant’s 
categorical imperative (Rawls, 1991: 256-57; Rehg, 1994: 4; Sandel, 1984: 85-86). This mode 
of decision appeals to a conception of morality in which the demands of justice trump all 
others. Rawls’s conception of justice, as formulated in Theory, aims to be universal and 
impartial, affirming the necessary worth of individual moral autonomy – understood as the 
ability to rationally frame, revise and pursue our understanding of the good life – as well as of 
political relationships regulated by individual rights and duties for all persons (Rehg, 1994: 4; 
Mulhall & Swift, 2003: 476).  
In the vigorous and ongoing debate ignited by Rawls’s book, many commentators have 
traced a divide between those following Rawls in affirming a universal conception of justice 
as the fundamental normative principle governing social consensus and those contending that 
modern democracies cannot entirely do away with the more traditional mode of social 
cohesion which draws its allegiance from a substantive conception of the common good or 
human telos (Kymlicka, 1989a; Rehg, 1994; Mulhall & Swift, 2003). Though it lends itself to 
an analytically reductive schematism, a common trend in the literature is to refer to the former 
camp as “liberals” while their critics, generally of a neo-Aristotelian or neo-Hegelian leaning, 
have come to be known as “communitarians” (Habermas, 1993: vii; Rehg, 1994: 3-4; Carse, 
1994: 188; Honneth, 1995). While the so-called “liberal-communitarian debate” encompasses 
an exceedingly diverse range of issues, and while Rawls and others have reformulated their 
positions in the course of this debate, these discussions all presuppose in varying degrees an 
understanding of practical reason (Rehg, 1994: 4). This is because critics of liberalism have all 
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attacked in some form the liberal “scheme of justification”, that is, the standards in virtue of 
which a given substantive moral or political demand, or set of demands, is justified and 
therefore has generally binding authority, as opposed to the moral or political commitments 
(the specification of rights, the function of the state as the safeguard of civil and political 
liberty, etc.) themselves that flow from these demands (Carse, 1994: 185).  
In this chapter I attempt to distil what I believe to be Taylor’s most important 
contributions to this debate over justification. In “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian 
Debate” Taylor argues that in the discussions of social justice that have been central to this 
debate “liberals” have frequently failed to demonstrate a receptivity to “communitarian” 
attempts to reveal how ontological reflection may inform these advocacy debates and steer 
them clear of certain fundamental errors (1995a). While I make little attempt to get into the 
details of Taylor’s engagement with specific thinkers, except where this enables us to better 
understand Taylor’s arguments, this chapter explores Taylor’s contribution to the deeply 
contested issue of whether moral deliberation for the purposes of conflict avoidance or 
resolution and the construction of democratic consensus should avoid appealing to a 
substantive account of the human good when justifying public policies.  
Taylor, whose thought is strongly marked by Aristotelian and Hegelian sympathies, 
answers in the negative, contending that procedural liberalism appeals to a conception of the 
good that will frequently be too weak to command consensus in practical political life, and 
that this weakness owes something to the theoretical attempt to define the common good in 
universal terms through a formal testing procedure. While there may be cogent reasons for 
endorsing a procedural model of practical reasoning, such a procedure cannot yield the result 
that Taylor believes procedural liberals wish it to – it cannot be employed to define a universal 
understanding of the good that both floats free of particularistic values and commitments and 
that categorically surpasses those in normative priority. This is because the meta-theory 
explicitly or implicitly justifying the proceduralist test will itself necessarily be informed by a 
substantive conception of the good indexed to some communal framework of meaning. Below 
I suggest that Taylor doesn’t do enough to redeem this claim, at least where this is read as an 
attempt to charge defenders of procedural forms of practical reason with theoretical 
incoherence. I contend, however, that his argument works better as a claim about the negative 
political consequences of normatively prioritising universally shared human interests over 
more partial interests within culturally plural political societies. But in order to better 
understand Taylor’s polemical claims and the problems that they present it is necessary, firstly, 
to say something about his understanding of practical reason and the difficulties associated 
with reaching public agreement in conditions of pluralism. I argue that, while accepting 
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Taylor’s ontological views about human identity and language use make the difficulties more 
apparent, these are not insurmountable in principle. Lastly, I consider Taylor’s constructive 
contributions to an understanding of what reaching agreement in public deliberations might 
entail in practice.  
 
3.1 Dialogue, practical reason and social solidarity  
Practical reason is the form of deliberation that we employ when responding as agents to the 
exigencies of our engaged situations by answering the question “What should I do?” or “What 
is right for me?” (Habermas, 1993: 2, 116). In Chapter One we discussed how, when selecting 
between possible courses of action, people sometimes operate as simple weighers of desire, 
choosing whatever offers the most prudent or most urgently desired route to a desired outcome. 
Typically, when we assign little significance to the range of possible outcomes in question – 
when the goods that we identify are only weakly valued and, as such, their realisation is not 
integral to our sense of self – we deliberate in this instrumental fashion. But Taylor contends 
that all people exist in the world in such a way that, throughout our lives, situations arise that 
inescapably require of us some sense that certain things are of incomparably greater value than 
others and deserve to be treated as such. Such situations, encountered on a quotidian basis, 
confront us with moral questions and can only be answered by appeal to our grasp of strongly 
valued good and so a “true ‘simple weigher’ in all contexts in life would be a severely 
pathological case, incapable even of what we would call an identity” (in Tully ed., 1995b: 
249). Our sense of strong value provides us with standards that guide moral deliberation by 
delimiting a class of ends or goods that categorically trump other, weakly valued goods, and 
we construct our identities in conformity to these standards.  
But what happens when we are forced to choose between strongly valued goods? As 
we said at the end of the previous chapter, moral values are forever coming into collision by 
prioritising ends that cannot all be practically reconciled and, unless this dilemma can be 
resolved, those who have built their identities around these values will be internally or inter-
personally divided (Taylor, 1985a; 1989). The question of inter-personal division is of 
particular concern for the political theorist concerned with working out the principles of social 
co-operation. Moreover, to the extent that this theorising is concerned with finding liberal 
solutions to political problems within contemporary liberal democracies, it will also attempt to 
be sensitive to the conditions of pluralism in which collective goods are worked out. Because 
the languages in which people articulate and debate their understandings of the good life may 
not simply diverge but may rather appear to entirely lack a common foundation of value 
commensurability, those who define their identities through divergent cultural and social 
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affiliations may not only be divided in their allegiances but may also feel themselves to be 
speaking across an unbridgeable gulf when trying to overcome these divisions. 
 
3.1.1 Hermeneutic contextualism, holism and value realism  
If it is impossible to attain all our strongly valued ends in practice, Taylor believes we 
nonetheless cannot be indifferent to them. Moral dilemmas, Taylor argues, can only be 
responsibly resolved by acknowledging or establishing a foundation of commensurability 
obtaining between strongly valued goods and, on this basis, effecting a rank-ordering of these 
goods (1985b; 1989). While utilitarian accounts of the good dress themselves up in the 
language of subjectivism, arguing that morality should only properly be concerned with 
weighing satisfactions or preferences, we have seen that, for Taylor, the rejection of subject-
transcending standards of value runs counter to the logic of strong evaluation and supports an 
atomistic account of goods. But Taylor has also argued that, where our social ontology allows 
for subject-transcending standards of value but considers these inescapably culture-bound, a 
similar problem arises for moral debate, and in both cases the result is to radically undermine 
the possibility of consensus or compromise through practical reason in political contexts 
where members of distinct cultures or societies attempt to reach deliberative agreement. These 
holistically grounded arguments, presented by, among others, “neo-Nietzscheans” like 
Foucault, hold that there exist no shared standards of value for such deliberators to appeal to. 
Taylor believes that such arguments are harder to dismiss than their atomistic counterparts, but 
he holds that there are no convincing arguments for this position a priori (1985b, 1989).  
I don’t hope to do justice to the complexity of these neo-Nietzschean positions here. 
Taylor’s argument, in short, is that while thinkers like Foucault, who also endorse what we 
have been calling a hermeneutic contextualism, correctly point out that the goods we pursue 
are unintelligible without reference to the languages and social interchanges of a given society, 
they mislead by inferring from this that these goods cannot in many cases also exercise a 
human appeal that extends beyond the society in question (1989: 60-71; 1993: 355-56; 1996a: 
38-39).35 Conversely, it is not wrong in principle for a person to criticise or repudiate another 
culture’s vision of the good. Indeed, given the indispensability of strong evaluation in the life 
of persons, affirming the possibility of avoiding either of these stances seems to verge on 
confusion (Taylor, 1989: 99). Whether affirming or criticising, what is required is a receptive, 
                                                
35 Taylor’s dissatisfaction with neo-Nietzschean thought, which boils down to the claim that it dismisses strong 
evaluation and provides a reductive account of moral reasoning, is most clearly formulated in his discussion of 
Foucault’s thought in “Foucault on Freedom and Truth” (1985b) and “Living With Difference” (1998c). For a 
detailed discussion of Taylor’s reading of Foucault, which identifies points of similarity between Taylor’s and 
Foucault’s thought, and which offers a qualified defence of Foucault against Taylor’s criticisms, see Connolly 
1985. For Taylor’s response, see Taylor 1985c.  
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well-informed and morally tractable engagement with the other, which provides the mutual 
understanding required for reasoned deliberation and constructive debate (Taylor, 1992; 
2002a). While we may ultimately fail to establish commensurability between the languages in 
which we express our self-understandings, there are no grounds for ruling this out a priori 
(Taylor, 1989: 60-62).  
Taylor is aware that Neo-Nietzscheans raise a serious philosophical issue by arguing 
that if we accept hermeneutic contextualism and an associated social holism it may be 
impossible to also avoid non-realism about value, including moral values (Taylor, 1990). 
Given a holistic methodology, and the contextualist thesis that underpins it, it might seem 
plausible that there can be no “true” or transparent understanding of our selves any more than 
there can be rational agreement between people from distinct cultural backgrounds. We would 
then have to accept that in understanding ourselves we have no access to any truth of the 
matter and that in encountering people from other cultures a certain measure of ethnocentrism 
is simply unavoidable.  
Richard Rorty has argued the neo-Nietzschean case against Taylor,36 contending that 
Taylor cannot avoid these conclusions (Rorty, R., 1991; 1994a; 1994b; Guignon in Hiley, 
Bohman & Shusterman eds., 1990). Taylor, for his part, believes that Rorty’s position fails to 
consider the real philosophical alternatives available to us from within a philosophical position 
that accepts hermeneutic contextualism (Taylor, 1990; in Tully ed., 1995b). Taylor argues that, 
while rightly rejecting a “representationalist” model of language use and value construction 
which understands knowledge to be an accurate inner representation of a wholly external 
reality, Rorty is nonetheless committed to a fundamental error inhering in the 
representationalist outlook by viewing language use and reason as mere tools, as opposed to 
enabling conditions, for the exercise of our human agency (Taylor, 1990: 271; 1995a: 2-3). 
Rorty fails, in Taylor’s opinion, to appreciate that the inability of language to frame meanings 
that are true to a subject-independent world viewed in isolation from the perspective of an 
engaged agent does not mean that language cannot make true statements about the world 
(Taylor, 1990). Our human languages have evaluative claims built into them which reflect the 
shared understandings of a cultural community, and this means that truth claims will always 
                                                
36 We should note that Rorty does not self-identify as a “neo-Nietzschean”, and it is not clear whether Taylor 
would choose to lump him into this category. Here I am only suggesting that Rorty defends the non-realist thesis 
that value is indexed to a given set of social practices in such a fashion that people from distinct societies cannot 
hope to reach meaningful agreement about values. This claim, along with an aesthetic account of freedom as 
individual self-making, I take to be central to Taylor’s identification of the neo-Nietzschean outlook. Taylor 
appears to believe that these theories, despite their clear differences, owe a debt to Nietzsche in viewing truth 
claims, or at least claims for moral truth, as exclusively an expression of social dispositions of power and in 
understanding freedom to consist in subverting these power relations through individual acts of willed creation 
(Taylor, 1985b; 1989; 1998c). 
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be those of situated agents with predefined purposes and taken-for-granted beliefs that are, at 
least in part, those of a larger group, but this does not in itself mean that our claims are 
arbitrarily related to reality and can be justified only by establishing correspondences between 
these claims and our other beliefs (Taylor, 1990; 1995b; Dreyfus in Abbey ed.: 56-58). Rather, 
we check our claims according to their ability to orient us in a reality that is neither wholly 
graspable outside of our representations of it nor assimalable to these representations. It is just 
this need to negotiate a reality that is not reducible to our chosen pictures of it that both 
explains why we need to formulate articulated beliefs and how we judge some better than 
others; and if our understanding does connect up to a reality that is shared, against which we 
test our judgments and alter them if necessary, then, at least in principle, we will have 
common points of reference with which to establish commensurability of value (Taylor, 1990; 
1995b; Dreyfus in Abbey ed.: 56-58, 69-70).37 
 
3.1.2 Moral pluralism, moral dilemmas and the diversity of goods  
Ganted, then, that we do not start out from the “preshrunk moral universe” of subjectivism, 
while also avoiding the cultural relativism that attaches to the non-realist holism defended by 
thinkers like Rorty, how does this contrast and prioritisation of goods proceed (Taylor, 1989: 
62)? How do we justify one strongly valued end over another in a deliberative procedure, and 
of what practical value is such justification when applied in the contexts that usually bring it 
into play? In the dialogical encounters that are of concern to liberal political theory, this is 
typically some ideal situation in which people or groups possessing divergent understandings 
of the good are attempting to reach consensus over the provision of public or common goods 
through non-coercive means (Larmore, 1992: 53-54; Williams, 1987: 99).  
For an influential strand of modern liberalism, the question of moral justification turns 
on the rationality of the deliberative procedure (Larmore, 1992: 53-55; 124-25; Williams, 
1987: 54, 100). Taylor argues that utilitarian and Kantian moral theories locate the rationality 
of a choice in its conformity to a procedurally defined deliberative criterion, the former 
enjoining people to privilege those actions that conduce toward the greatest aggregated 
happiness of a given society and the latter endorsing actions that pass a test of universalisation 
(1989; 1993). Despite their disagreements, both theoretical outlooks hold that it is just 
adhesion to a generalisable, procedural norm that determines whether a choice is rational or 
morally justified; the situated context to which the action is a response cannot call for some 
                                                
37 I discuss the issue between Taylor and Rorty further in Appendix 2. A thoroughly informative overview of 
Taylor’s disagreement with Rorty and of Taylor’s views on epistemology more generally can be found in Herbert 
L. Dreyfus’s essay “Taylor’s (Anti-) Epistemology” in Abbey ed., 2004.  
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other deliberative norm to override these more basic criteria (Taylor, 1989: 82-89). Taylor 
contrasts this procedural model of practical reason with an alternative substantive model 
endorsed by thinkers of a broadly Aristotelian allegiance, who accept as provisionally valid a 
wide range of the actual goods pursued by particular agents and define practical rationality 
along the lines of what Aristotle referred to as phron!sis or practical wisdom, that is, as the 
capacity for moral discernment between rival goods based on an insightful reading of the 
situation that calls moral deliberation into play (Taylor, 1989: 85-86, 125; 1991b: 29-30; 1993: 
346, 350). On the former model we get things right – we choose rationally – if we have 
followed a certain style of reasoning and regardless of the content of our choice, while on the 
latter account our conception of the good is judged according to its substantive worth.  
The procedural model of justification has been very attractive to contemporary neo-
Kantian thinkers like John Rawls, who wish to isolate a narrow category of human concerns 
that are of greater normative value than others, touching on the very nature of autonomous 
agency and thereby commanding universal assent. Taylor most often engages with these neo-
Kantian theorists when discussing what he believes to be the shortcomings of purely 
procedural models of practical reason. This, I believe, is not only due to the immensely 
influential effect that these thinkers have had on contemporary moral and political philosophy 
but, more importantly, because Taylor considers utilitarian and neo-Nietzschean moral and 
political theories to be committed in their essence to subjectivism or a non-realist account of 
value, whereas non-subjectivistic, value realist versions of neo-Kantian thought are both 
conceivable and, potentially, able to avoid the errors attending both the atomism of 
utilitarianism and the holistic parochialism of thinkers like Rorty.     
Neo-Kantian thinkers generally endorse some version of the distinction between moral 
and ethical values. Moral concerns matter to us simply in virtue of the absolute commitment to 
pursue autonomously chosen ends and uphold justice binding on all rational beings, while we 
possess ethical values by participating in communities that cohere around the common pursuit 
of a particularistic vision of the good life (Taylor, 1989: 63-64; 1991b; Rasmussen ed., 1990; 
Rawls, 1991: 12, 19; Williams, 1987: 6, 93-112, 174-96).38 In this schema, practical reason 
must privilege moral over ethical concerns when these are in conflict due to the universal 
consent that moral values command. While we must appeal to ethical values when filling out 
the contours of what we personally take to be a good life, only moral values can guide us in 
public debates concerning the conditions of inter-personal or inter-group justice designed to 
                                                
38 Ronald Dworkin offers the following shorthand definition: “ethics includes convictions about which kinds of 
lives are good or bad for a person to lead, and morality includes principles about how a person should treat other 
people” (Avineri & de-Shalit (eds.), 1992: 205, n.1).  
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allow all members of a society to determine and pursue the good in the first place. This is 
because the universality of the moral point of view provides an impartial standpoint from 
which to arbitrate rival claims for all-purpose means for securing a dignified life (Rawls, 1991: 
12, 19). Rawls calls these means “primary goods”, which include, on the barest reckoning, 
some basic set of rights and liberties and a fair portion of social and economic goods (1991: 
92-93).  
One of the driving motivations behind these neo-Kantian theories is to articulate a 
vision of the good that can command widespread political agreement, especially in the 
contemporary atmosphere of moral pluralism that characterises the culturally diverse societies 
of today (Taylor, 1993: 347; 1998c). The hope is that a sufficiently formal criterion of 
justification can isolate and prioritise what Rawls has called a “thin theory of the good”, 
promoting a conception of human freedom that fits with widely held intuitions about the 
dignity of human life while avoiding controversial issues about the good life (Rawls, 1991: 
395-99). Taylor, like Bernard Williams, believes that common to such thin accounts of the 
good is a concern with what we ought to do, with theory typically limiting itself to describing 
a range of obligatory actions binding on all rational agents and offering a purely procedural 
criterion for selecting from among these in practical deliberation (1989: 84-89; 1993: 348; 
Williams, 1987: 174-96). Here our actions are described as good or rational without appeal to 
the objects or ends we seek to secure; the rationality of an action, in other words, is not 
contingent upon its realising a substantively defined human good. What is important is rather 
that our choices issue from a process of practical reasoning that adheres to specified formal 
laws of rationality (Taylor, 1989: 84-89; 1991b: 30; 1993: 347; Larmore, 1992: 9-10).  
“Thick” accounts of the good, as Taylor chooses to characterise them, go beyond this 
and concern themselves with what it is good to do even in the absence of obligation, and/or 
with what is good to be or to admire, focusing not only on action but on motivations and 
desired modes of life (Taylor, 1989: 79-90). From this perspective, our choices are good or 
rational if they press toward the realisation of some strongly valued human capacity. Such 
eudaimonic discussions of the good typically find expression in languages of qualitative 
contrast, with their culturally-bound evaluative terms and corresponding inclination to endorse 
a substantive ethics pegged to some particularistic understanding of human nature and the 
good life (Taylor, 1989: 80, 85).  
Taylor believes that the seduction exercised by proceduralist ethical models, especially 
in contemporary liberal political circles, resides in their seeming promise to dispel 
unnecessary conflict from the public domain and thereby to promote political solidarity and 
stability (1993; 1998c). At the same time, these liberal thinkers believe that procedural models 
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of practical reason geared at determining universally valid norms of social justice or fairness 
offer critical social thought an important platform from which to rationally criticise existing 
social practices and the actions of political authorities. By cutting through the existing thicket 
of parochial and exclusionary conceptions of the human good, moral theory may arrive at a 
conception of just political accommodation that stands to benefit all the members of a 
particular society (Taylor, 1985b; 1989: 87, n.60). Rawls, for instance, argues in A Theory of 
Justice that people can reach consensus in public by abstracting from their particularistic 
conceptions of the good life and debating matters of public policy by appeal to non-
controversial and culturally neutral principles of right or justice, thereby setting up an 
“Archimedean point for assessing the social system without invoking a priori considerations” 
(Rawls, 1991: 261). For Rawls, as for Kant, this entails taking the “right” to be morally prior 
to the “good” (Rawls, 1991: 30-32, 446-51; Sandel, 1994: 1766). One meaning of this dictum, 
as Rawls defends it, is that the principles of justice that specify our rights do not themselves 
require a moral justification that appeals to a particular conception of the good life but rather 
to the good of all rational persons whatever their life plans (Sandel, 1994: 1766).39 
 
3.2 Justification in proceduralist ethics  
A central support of Rawls’s normative prioritisation of the right over the good is an 
epistemological claim about moral knowledge which argues that the particularity and diversity 
of individual conceptions of the good disqualifies them from providing suitable grounds for 
the justification of principles of social co-operation (Baynes in Rasmussen ed., 1990: 63). 
Taylor contends, however, that the dislocation of a narrow range of moral demands from the 
identity-defining commitments of the ethical realm carries with it some important theoretical 
shortcomings. By questioning both the possibility of conceptually separating the right from the 
good and the notion that the right must trump the good whenever these principles conflict 
Taylor calls into question liberal attempts at justifying their political formulae on purely 
procedural grounds. He hopes to show that the normative claim he disputes, which is integral 
to the liberal scheme of justification, cannot be presumed a priori, and that the prioritisation of 
the right over the good can only proceed from dubious ontological premises about human 
agency (Taylor, 1985b; 1991b; Baynes in Rasmussen ed., 1990). Taylor argues that procedural 
liberals, in seeking a universalistic foundation for their scheme of justification, put forward 
models of practical reasoning that lack an awareness of their own ethical situatedness. But 
                                                
39 The other sense in which the right is prior to the good, common to what Taylor refers to as “primacy of rights” 
theories, is that individual rights morally outweigh the common good of a political society (Taylor, 1985b: 188; 
Sandel, 1994: 1766). This second issue I consider in the following chapter.  
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while Taylor appears to believe that this untenability resides both in an inability to provide 
ontological grounds for distinguishing the right from the good and for normatively prioritising 
the right over the good without violating the justificatory neutrality that procedural theories 
seek to uphold, the first of these criticisms is difficult to sustain and appears inconsistent with 
other of Taylor’s claims about moral reasoning. Taylor’s second criticism may still hold but, 
depending on how we formulate it, it either fails to draw on Taylor’s ontological reflections 
concerning human identity for its credibility or else it does so but at the cost of shooting 
somewhat wide of its procedural liberal targets.  
  
3.2.1 Contesting the theoretical priority of the right  
Taylor believes that adopting a proceduralist ethic in order to neutrally arbitrate between 
competing conceptions of the good by delimiting a select category of higher-order goods 
deemed to command universal assent might plausibly offer a method for resolving disputes 
over the definition of common goods and ensuring social co-operation in pursuit of these 
goods, but only if those endorsing this procedural test are able to provide a compelling account 
of what makes this form of arbitration between goods desirable or just (1985b, 1991b, 1989). 
The answer to this cannot simply be that the procedural formula allows us to adopt the moral 
perspective; we must also have some account of why the moral perspective is superior to 
others. Taylor illustrates his argument with reference to the influential spectrum of neo-
Kantian political thought, of which Rawls stands out as an influential contemporary exponent, 
that typically argues that my respect for the moral autonomy of all persons, as expressed in a 
willingness to deliberate about the common good from the impartial standpoint of justice, is a 
precondition of securing my own freedom and dignity in the long term (Taylor, 1985b; 1989: 
86-89; 1995a: 199; Williams, 1987: 58-64). If this is so, then (so runs the argument) principles 
of law, norms concerning the just distribution of social goods, and whatever else is 
demonstrably consonant with an affirmation of my freedom and dignity, must be formulated 
through a decision-making procedure that ensures that all persons regard the autonomy of 
others and evaluate their choices from an impartial perspective. This perspective is that of 
justice or the right because by appealing to a set of moral obligations binding on all rational 
persons we can best avoid selfish, ethnocentric or otherwise partial judgements and secure a 
fair settlement for all (Taylor, 1985b, 1989; Habermas, 1993: 42; Carse, 1994).  
This is the reasoning behind Rawls’s much-discussed conception of the original 
position, a hypothetical situation employed to demonstrate how subjects with a purposive 
rational orientation and subject to an imagined veil of ignorance concerning their natural 
endowments and social position deliberate about the most desirable form of social 
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organisation (Rawls, 1991: 12; Honneth, 1995: 233-34; Sandel, 1984: 86). Under such 
conditions Rawls believes that people would be likely to settle upon two principles of justice – 
the principle of the greatest possible freedoms in the assignment of basic rights and duties 
compatible with a similar degree of freedom for all and the principle of difference, holding 
that social and economic inequalities are only justified when they benefit all members of 
society, and especially the least advantaged – because these principles ensure a maximal level 
of primary goods for all, which the imagined deliberators require for freely formulating and 
pursuing their conception of the good (Rawls, 1991: 14-15, 60-65; Honneth, 1995: 234). 
“Rational individuals,” explains Rawls in a pithy formulation,  
 
whatever else they want, desire certain things as prerequisites for carrying out their plans of life. Other 
things equal, they prefer a wider to a narrower liberty and opportunity, and a greater rather than a 
smaller share of wealth and income. That these things are good seems clear enough (1991: 396). 
 
Taylor does not wish to reject these liberal egalitarian principles, but he believes that 
Rawls needs to do more than he does here in order to argue for them. Although Taylor’s 
criticisms are rendered impressionistically, I believe he wants to argue that even if we do grant 
that the ethically neutral persons Rawls imagines really would arrive at these principles of 
justice, we, as ethically situated deliberators, still have to question whether the conclusions so 
reached fit with our original motivations for procedurally pre-determining the limits of 
acceptable moral deliberation in conformity with the mode of practical reasoning that Rawls’s 
original position is intended to model. This balancing of basic regulative principles that have 
their foundations in moral intuitions with the considered judgements that are the outcomes of 
our reasoning procedure is central to Rawls’s understanding of the process through which we 
seek certainty in moral matters, which he has called “reflective equilibrium” (Taylor, 1985b: 
290; Rawls 1991: 20-21, 48-52, 577-80; Mulhall & Swift, 1992: 119). Taylor, I believe, means 
to claim that these intuitions cannot be downplayed because they are an ineliminable part of 
what makes Rawls’s principles of justice appear desirable options at all.  
Rawls doesn’t hold that we can steer completely free of moral intuitions, but Taylor 
accuses him of overlooking the connection between out most basic moral intuitions and the 
background frameworks that make these intelligible. In this connection we have seen in 
Chapter One that, in choosing which principles are to guide our conduct, we do not, and 
cannot, appeal exclusively to weakly valued preferences concerning contingently desirable 
courses of action; rather, we always proceed with strongly valued principles about higher and 
lower modes of living in relation to which we rule certain forms of action out altogether or 
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deem them more preferable to others. As Taylor, in a polemically charged passage in SS, 
explains: 
 
Rawls…seems to be proposing in A Theory of Justice that we develop a notion of justice starting only 
with a “thin theory of the good”, by which he means what I am calling weakly valued goods. But this 
suggestion is on the deepest level incoherent. Rawls does, of course, manage to derive (if his arguments 
in rational choice theory hold up) his two principles of justice. But as he himself agrees, we recognise 
that these are indeed acceptable principles of justice because they fit with our intuitions. If we were to 
articulate what underlies these intuitions we would start spelling out a very “thick” theory of the good. 
To say that we don’t “need” this to develop our theory of justice turns out to be highly misleading. We 
don’t actually spell it out, but we have to draw on the sense of the good that we have here in order to 
decide what are adequate principles of justice (Taylor, 1989: 88-89).  
 
Rawls’s original position is designed to ensure impartiality in collective decisions by 
deriving principles of justice that don’t rely on any particular conception of the good. Rawls’s 
two principles are rather claimed to be prerequisites for pursuing whatever (justice-respecting) 
goods we do seek. Only by adhering to such impartial principles can the political practices and 
institutions that are regulated by these norms steer clear of constraining people from forming 
and pursuing their own life plans in an autonomous fashion. Taylor argues, however, that if we 
are to agree to view these principles as just and worthy of pursuit it will only be because we 
share a more fundamental ethical agreement in value. Rawls’s two principles are not rational 
per se; they command rational assent only because they are a working out of a more 
fundamental commitment to what Taylor calls “the universal attribution of moral personality”, 
i.e. the ideal of human dignity unique to the modern West that, “in fundamental ethical matters, 
everyone ought to count, and all ought to count in the same way. Within this outlook, one 
absolute requirement of ethical thinking is that we respect other human agents as subjects of 
practical reasoning on the same footing as ourselves” (1985b: 231-32). 
Rawls defines moral personality in a broadly Kantian sense, as the capacity for 
autonomously choosing a conception of the good and formulating a life plan, as well as for 
possessing a sense of justice (1991: 335, 505). Taylor accepts the universal attribution of 
Rawls’s ideal, as well as his attempt to derive a commitment to some basic set of rights, 
liberties and socio-economic goods – Rawls’s “primary goods” – that enable the exercise of 
this capacity. What Taylor questions is the attempt to argue for some distributive schedule of 
primary goods without articulating the grounds of the universalistic commitment to moral 
personality that makes these demands intelligible (1985b). A defence of primary goods that 
are valued in accordance with a commitment to a universally shared capacity for moral 
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personality, where the super-ordinate value of this capacity is itself taken as a given, will not 
only lack self-awareness or theoretical depth but will also be insensitive to claims for 
complementary or competing goods that are justified on other grounds.  
This prior ethical commitment to a universally-shared capacity for human dignity does 
not, of course, invalidate Rawls’s project, but rather requires that Rawls and those who 
endorse his account of justice alter their theoretical self-understanding by acknowledging that, 
despite Rawls’s contentions to the contrary, the good precedes the right in his proposed 
scheme of justification.40 From this ethical grounding in a principle of equal respect for all 
persons, Taylor believes that neo-Kantians can establish a meta-theoretical platform upon 
which to intelligibly argue for the singular importance of autonomy-promoting values in their 
scheme of justification (1985b; 1993).  
Taylor thus wishes that Rawls be more explicit about the conception of the person that 
he endorses, and that he realise that this conception is more contestable, because more 
culturally contingent, than it may appear. Rawls’s neo-Kantian meta-ethical justification for 
his principles of justice builds on a basic philosophical anthropology that privileges the 
potential for exercising moral self-determination as a uniquely significant source of human 
dignity and posits that this capacity is universally shared. Where this view commands general 
assent, it can function as a non-controversial shared value that may serve as the ground for 
adopting a formal procedure binding on the scheme of justification through which we 
deliberate over proposed principles of redistribution, rights ascription and the like. But, 
importantly, the political principles that we agree on in this deliberation must be considered 
rational insofar as they are a working out of our shared substantive commitment to respect the 
moral autonomy of all persons equally and not for the purely derivative reason that we adhere 
to a particular procedure in reaching them.    
 
3.2.2 Taylor on the priority of the good 
To better appreciate Taylor’s criticism of Rawls, which I believe is not altogether convincing 
as it stands, we must further attend to certain features of Taylor’s understanding of practical 
reasoning. Taylor believes that arguments of practical reason should not seek justification in 
what he calls “basic” or “external” reasons, i.e. supposedly rationally unrepudiable moral 
                                                
40 Will Kymlicka accords with Taylor on this point: “Rawls doesn’t favour the distribution of primary goods out 
of a concern for the right rather than the good. He just has a different account of what our good is, of what 
promotes our essential interests, and hence of what it means to give equal weight to each person’s interests” 
(1989a: 35). Kymlicka, following Ronald Dworkin, argues that both liberals and their “communitarian” critics 
believe justice requires that we give equal consideration to each person’s good. Both sides start from what 
Dworkin calls the same ethical “egalitarian plateau”, and principles of right are just a working out of how best to 
do define this good and promote it in practice (Kymlicka, 1989a: 21). 
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principles like utilitarian doctrines of happiness and Kantian principles of universalisation 
(1989: 76, 77; 1995a). These moral principles, like all others, can only claim our moral 
allegiance if, in the first place, they are set in a broader moral framework that makes 
intelligible the grounds upon which pursuing them would be rational. Thus instead of seeking 
moral certainty by appeal to apodictic moral principles that are said to categorically command 
the allegiance of rational agents, Taylor believes that arguments in practical reason must begin 
by demonstrating that a certain mode of reasoning and conflict resolution is in fact best suited 
to accommodate the most basic value intuitions – the strong values – that all deliberators share. 
Working from such a shared set of common understandings, partner X can then proceed to 
convince partner Y that X’s position best accommodates the insights that they both accept 
while eliminating contradictions, confusions or omissions in Y’s understanding (Taylor, 1989: 
72; 1995a).41 Instead of retreating to a standpoint of moral impartiality external to the moral 
positions of the deliberators in question, the existence of which Taylor (like Rorty and other 
thinkers opposed to epistemological foundationalism) disputes, Taylor believes that we can 
prioritise goods and reach rational agreement in moral matters without bracketing strong 
goods out of our deliberative procedures (Taylor, 1995a). Taylor’s point is, however, not only 
the weak claim that we can do so, but rather also the stronger claim that we always in fact do 
so, whether or not we wish to. As Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift explain, Taylor’s claim 
that practical reason proceeds through transitions 
 
amounts to the claim that any evaluations of practical reasoning will necessarily involve the invocation 
of conceptions of the good. Specific moral decisions and positions can be assessed as rational or 
irrational only by reference to one’s own concrete moral experience and intuitions, and the conceptions 
of the good that they presuppose; and it will also entail the higher-order ranking of competing goods 
(1992: 116).  
 
This reliance of our practical reasoning upon ideas of the good is, for Taylor, an in-
principle limitation on moral deliberation. But, assuming we grant Taylor this point, it is an 
open question whether it really shows up any flaws in procedural liberalism. The sort of 
Archimedean point envisaged by Rawls in Theory, for instance, needn’t be, and in fact isn’t, a 
                                                
41  The contradictions Taylor has in mind are not necessarily logical contradictions, but also conflicting 
substantive value commitments. Thus we may criticise another’s position for the logical contradictions it contains 
but, where such contradictions are absent, we may still find it irrational, and it is this latter form of moral 
disagreement that Taylor is most concerned with. Here the rationality of another’s position turns not on the a 
priori validity of her beliefs, but on their ability to make the best sense of her engaged situation in the world, that 
is, with the “effective practices of knowing and being in a world” that are available to her (Taylor, 1990: 267). 
Taylor discusses these issues in great detail in “Rationality” (1985a), “Rorty in the Epistemological Tradition” 
(1990) and “Overcoming Epistemology” (1995a).  
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value-neutral position but rather a common foundation of human value that Rawls believes all 
persons who value their freedom and dignity cannot repudiate in reason (Rawls, 1991: 587; 
Mulhall & Swift, 2003: 470).42 I take Rawls to be arguing that we can have a universal good 
or goods as the support of our justificatory theory but not any particular good, and in this 
sense hold that the right remains prior to the good without forsaking the claim to ethical 
neutrality of our justificatory scheme. Thus Rawls, clarifying and reformulating his views in 
Political Liberalism, can hold firmly to his claim that the two goods that constitute his “thin” 
theory of the good in A Theory of Justice (the presentation of goodness as rationality and the 
intrinsic worth of primary goods), are in an important sense impartial between rival particular 
conceptions of the good, and in explicating the grounds for accepting his theory he needn’t 
have recourse to a “thick” theory of the good as Taylor claims he inevitably must (Rawls, 
1993: 173-206; Mulhall & Swift, 2003: 472).43  
We have said above that Taylor accepts that goods are, at least in principle, valid 
across cultures, so it is possible that Taylor would find the clarification of Rawls’s meta-
ethical commitments in Political Liberalism an acceptable defence of his theory. We might, 
however, be given pause at this point as there are places where Taylor draws on his expressive 
account of language to argue that, because the language of descriptive theory is shot through 
with strongly evaluative terms, describing the moral point of view in culturally-neutral terms 
is a non-starter (1991b: 34). Taylor argues that, when challenged to defend a given account of 
moral or just action, the defender of the theory in question must have recourse to a value-laden 
background of linguistic intelligibility that provides strongly valued reasons for her 
delimitation of a single province of human concerns as universally binding on all rational 
agents (1991b: 34).44 That the theorist may be unaware of this reliance or disavow it is, for 
                                                
42 Thus Rawls observes that “to see our place in society from the perspective of [the original] position is to see it 
sub specie aeternitatis: it is to regard the human situation not only from all social but also from all temporal 
points of view” (1991: 587). While this sort of statement might make us think that Rawls hopes to seek 
agreement on abstract universalistic grounds, Rawls clarifies that “[t]he perspective of eternity is not a 
perspective from a certain place beyond the world, nor the point of view of a transcendent being; rather it is a 
certain form of thought and feeling that rational persons can adopt within the world. And having done so, they 
can, whatever their generation, bring together into one scheme all individual perspectives and arrive together at 
regulative principles that can be affirmed by everyone as he lives by them, each from his own standpoint” (1991: 
587). Rawls believes that we seek to adopt this position when justifying our moral beliefs, both as individuals and 
in moral discussion with others. Justification, Rawls explains, “presumes a clash of views between persons or 
within one person, and seeks to convince others, or ourselves, of the reasonableness of the principles upon which 
our claims and judgements are founded. Being designed to reconcile by reason, justification proceeds from what 
all parties to the conversation hold in common” (1991: 580-81). 
43 Rawls also claims that this is true of his position in Political Liberalism, although he now explicitly defends 
five basic goods, which include those of Theory as well as the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable 
conceptions of the good, the conception of the political virtues and the account of the intrinsic good of a well-
ordered society (Rawls, 1993: 173-206; Mulhall & Swift, 2003: 472).  
44 In this connection Taylor writes: “Language plays an indispensable role as an expressive medium in the overall 
domain of practical reason. We express our moral ends and our understanding of ourselves as humans by at the 
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Taylor, neither here nor there; the social theorist no more than any other person can escape the 
orientation to strong values that is built into our human languages. Taylor might therefore be 
understood to hold that any claim to the ethical neutrality of the right will be indefensible as 
the very idea that people can forge agreement by appeal to a “thin” theory of the good relies 
upon a philosophically naïve conception of human agency (1989, 1991b, 1993). 
This would, however, be an uncharitable reading of Taylor. For Taylor, as we have 
seen in Chapter Two, identity-formation through language draws on both langue and parole, 
where the latter designates the active, creative use of language that has a certain independence 
from the pre-existing linguistic system as a whole. Taylor’s point about the substantive claims 
built into language can therefore establish at most that practical deliberation starts out from a 
thick account of goods. There seems no reason why, accepting Taylor’s views on human 
agency and language use, we cannot move from a thick to a thin account of the good in 
practical reason, provided only that we mean by a thin account of the good not a moral 
position external to the value orientations of all deliberators but one common to all. If Taylor 
were to seriously suggest that justificatory discourses cannot float free of thick accounts of the 
good at all, this would have to be read as an inconsistency in his philosophy. We would then 
have to agree with Habermas that Taylor’s understanding of language use, while purporting to 
give equal weight to both the structure of language and the isolated acts that renew it in the 
generation of inter-subjectively acceptable values, tends illegitimately to privilege the former 
(Habermas, 1991: 215; 219). But Taylor, as we shall see below, has argued that while we may 
come to our practical deliberations as bearers of a linguistic orientation that is deeply 
imprinted with the strong values of our culture, we are always capable of leaving with a grasp 
of the good that has moved some distance from this original parochialism (1992; 2002a). If 
this move toward a commonly acceptable moral orientation situated within our ethical 
commitments, as opposed to a value-neutral position external to these, is all that is meant by 
adopting a thin theory of the good, then Taylor cannot disagree with it, or can only do so at the 
cost of the sort of inconsistency that Habermas has argued he is guilty of.  
Even granted that we can intelligibly articulate a thin theory of the good, however, 
Taylor’s objection to the priority of the right might still hold insofar as he believes that 
procedural liberals have to articulate why the universal goods that we endorse from the moral 
point of view are not just another category of good but are of superior value to competing 
particularistic goods. This they have to do while also upholding their commitment to ethical 
                                                                                                                                                    
same time understanding and justifying our ends: we articulate the implicit understanding which comprises the 
background of our social norms, customs and institutions, and which is closely bound up with our understanding 
of moral ends” (1991b: 34).  
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neutrality. Rawls’s answer to this, we have seen, is that endorsing universally valid moral 
principles of justice furthers social co-operation by securing rational agreement on moral 
grounds that will not prove politically divisive. This will allow all persons to pursue their 
individual or group goods without unjust obstruction. This is certainly a coherent argument, 
and the real issue between Taylor and Rawls concerns whether Taylor is right to affirm that, as 
we said above, the universal attribution of moral personality is a value that reasonable persons 
seeking political accommodation cannot deny once they have understood the grounds for this 
belief or whether endorsing this ideal will strongly depend on a pre-established embededness 
within some particular cultural structure. Whatever our position on this issue, however, it 
seems fair to note that if we take the burden of proof to be on Taylor rather than Rawls then 
we will be unlikely to side with Taylor, who offers very little in the way of argumentation to 
establish his claim.45 Nonetheless, there is a way of formulating Taylor’s objection to Rawls 
that might make it seem more plausible, and it is to this that we must now turn.  
 
3.2.3 Taylor on the motivational appeal of the good 
From the discussion above it should be clear that agreeing with Taylor’s objection to 
procedural attempts to prioritise the right doesn’t require that we find their ontological 
premises wanting. In this sense, Taylor’s advocacy position doesn’t appear to follow on from 
his ontological understanding of human identity. But here I want to argue that, presuming we 
                                                
45 What Taylor does argue for, and quite compellingly I believe, is the sheer impracticality of a universalistic 
ethics. Both Taylor and Rawls consider uncoerced public agreement crucial to the maintenance of a liberal 
society that upholds the moral worth of individual choice, but Taylor suggests in places that if co-operation were 
secured on universal grounds it would lack normative content when applied to concrete political issues. Thus, for 
instance, Taylor holds that a Rawlsian consensus on principles of justice would have no difficulty ruling public 
incitements to murder like the fatwa issued on Salman Rushdie to be unreasonable, but we are unlikely to have 
any clear guidance about more troublesome issues like the legality of school prayer (1998c: 219). Habermas, in 
“Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State” (1999), has taken issue with Taylor on this 
score, arguing that this is not a concern for justificatory theory because discourses of justification are inevitably 
given substantive content by political actors when they are interpreted and applied in concrete political settings. I 
consider this disagreement between Habermas and Taylor in Appendix 3.   
Taylor’s position here might profitably be viewed to issue from his dissatisfaction with the neo-Kantian 
belief that a purely universal conception of the good could generate the sort of principles required to distinguish 
between the substantive doctrines we take to be morally acceptable and those we don’t. Taylor has argued that 
Kant’s own moral theory, which provides the paradigm for many contemporary proceduralist models of practical 
reasoning, succeeds where its successors fail insofar as it is informed by a thick account of human nature and the 
human good (1985b: 322-25; 1989: 83-84; 1993: 349). Kant privileges the formal criterion of universalisability 
(as well as self-consistency) by appeal to substantive claims about the centrality of the rational faculty to who we 
are as human beings. This basic anthropological claim allowed him to maintain that a substantive understanding 
of the good emerged from the universalisation test that the categorical imperative defines (Taylor, 1991b: 30; 
Williams, 1987: 64). While Taylor doubts that Kant succeeded in this, he believes that, in principle, procedural 
models of practical reasoning grounded in a substantive account of the human good can generate such normative 
claims. Analogously, he suggests that disowning these substantive ontological underpinnings cripples the theory 
at a normative level by rendering its advocacy positions irrelevant to the concrete circumstances that call practical 
reason into play (1988a; 1991b: 31-32; 1993: 359; 1995a). But, again, if we do follow Taylor here all he seems to 
establish is that universal principles of social co-operation are impractical, not that they are illegitimately partial.   
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don’t take Taylor to be objecting to the intelligibility of proceduralist theories, or presuming 
that this argument is not terribly effective when directed against procedural liberals like Rawls, 
there is another objection that he directs at procedural liberalism which might raise a more 
serious challenge to any normative prioritisation of the good. This argument concerns our 
motivations as concrete moral agents for pursuing social co-operation and it does derive some 
credibility from Taylor’s ontological reflections. Unfortunately, this link-up between Taylor’s 
ontological arguments and his advocacy position appears to undermine his polemical attempt 
to show up some basic flaws in procedural liberals like Rawls.  
 To appreciate Taylor’s criticism we must consider that Rawls’s conception of justice in 
Theory requires that, in assuming the moral point of view, we deliberate about the ends that 
we seek as free and equal persons and not as particular individuals with a substantive set of 
personal and communal identity-defining commitments (Carse, 1994; Nussbaum in Mulhall & 
Swift eds., 2003). A similar identity split is implicit in the model of moral deliberation 
defended by Rawls in Political Liberalism, where, however encumbered I am by the 
commitments attendant upon the substantive views (Rawls calls them “comprehensive 
religious, philosophical and moral doctrines”) I endorse in my private life, I am capable of 
also holding a “public” or “institutional” identity as a citizen of a democratic, constitutional 
state (1993: xvi, 30). By appealing to the values central to my public identity I may reach an 
“overlapping consensus” with others about basic political issues in conformity with a self-
understanding that abstracts from my privately held, “nonpolitical” or “noninstutional” 
identity (Rawls, 1993: 10, 30, 31). Regardless of whether we conceive of the deliberator in 
question as a citizen of a constitutional democracy or as a moral deliberator more abstractly 
defined, it is precisely this real deliberative situation, which Rawls claims any person or group 
of persons can enter (when not subject to aversive conditions) at any time, that the 
hypothetical conception of the original position is meant to model (1991: 138; 1993: 24-28). 
Taylor, unlike Michael Sandel (with whom he is frequently associated in the literature), 
doesn’t generally dispute our ability to stand apart from our most basic identity commitments 
in practical deliberation, and so there seems no reason why he should find this ideal of public 
reason conceptually unsound (Kymlicka, 1989a; Sandel, 1982: 150-65, 175, 179-83; 1984: 85-
87).46 What Taylor does dispute, however, is the normative notion that the conclusions we 
                                                
46 Taylor does not claim, with Sandel, that liberals presume a metaphysically implausible transcendental subject 
that can be known and experienced in isolation from its most basic motivations, or a self that is unconstrained by 
socially-defined roles and commitments, but he does, analogously, suggest that they conceive of individual 
autonomy as a matter of radical choice, that is, of abstracting from all pre-given ends in practical deliberation 
(Taylor, 1988a: 157; Kymlicka, 1989a; Sandel, 1982: 150-65, 175, 179-83; 1984: 85-87). Taylor finds this 
unsatisfactory because, by considering both individually held and communally shared standards of evaluation 
dispensable to meaningful choice we are left with a vision of freedom which “would be a void in which nothing 
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reach and the commitments we undertake by reasoning morally, in the restricted sense of this 
term that he attributes to liberal moral and political theory, should trump our more general 
ethical commitments. Taylor appears to believe that the only manner in which a person could 
be persuaded to accept the superiority of universal moral norms would be through accepting 
some more basic substantive claims about the good. Viewed in this light, Taylor’s challenge to 
Rawls would be that Rawls fails to provide any theoretically interesting reasons for why 
concrete persons, as opposed to hypothetical deliberators in the original position, would 
rationally opt for a conflict-resolution procedure of the sort Rawls outlines, regardless of the 
particular goods that the conflict situation they are engaged in requires them to weigh.   
Taylor, in a critical response to Habermas’s47 Theory of Communicative Action (1981), 
has similarly argued that Habermas cannot answer radical challenges to the normative priority 
of the right while also maintaining justificatory neutrality because, in maintaining that we 
should adopt a universalistic value perspective for the purpose of forging political consensus, 
Habermas deprives himself of any satisfactory way of answering the question of why we 
should choose to behave morally. Taylor appears to believe that Rawls cannot provide for why 
a person would want to enter the original position in the first place; similarly, he suggests that 
Habermas cannot offer any reason that is both compelling and impartial for why people should 
seek through uncoerced discourse generally acceptable norms to regulate their interaction 
(Taylor, 1989, 1991b; 1993; Rehg, 1994: 132-36). As William Rehg argues, both Rawls and 
Habermas appear to offer models of public practical reasoning that rely, for their acceptance, 
on a more basic moral commitment to a good of rational co-operation among autonomous 
individuals, and these thinkers don’t offer us a great deal in the way of explanation of how this 
is arrived at (Rehg, 1994: 132, 138-39).  
                                                                                                                                                    
would be worth doing, nothing would count for anything. The self which has arrived at freedom by setting aside 
all external obstacles and impingements is characterless, and hence without defined purpose, however much this 
is hidden by such seemingly positive terms as ‘rationality’ or ‘creativity’. These are ultimately quite 
indeterminate as criteria for human action or mode of life. They cannot specify any content to our action outside 
of a situation which sets goals for us, which thus imparts a shape to rationality and provides an inspiration for 
creativity” (1988a: 157).  
But I do not consider passages such as this, taken from his Hegel and Modern Society, as generally 
representative of Taylor’s views on practical reason. This is felicitous because if Taylor were to consistently 
defend this account of practical reason then it would seem both profoundly counter-intuitive and politically 
unappealing in that it might slide into a justification of just the sort of parochialism to which thinkers like Rorty 
are resigned (Kymlicka, 1989a: 47-53; Carse, 1994: 191; Mulhall & Swift: 1992: 177; 2003: 465; Buchanan, 
1989: 871, 872). It would also seem an uncharitable representation of the understanding of freedom held by most 
important liberal thinkers (Buchanan, 1989; Kymlicka, 1989a; Digeser, 1995; Mulhall & Swift, 2003). For a 
more detailed discussion of this issue see Appendix 4. 
47 Although Habermas may not be a liberal in any conventional sense, he is certainly a formalist who favours a 
procedural model of practical reasoning in the formation of public agreement. Taylor believes that for this reason 
his discourse ethics lends itself to the same theoretical reductionism that one finds in Rawls and his followers 
even while going one up on them by better providing for the dialogical nature of collective will-formation 
(Taylor, 1989; 1991b; Habermas, 1993: 42-43, 64).  
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It should be noted in their defence, however, that Taylor’s criticisms look very external 
to the projects that Rawls and Habermas put forward. Rawls explicitly presumes that people 
enter the original position because they have an antecedently formed sense of justice, and 
Habermas believes that the task of philosophical argumentation is to reconstruct the moral 
intuitions that socialised persons already posses (Rehg, 1994: 132, 138-39). This means that 
while these thinkers can hold, with Taylor, that concrete actors are oriented to the good before 
they are to the right, there is no obvious need to posit a priority of the good at a theoretical 
level (Rehg, 1994: 138). Habermas argues in this connection that Taylor believes 
 
philosophy should protect us from becoming blind or cynical toward moral phenomena. It 
should…persuade us of the pre-eminent importance of the orientation to the good; it should sensitize us 
to the hidden dimension of the good and infuse us with the strength for passionate engagement in the 
cause of the good….But the ethical-individual process of reaching an individual self-understanding and 
the ethical-political clarification of a collective self-understanding are the concern of those involved, not 
of philosophy. In view of the morally justified pluralism of life projects and life-forms, philosophers can 
no longer provide on their own account generally binding directives concerning the meaning of 
life….We learn what moral, and in particular immoral, action involves prior to all philosophizing; it 
impresses itself upon us no less insistently in feelings of sympathy with the violated integrity of others 
than in the experience of violation or fear of violation of our own integrity (Habermas, 1993: 75-76; 
emphases in original).  
 
As it stands, Habermas’s criticism may be somewhat misplaced because Taylor does 
not think that it is up to philosophers to prescribe solutions to moral and political problems. 
Rather, his concern is that we are able to offer a philosophical account of why persons would 
choose to resolve their disagreements in what is considered by neo-Kantian liberals to be a 
moral fashion, privileging ideals founded on universality and equality like fair treatment and 
benevolence, as opposed to pursuing goals like self-fulfilment and expressive integrity that 
they possess through inclusion in less than universal communities, where both courses stand 
open to them and are mutually incompatible (1989: 89, n.66; 101). But we can better 
appreciate Habermas’s position if we see that he is objecting not to the details of Taylor’s 
theory so much as to what this means for Taylor’s normative approach to securing reasoned 
social co-operation within contemporary pluralistic societies. 
 
3.3 Cultural pluralism: problems and solutions 
If we are willing to go this far with Taylor’s understanding of practical reason, we will agree 
that it points to an important gap in procedural liberal theories without in any way 
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undermining them. Taylor’s real theoretical challenge, then, is to complacent views about the 
appeal of conflict resolution founded upon universal goods, but we must still consider what 
the upshot of his ontological reflections is at the advocacy level. In this regard Taylor argues 
that, for political consensus to emerge less fortuitously and disagreement to prove less 
stubborn, we need to acknowledge the inescapable place of strong value in the constitution of 
personhood. From this assumption it can be derived that bracketing important identity-shaping 
values and the associated shared particularistic conceptions of the good life out of our 
deliberative procedures will not always be desirable, and public debate needs to engage this 
broader spectrum of human concerns. 
Habermas’s criticism of Taylor starts to look more pertinent when we consider that 
Taylor does believe that, where people lack a common sense of strongly valued goods, or 
where co-operation breaks down over the nature of these goods, we may have to fall back on 
philosophical argumentation that makes explicit our inarticulate moral orientations so that the 
motivational force of these can be better felt and communicated (1989: 103). But if this is the 
case then clearly Taylor’s account of practical deliberation sets a very demanding standard for 
mutual accommodation through public debate because it stipulates that reaching agreement 
over policies designed to secure public goods will always require a more basic ethical 
agreement that grants, at the outset, equal weight to the strong values of all deliberators. As 
Rehg explains,  
 
[r]ather than enjoining on the participants in a conflict resolution a perspective taking aimed at locating 
those thin values and points of mutual understanding that would allow for further cooperation, Taylor’s 
model would apparently require participants to work out a shared substantive identity or framework 
within which conflicting goods are rightly ordered (1994: 120; emphasis in original).  
 
Habermas has noted that the attempt to present a specific form of life as generally 
fulfilling in contemporary conditions of pluralism, which Taylor’s model of practical 
reasoning would appear to require of political actors, would be a monumental philosophical 
undertaking and one unlikely to ever succeed in practice (Rehg, 1994: 123). This is 
undoubtedly a real problem for Taylor’s theory, but he would no doubt argue that it simply 
cannot be sidestepped. If we invariably do start out from a substantive value orientation when 
entering into practical deliberation with others then, where our values diverge, we must seek to 
articulate our most fundamental beliefs if we hope to move toward mutual reconciliation. 
Moreover, as we shall see below and in Chapter Five, Taylor argues that in such cases the 
willingness to take the substantive values of all parties into account in order to get 
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conversation going, which neo-Aristotelian models of practical reason are willing to do, is 
likely to promote a spirit of solidarity between deliberators who might otherwise feel 
dismissed out of hand (1998c). 
 
3.3.1 Moral realism in a pluralistic society 
Taylor certainly does present a model of mutual understanding that places very high demands 
upon agents seeking a foundation for mutual understanding and co-operation in practical acts 
of public deliberation where sources of mutual agreement are not easily located. This is 
presumably why he concedes that, in practice if not in principle, neo-Nietzscheans may be 
right to emphasise the futility of seeking reasonable political co-operation across cultural 
divides. But if Taylor is right to say that Rorty and Foucault are too ready to accept that 
judgements about the good are solely justified from a certain social or cultural perspective, 
without there ever being something in the nature of the case to arbitrate between competing 
perspectives, then he owes us an account of how we do determine the good in such cases. It 
cannot be enough to argue that we must reach inter-subjective agreement about goods by 
simply endorsing one existing point of view over another or by locating values that we both 
share because this agreement might be reached on morally arbitrary grounds. This is a 
possibility that Rorty, for instance, acknowledges; indeed, as I understand him, Rorty believes 
that truth claims are only ever justified by reference to the linguistic norms and beliefs internal 
to the practices of a certain community, which are inescapably arbitrary in the sense that these 
don’t and couldn’t have any purchase on some extra-cultural reality.  
Taylor, as we have said above, can avoid non-realism by demonstrating that truth 
claims needn’t refer to a wholly independent reality and are rather true insofar as they enable 
us to realise our concrete purposes best, where our environments place some boundary 
conditions on what choices are available to us without this eradicating the need for us to 
engage with our surroundings interpretively. But Taylor still has to say something more about 
what it is that makes adopting from within a range of meaningful possibilities whatever 
interpretations we do to be worthwhile, and what makes some more so than others, in a way 
that refers to something other than the set of preferences we happen to hold at a given time 
from personal inclination or cultural conformity (Anderson, 1996: 24). Failing this, it is 
difficult to understand why it is rational to privilege one set of beliefs over another and what 
generally binding normative weight could attach to collective agreements forged around such 
beliefs. Taylor is quite aware of this problem but is nonetheless upbeat about the prospects of 
overcoming incommensurability in practical deliberation on non-arbitrary grounds. It is an 
open question, however, whether the solution he proposes – an aesthetic receptivity to sources 
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of meaning or inspiration credited with a subject-transcending ontological status – relieves or 
compounds the problem he identifies. Joel Anderson has argued that, granted Taylor’s claim 
that people must always reach rational consensus through the contrasting of inter-subjectively 
formed values, his belief that we must provide an ontological justification for elevating some 
values over others may sit awkwardly with the commitment that he shares with liberals to 
sustaining and promoting value pluralism (Anderson, 1996).  
This problematic is given its most extensive treatment in SS, where Taylor argues that 
articulating our interpretations of the good in ever-more perceptive or perspicuous terms 
enables us to derive a sense of the good and define of our identities in a manner that, 
metaphorically speaking, places us “closer” to subject-transcending “sources” of value48 that 
we must credit with some form of ontological independence from ourselves (Taylor, 1989: 91-
97; Anderson, 1996). Taylor does not name these sources, but seems confident that there exist 
a plurality of environmental, political, theistic, etc., frameworks of value with regard to which 
no person could prove wholly indifferent (1989: 102). The problem that Anderson flags, 
however, is that to the extent that we seek to publicly justify our choices in relation to 
purported ontological sources of value we will be less inclined to accept a similar approach by 
other individuals or groups (1996).  
This is undoubtedly an unresolved difficulty in Taylor’s moral philosophy and, as I 
argue in Chapter Five, it creates a number of problems in Taylor’s work on multiculturalism. 
There exists a tension between what Anderson calls Taylor’s account of the “individuating 
role of personal commitments” – that is, Taylor’s belief that our individual identities are partly 
what they are in virtue of us personally finding certain projects, relationships and ideals to be 
of unconditional value in a way that they may not be for others – and Taylor’s ontological 
account of the good as a source of value with (potentially) universally binding motivational 
force which is never satisfactorily worked out in Taylor’s writing (1996: 18).  
While pursuing this issue leads beyond the scope of the present argument, it might 
simply be noted that this is hardly an insurmountable difficulty for Taylor. As Arto Laitinen 
suggests, Taylor would only need to draw a distinction similar to that which Joseph Raz makes 
between respecting values and engaging with values to get around the problem (Laitinen, 2003: 
42-48). Strong evaluation alerts us to a plurality of goods that are conceivably worth pursuing, 
which our grasp of evaluative languages makes available to us but which we credit with a 
partially independent ontological standing. At the same time, strong evaluation also concerns 
our motivations for engaging with certain values in our own lives. Within the wide range of 
                                                
48 In SS Taylor refers to these as “constitutive goods” (1989: 92). 
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goods that we acknowledge (and which, Taylor believes, we can’t help acknowledging simply 
in virtue of our need to practically engage with our surroundings in thought and activity at all 
times), we can, however, hope to realise only a select few in our personal and collective 
activity (Taylor, 1985b; 1989). It is therefore consonant with respect for others’ choices that 
they pursue different goods than we in fact do, so long as these goods can appear to us as 
meaningful choices at all. Arguably, this respect would be seriously undermined if we held to 
non-realism about value; we might still respect others’ choices, but our grounds for doing so 
would be morally arbitrary – a deeply patronising matter of whim or culturally-induced 
conformity – in the absence of some belief in their ontological validity. In this regard Taylor 
argues that we will seek to realise a given set of values because of the inherent worth we 
attribute to them. Choosing to pursue a good doesn’t in itself make that good valuable; rather, 
its independent value makes it a potentially worthwhile choice (Taylor, 1991a, 1992; Laitinen, 
2003). Presuming, then, that realism about values is required for respecting choices that appeal 
to such values, it seems plausible to hold that, far from negating pluralism, moral realism 
would encourage it by providing the necessary grounds for respecting the identities of others. 
 
3.3.2 Fusion of horizons as a deliberative norm 
What, then, does Taylor have to say about how, in practice, public agreement is to be reached? 
Taylor describes what is required here by sketching an ideal of practical reason that builds on 
the social and political consequences of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s ideal of a “fusion of 
horizons”, where interlocutors articulate their most basic ethical frameworks and scrutinise 
their culturally inculcated values in the light of the alternatives that confront them (Taylor, 
1992). For Taylor, the difficulty with reaching this sort of understanding resides not so much 
in obtaining correct information about the other as in possessing the willingness to open 
oneself to the alien and possibly disturbing human potentialities that they have realised 
(2002a). Within this conversational paradigm, “in coming to see the other correctly, we 
inescapably alter our understanding of ourselves. Taking in the other will involve an identity 
shift in us. That is why it is so often resisted and rejected. We have a deep identity investment 
in the distorted images we cherish of others” (Taylor, 2002a: 295). Without such mutual 
openness, however, uncoerced understanding and accommodation can only ever be reached by 
interlocutors who already share a broad range of underlying values, and will always be 
vulnerable to dissent that calls these values into question.  
This does not in itself tell us much; nor does it seem that Taylor’s claims about identity 
will incline us toward accepting this norm. In order to appreciate the value of this ideal as a 
political creed I believe we do well to read it against the backdrop of Taylor’s understanding 
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of the basic political problematic of justice. If societies, whatever else they are, are essentially 
“associations for the achievement of common goods”, then  
 
what goods are to be distributed, and to whom, will depend on what the ends of the association are, and 
how they are achieved. The basic intuition underlying justice is this: in any common attempt to achieve 
the good, all genuine collaborators benefit from the contribution of the others. They are all in a sense in 
each other’s debt (Taylor, 1996a: 37). 
 
Taylor, developing Aristotelian themes he finds in Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1981, 
rev. 1982), argues that justice is not a unitary domain and distinguishes between “distributive” 
or “local” justice on the one hand and “absolute” justice on the other. The claims associated 
with the latter privilege the “transcendent” goods that make a claim on us simply as persons 
possessed of reason over the “internal” goods that are constitutive of the former, where issues 
of justice are considered in relation to the self-understandings and practices peculiar to a 
particular historical community that cannot be valued other than through study of or 
participation in the life of that community (Taylor, 1985b: 302, 1993: 355-56, 1996a: 38-40; 
MacIntyre, 1982: 175-78; 226-34). Procedural liberals, according to Taylor, hold that practical 
deliberation should privilege the pursuit of transcendent goods in all lived contexts if people 
are to agree on practical political policies while associating in conditions of fairness and 
equality. But Taylor argues that, while doing so may indeed bring us closer to absolute justice 
by furthering citizen equality in the most rigorous fashion, there are no persuasive conceptual 
reasons for categorically preferring the pursuit of transcendent goods that define absolute 
justice over the internal goods which ground claims for local justice: “we are faced with 
transcendent goods that demand our awed consent, with practices whose internal goals seem 
valuable, and with a distressing amount of prima facie conflict between the two. There is no a 
priori way to resolve this; we have to work it out case by case” (1993: 357).  
If we wish to accommodate vital political goods like social solidarity and social 
stability and bridge cultural divisions, Taylor believes we may be forced to sacrifice 
transcendent goods for internal goods. A fundamental principle of many communal 
associations is that members who contribute disproportionately to the common good merit a 
greater share of the rewards of their common association. We might therefore do best to adopt 
an Aristotlean principle of “proportionate” equality and distribute social goods in a fashion 
that accords with our society’s understanding of outstanding achievement and the benefits that 
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it merits (Taylor, 1985b: 290; 1996a: 37).49 More importantly, as we shall see in the chapters 
that follow, Taylor believes that members of distinct cultural groups (as well as regional 
groupings within a larger political union) may deserve different treatment before the law. This 
will not be for outstanding conduct but rather as a means of redress for social disadvantages 
like negative stereotyping, disenfranchisement, unequal development, historical conquest and 
associated forms of discrimination that these people have to contend with as members of such 
groups (Taylor, 1985b: 312; 1992). In such cases, upholding universalistic principles of 
absolute justice will lead us to downplay claims for differential treatment insofar as we will be 
inclined to regard all persons in a difference-blind fashion. While doing so may be just in 
absolute terms, in local terms it may fail to offer the rewards or to right the wrongs that these 
unique cases require.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Taylor’s endorsement of Gadamer’s ideal might seem more of a compelling incantation than a 
workable formula for reconciliation in practical politics. In Taylor’s defence, however, he 
insists that his political philosophy in general is not to be read as an attempt to define a 
worked-out policy orientation for the practical political issues it addresses (Taylor in Laitinen 
& Smith eds., 2002b). Here, as with all of Taylor’s political philosophy, he is rather interested 
in demonstrating how reflection on ontological issues of identity circumscribes a range of 
suitable advocacy solutions to stubborn political problems while ruling others out, without 
conclusively deciding in favour of any particular policy solution. In this instance Taylor is best 
read as attempting to work out a difference-sensitive model of public deliberation that can 
function as an alternative to the universalistic mode of justification favoured by procedural 
liberals. By invariably privileging justice claims considered to be universally binding over 
others that call for asymmetrical distributions of goods Taylor believes that procedural liberals 
may ultimately undermine the social solidarity that they seek to promote.   
The discussion above suggests, however, that there are some worrying flaws in 
Taylor’s project. This is because, if we read Taylor as objecting to the intelligibility of 
separating morality from ethics, or the right from the good, it is not clear that his argument 
holds up as anything other than a claim about how we begin our public deliberations. If we 
                                                
49 Taylor is cautious to point out that liberals like Rawls do not deny this principle but only that they tend not to 
give it its full due. He argues that Rawls’s difference principle, which Rawls uses to establish that “no-one 
deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favourable starting place in society”, appears to negate 
inequality in so thoroughgoing a fashion as to undermine any enduring proportionate equalities (Rawls, cited in 
Taylor: 1985b: 308). Taylor shares with Rawls the belief that inequalities must be tempered by egalitarian 
concerns, but he believes that the sort of difference-blindness that Rawls favours tends to overlook both morally 
arbitrary differences and morally relevant ones.   
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define the moral point of view as Rawls does, as a position that is universal, not by standing 
outside of the value commitments of all persons but as a common core of understanding 
shared by all, then this would appear to be a vantage point that all rational deliberators, 
including the strong evaluators envisaged by Taylor, can seek to occupy when resolving 
disputes. Moreover, assuming only that peaceful co-operation in pursuit of common goods like 
Rawlsian primary goods is a minimal requirement of the individual self-realisation of all 
members of society, then the notion that we must normatively privilege the moral point of 
view seems less contentious than Taylor, without much in the way of argumentation, suggests 
it is. Taylor can, of course, take another line and argue that procedural liberals offer us nothing 
in the way of explanations for why we would be motivated to be moral in the sense they 
envisage when our universally held ends clash with our particularistic or individual goals, but 
procedural liberals can respond that this is a concern that is external to their theories. What the 
discussion of absolute and local justice issues above underscores, however, is that, to the 
extent that procedural liberals are concerned with outlining in various ways a scheme of 
justification that promotes social solidarity within pluralistic societies, they may disregard the 
motivational appeal of non-universal goods at a great cost. In upholding universal principles of 
justice and favouring transcendent over internal goods they are not straightforwardly wrong; 
rather, in a formulation that Taylor approvingly borrows from Aristotle’s Politics, they “speak 
a part of justice only” (Taylor, 1985b: 312).  
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Chapter Four 
 
 
4. Freedom  
Taylor believes that the shortcomings he attributes to procedural liberal attempts at securing 
justificatory neutrality are not exclusively a problem for political theory. Because political 
practices are partly constituted by theoretical or pre-theoretical understandings, they can go 
better or worse in accordance with whether these understandings further or frustrate our most 
basic purposes. Thus a developed moral psychology that considers the motivational foundation 
of collective action offers to inform theoretical political discussions while also offering 
guidance in our practical political life. Something of this connection between theoretical and 
practical issues has already been intimated in the previous chapter, where we saw that a 
categorical preference for public goods held to be universally valid may undermine social 
solidarity by predisposing public deliberators to pass up “internal” goods for “transcendent” 
goods. This, we said, might fit better with an absolute conception of justice while distancing 
us from a local conception, and while such a move may be desirable, it may also not be. 
Taylor’s concern is that if we consistently prioritise universal criteria of justification alone the 
whole issue cannot arise at a practical level and certain claims made in the name of local 
conceptions of justice will be dismissed out of hand instead of being given a fair hearing. 
In this chapter and the next I hope to go further into the practical political problems 
that are of concern to Taylor. Addressing this broader range of issues, he identifies a number 
of political shortcomings in the contemporary procedural republics of the North Atlantic world. 
One of these concerns the centralisation and insulation of decision-making agencies within 
these societies. Here 
 
The average citizen feels power to be at a great distance, and frequently unresponsive. There is a sense 
of powerlessness in face of a governing machine that continues on its way without regard for the 
ordinary people, who seem to have little recourse in making their needs felt. There seems no way that 
the ordinary citizen can have an impact on this process, either to determine its general direction or to 
fine-tune its application to the individual case (Taylor, 1995a: 278-79). 
 
Bureaucratic centralisation is both cause and effect of citizen disempowerment, and it 
functions to entrench what Tocqueville referred to as “soft despotism” – the political condition 
of de jure entitlement co-existing with a de facto state of disenfranchisement. Taylor does very 
little to empirically establish the extent to which this condition prevails, and only offers the 
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vaguest of practical solutions for remedying it. What he does offer, however, is a challenging 
philosophical interpretation of the sources of the malaise, which he locates in a 
misunderstanding of the social prerequisites of human freedom and the manner in which the 
dignity and integrity of persons is to be politically protected. 
Taylor believes that modern Western social theory is frequently guilty both of 
misconceiving what our capacity for freedom consists in and of being insufficiently aware of 
the necessary social preconditions of its exercise. Taylor doesn’t always specify the objects of 
the “liberal” position against which he contrasts his own moral and political views; Locke and 
Hobbes are invariably invoked as paradigm models of political theorising in the Anglophone 
world, and the moral and political philosophies of John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and Robert 
Nozick (among a host of others less frequently mentioned) are portrayed, in various places, as 
successor doctrines with regard to certain conceptual essentials. Some of the confusion this 
creates can be dispelled if we appreciate that Taylor understands these theories to be 
symptomatic of far broader trends in modern Western thought, and it is to this wider backdrop 
of thought – what he calls an “unreflecting common sense shot through with atomist 
prejudices” – that his criticisms are ultimately addressed (Taylor, 1995a: 188). Even where 
Taylor defines his philosophical position by contrast with another thinker, his intentions are 
always to illustrate, at a theoretical level, a more basic critique of certain civilisational trends 
in the modern West which he believes affect members of our culture at a pre-theoretical level 
and seldom pass the threshold of explicit theorisation.  
To appreciate both where we have gone wrong and where we may seek moral solutions 
Taylor considers it vitally necessary to address the question of how people formulate and 
defend their identities in the social and political conditions of modernity where 
 
freedom has become the central value of our culture. All sorts of demands are made from all sorts of 
quarters in the name of liberty. People seek recognition, equality, justice, but all as corollaries of 
‘liberation’. This is something which has evolved in our civilization over the last three centuries. The 
process has been punctuated, and partly shaped, by paradigm statements by major thinkers, although it 
has amounted to much more than these: the movement of a whole culture (1985b: 318). 
 
By foregrounding the issue of freedom in Taylor’s philosophical work we are better placed to 
address what Taylor understands to be an insensitivity within liberal theory and contemporary 
Western societies more generally to the importance of public service motivated by a sense of 
patriotic allegiance in securing the defence and exercise of freedom. Below I explore Taylor’s 
contention that procedural liberalism, building on a conception of “negative freedom”, may 
unwittingly erode citizen liberty by undermining the political commitment that serves to 
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sustain it. In so doing I will contrast negative freedom with the vision of republican freedom 
that Taylor attributes to the tradition of civic humanist thought and draw out both the conflicts 
and the possible complements between them. I argue that Taylor believes clarity at the 
ontological level about the indispensability of collective self-rule to the maintenance of 
individual freedom recommends, at the advocacy level, a model of society bonded through an 
ethos of participatory patriotism that facilitates decentralised democratic debate and broad-
based civic initiatives.   
 
4.1 Supplementing negative freedom: freedom and collective self-rule  
John Christman argues that a common feature of traditional liberal theory is a conception of 
human freedom in which  
 
the liberty of a person is strictly a function of the restraints that the agent faces in the carrying out of her 
decisions (however the concept of a restraint is construed). The person – the complex set of functioning 
capacities and the forces that condition them – is not to be counted in the freedom of the agent (1991: 
343). 
 
An influential articulation of this belief in recent political philosophy is Isaiah Berlin’s essay 
“Two Concepts of Liberty”, which contrasts “negative” and “positive” freedom or liberty 
(Berlin, 1969; Christman, 1991: 343). Negative freedom, for Berlin, is the political condition 
in which we are safeguarded by the state or other authorities from obstruction by others in 
doing what we would do unobstructed (Berlin, 1969: 122; Larmore, 1992: 46-47). This entails 
drawing a line between an area of private activity with which no other person or authority may 
legitimately interfere and a public realm of obligatory behaviour in which we may justifiably 
be coerced to the extent that our actions threaten to undermine the equal private freedom of 
others (Berlin, 1969: 124).  
Liberals traditionally advance a conception of negative freedom which corresponds to 
the above, while distinguishing between this and positive freedom. Those adhering to a 
positive conception of freedom argue that, in addition to having our negative freedom secured, 
we are only free when possessing the capacity for self-mastery and self-government 
(Christman, 1991: 344). However this self-government is construed, it entails determining out 
of my own will my most basic purposes and in so doing escaping having these purposes 
imposed upon me by some force or authority with which I do not identify (Berlin, 1969: 131-
34). Though it is uncommon to dissociate them, arguments for positive freedom usually make 
two conceptually distinct claims: that freedom requires self-direction in the formation of an 
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individual’s desires and values, and that political participation or collective self-government is 
indispensable for a truly free life (Christman, 1991: 344).50   
In “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty” (1985b), Taylor faults negative conceptions 
of freedom for failing to accommodate the first of these two theses, while elsewhere he argues, 
in addition to this, that negative accounts of freedom fail to place sufficient value on the 
participatory dimension of freedom (1985b, 1991a; 1995a). Below I consider Taylor’s 
arguments for the necessity of participation and collective self-rule, which advance what I will 
refer to as a “republican” conception of freedom, while in Chapter Five I consider what might 
be called Taylor’s “expressive” understanding of freedom, which is more concerned with the 
necessity of autonomous and authentic desire formation and belief in the life of a free agent. 
Taylor, clearly believing that any satisfactory account of freedom must contain negative, 
expressive and republican elements, seldom draws these distinctions, but in separating them 
out I hope to better clarify some notionally distinct elements in Taylor’s political thought.  
 
4.1.1 The social thesis and the primacy of rights 
The question of whether, if at all, there are certain social preconditions of freedom – whether, 
that is, belonging to society, or society of a certain sort, is indispensable to the exercise of 
freedom – is, Taylor believes, an important locus of contention between liberals and their 
critics (Taylor, 1985b; 1995a; Mulhall in Abbey ed., 2004: 108-09). Taylor maintains that the 
exercise of meaningful freedom of any sort necessarily requires that certain social conditions 
be in place, and that these conditions aren’t exhausted by the allocation of schedules of 
freedom-promoting individual rights. One important statement of this point is found in the 
influential essay “Atomism”, where Taylor outlines what he calls “the social thesis” (1985b). 
Briefly stated, the social thesis holds that, if one accepts the ontological claim that the 
capacities central to the appreciation and exercise of freedom are socially derived, then in 
normatively affirming their worth one is, on pain of inconsistency, also committed to 
affirming the worth of the society (or relevant aspects of the society) that facilitates their 
development and continued exercise (Taylor, 1985b: 187-94).  
While this may seem trite, Taylor’s argument for the social thesis should be read in the 
context of the previous chapter’s discussion of the liberal prioritisation of the right over the 
good. Liberals can hold that the right is prior to the good at what we have called the advocacy 
level of political deliberation, not because justice must take priority over the common good in 
                                                
50 Taylor’s own understanding of positive liberty only endorses a version of the second of these two claims. As 
we shall see in Chapter Five, this is because it relies on what he calls an “exercise-concept”, which is 
incompatible with Berlin’s sense of negative freedom, while the first claim employs an “opportunity-concept” 
which can be assimilated with a negative conception of freedom (1985b: 213).  
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the formulation of an impartial scheme of justification but because, as persons whose freedom 
resides in part in formulating and pursuing our life plans without external coercion, we need to 
belong to a political society that secures the conditions under which we can deliberate about 
the good and pursue our plans without excessive obstruction (Honneth, 1995: 236-37). The 
manner in which this freedom is secured in modern Western societies, and which is defended 
by liberal theories across the board, is by allowing basic individual rights to “trump” the 
demands of the common good (Baynes in Rasmussen ed., 1990: 62; Sandel, 1984: 82; 1994: 
1766). Taylor doesn’t wish to take issue with this principle of right per se, but rather fears that 
it threatens to erode communal solidarity if pushed beyond certain limits and in so doing 
threatens to unravel the social arrangements that both make individual rights appear valuable 
and which allow for their meaningful exercise.  
To establish his point, Taylor argues that the only defensible rationale informing the 
defence of rights is that they function to protect the strongly valued capacities in virtue of 
which people are considered free and dignified subjects (Taylor, 1985b: 190-91). In speaking 
of these capacities, Taylor has in mind those competencies commonly seen as inseparable 
from the human aspiration to freedom, regardless of whether we understand freedom to rely 
upon the capacity for moral autonomy, expressive self-realisation or collective self-
determination (and Taylor, I will argue in this chapter and the next, believes that true freedom 
entails all of these) (Taylor, 1985b: 200-03). Typically, these capacities are ascribed to people 
in virtue of their potential for developing and exercising the qualities of rational thought or full 
moral agency and moral responsibility, through which we may be considered persons 
possessing dignity and worthy of respect (Taylor, 1985b: 191). Whether explicitly formulated 
or merely presumed, this is the background that makes intelligible the defence of schedules of 
rights in liberal societies. Rights of self-expression such as the unimpeded profession of 
conviction, the free exercise of moral or religious beliefs, the free choice of lifestyle and 
profession, as well as rights to the free disposition of property, to a living wage, and whatever 
else may stand as a guarantor of these expressive behaviours are defended by liberals in order 
to allow people to realise their purposes according to their own freely chosen life plans 
(Taylor, 1985b: 191, 193, 195). 
Taylor further argues that, if the capacities that we take to be integral to free self-
realisation are reckoned to be good, and if these can only develop in a society that protects 
them through awarding individual rights and the like, then – so the social thesis tells us – their 
value must at the very least be co-equivalent with the good of social belonging, by which 
Taylor means commitment to furthering the collective good of a particular society. Respecting 
one of the distinctly human capacities by the conferral of a right therefore draws with it the 
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necessity of accepting such a principle of belonging (Taylor, 1985b: 197-98). This affirmation 
of the collective good extends not only to the political institutions and practices of the society, 
but also to the cultural life of that society which makes the defence of these capacities and the 
ascription of rights appear a cogent and valuable pursuit by comparison with a range of 
alternative human possibilities (Taylor, 1985b: 204-08; 309-10).  
At a conceptual level, any normative claim affirming the value of the socialised 
capacities that lacks this background understanding lacks also a condition of its own 
intelligibility (Taylor, 1985b; Smith, 2002: 146-47). At a practical level, this means that any 
policy aiming to promote individual freedom must at the same time sustain, or at least not 
undermine, the broader social conditions that make this freedom possible at all. For purely 
empirical reasons which Taylor nonetheless takes to be overwhelmingly plausible, these 
conditions would seem to include the functioning of a wide range of institutional supports, 
cultural endeavours and political fora for collective deliberation and decision-making (Taylor, 
1985b: 205-07, 309). Without commitment to sustaining these aspects of society indefinitely, 
the conditions for the enjoyment of individual freedom – a social structure that makes 
available a broad range of meaningful life choices, that allows for these choices to be reached 
in collective deliberation, and that empowers its citizens with the political means for 
exercising their common will – may be jeopardised at any time by those whose visions of the 
good are inimical to diversity, innovation and originality (Taylor, 1985b: 207; 309-10). 
 Considering the above, the social thesis laid out in “Atomism” can be understood as a 
thesis concerning the social preconditions of freedom and dignity and can be used to derive a 
sub-thesis concerning the foundation of democratic legitimacy and rights ascription. In the 
former aspect it is intended to establish a conceptual foundation for the notion that freedom 
cannot be exhaustively conceived in negative terms; individual freedom, Taylor argues, cannot 
be guaranteed without supporting what, in the argot of contemporary political theory, has 
come to be called a “politics of the common good” (Sandel, 1984: 93; Kymlicka, 1989a). In 
the later aspect the social thesis argues that what Taylor elsewhere refers to as “active” respect 
– the legalistic protection of individual freedoms – cannot be guaranteed without also 
committing to the defence of a particular community’s way of life that the extended, 
participatory account of freedom he outlines demands (1985b; 1989: 15).  
In both these regards the social thesis is intended to undermine social theories built 
upon atomist premises. Taylor charges atomist theories with lacking an understanding of the 
social preconditions required for both the evaluative appreciation and the rights-based defence 
of the freedom-sustaining human capacities (1985b). Such theories, he maintains, provide 
arguments that seek to establish the legitimacy or otherwise of a political dispensation, or the 
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desirability of certain public policies, by appealing exclusively to their ability to further 
individual freedom with such measures as defending autonomy-promoting rights (Taylor, 
1985b). Taylor shows that, without an equivalent commitment to maintaining a social 
structure that allows the capacities defended by such rights to appear valuable when set against 
a background of other possibilities and to develop to their fullness, the defence of the right can 
undermine the social conditions that make it meaningful and that allow for its practical 
exercise (1985b).   
But however compelling, Taylor’s arguments in “Atomism” are open to a number of 
criticisms. For one thing, it might be possible to contest the extent to which the capacities so 
highly prized by liberal theory are socialised but, given this claim, it seems to fall out as a 
simple truism that commitment to furthering these values must also extend to protecting a 
society that fosters them. Thus Will Kymlicka argues that, while the conceptual coherence of 
the social thesis is surely irrefutable, it is hard to credit the idea that any prominent liberal 
theorists would attempt to challenge it (1989a: 79-80, 95).51 This softens the edge of Taylor’s 
polemical thrust and means that at best Taylor might be credited with having identified a 
shortcoming in the common-sense of members of liberal societies. Secondly, while Taylor 
argues that traditional liberal theory lacks an adequate account of the need that all individuals 
possess to belong to a vibrant, freedom-promoting culture, his social thesis offers no 
indisputable conceptual grounds for arguing from this to promoting a particular conception of 
the common good attributable to any specific culture (Kymlicka, 1989a: 78-79). The first of 
these objections, which to be upheld would lead far beyond the scope of this work,52 I leave 
hanging, while I address the second below. Before doing so, however, I consider a third, 
connected problem with Taylor’s social thesis: as an attempt to establish a necessary 
connection between individual freedom and social commitment, it would appear that Taylor’s 
                                                
51 While Taylor puts forward empirical concerns about the vulnerability of freedom-respecting and tolerant 
understandings and practices that may be well-founded, Kymlicka points out that this doesn’t necessarily pose a 
problem for most liberal thinkers. Nozick’s libertarianism, which is the immediate target of Taylor’s criticism in 
“Atomism”, may overlook the social supports of freedom in espousing a model of apolitical, spontaneous social 
co-operation, but this is certainly not true of the liberalism of Rawls, Dworkin and others, who acknowledge that 
freedom of any sort requires the active defence of the justice-promoting institutions of society (Kymlicka, 1989a: 
84, n.6). Taylor does not criticise these latter thinkers in his discussion of the social thesis, nor any other of the 
heirs of Hobbes and Locke that he targets, but then it is not clear to what extent Taylor has successfully identified 
a general weakness in contemporary liberal thought. Thus Kymlicka goes on to point out that “Taylor is right to 
emphasize the importance of his social thesis, and hence the importance of a secure social context, of public 
principles of justice, and of civic participation. All these are of unquestionable importance. But that is just the 
problem. No one does question their importance. Liberal principles of justice may be misconceived, but not 
because they deny any of these obvious truths about our social situation” (1989a: 95).  
52 Taylor may fail to diagnose a general problem in procedural liberal theory, but this would not concern us 
directly as we are concerned with establishing the extent to which Taylor’s moral and political work is internally 
coherent. Taylor can claim that procedural liberals fall foul of the social thesis without appealing to his 
ontological work at all, and so if this claim rings hollow, as I suggest it does, then this is at best an external 
objection to his argument.  
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argument can be accommodated by those wishing to hold to a purely instrumental account of 
the value of social solidarity and the nature of shared goods which views our associations with 
others to be valuable but only of purely contingent worth.  
Atomists, as Taylor portrays them, hold an instrumental view of social relationships 
and view social co-operation as an aid to furthering our own individual goods but take this co-
operation to be external to (or a causal condition of) our appreciation of these goods. I may be 
wholeheartedly committed to a social movement defending the civil liberties that both I and 
my fellow countrymen enjoy against political authorities that unjustly seek to curtail these 
freedoms, or I may be devoted to the cause of a labour union, or I may refrain from making 
unnecessary social welfare demands, or again I may scrupulously regard the laws forbidding 
me from cheating on tax payments, but the reason for me doing so may be simply that I 
cherish the personal fulfilments – the possibility of religious, ideological or sexual non-
conformity, the financial independence I gain from holding down a well-paying job, the 
fulfilment I derive from contributing to the upliftment of members of society less fortunate 
than myself, or whatever the case may be – that belonging to this society offers me. When my 
personal fulfilments are not threatened or cease to be effectively advanced by these forms of 
co-operation, however, my commitment to these social causes loses the urgency that it would 
otherwise have and may well seem a distraction from the pursuits that I truly value.  
Taylor is not unaware of the possibility of valuing community involvement for 
instrumental reasons alone and tries to head off this interpretation of the social thesis by 
arguing that freedom can only be valued in virtue of a culturally inculcated identity, and that 
this identity is nourished by a range of conceptual and material forces that could only evolve 
along with an entire culture or civilisation (1985b: 209, 309). For this reason, we must 
acknowledge an unconditional debt to the broader cultures in which we, as individuals, are 
embedded, and must see our own self-development as essentially reliant upon the flourishing 
of an entire cultural structure, not only in the present but across succeeding generations (1985b: 
205-06, 209, 309-10). In “Atomism” however, he does little to defend this claim which, to be 
convincing, would require a more worked-out understanding of human identity that did 
something to explain the moral psychology of political commitment. Taylor would have to 
demonstrate that, for purposes of mobilisation in defence of freedom-promoting institutions as 
much as for the receptivity to non-coercive deliberation that we discussed in the previous 
chapter, a society united in its affirmation of a shared thin good such as a universal conception 
of the right or justice cannot secure a more tolerant and resilient foundation for co-operation in 
pursuit of shared goods than a society united in its pursuit of some substantively defined 
common good (Kymlicka, 1989a: 83-85).  
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4.1.2 The republican thesis I: public service through patriotic virtue  
Taylor outlines in various places an extension of the social thesis which goes some way 
toward addressing these shortcomings by arguing that social commitment must have as its 
object a particular historical community and that, for such commitment to endure, it requires a 
non-instrumental appreciation of the common good of this community. In “Cross-Purposes: 
The Liberal-Communitarian Debate” he refers to this as “the republican thesis” (1995a: 193). 
The republican thesis is presented as a schematic outline of the underlying logic informing the 
otherwise very different versions of civic humanist thought that Taylor identifies. Taylor 
consistently sets up civic humanism as a current within traditional liberal thought that can be 
used to frame a conception of liberal democratic politics that provides a supplementary ideal 
to the rights-based and procedural understandings of liberal politics dominant in the North 
Atlantic world. In Taylor’s hands the republican thesis is meant to establish not so much that 
freedom requires commitment to an institutionalised culture of freedom as that this 
commitment must necessarily be understood to issue from the affirmation of a commonly held, 
thick conception of the good. Any free political society, for Taylor, is and must be sustained 
by the dedicated exertions of citizens whose individual conceptions of the good are in part 
formulated in conformity with the common good of their communities. While procedural 
liberals can accommodate this insight, they can only do so at the cost of abandoning any 
atomistic conceptions of the human subject that might undergird their theories because fidelity 
to the common good must at the very least include a lively sense of patriotism, where this 
patriotism is properly understood as a common, particularistic good of inherent value and not 
a contingently valued, convergent good.  
Taylor defines republican freedom as non-despotism. This is the political condition 
where people are not subject to the authoritarian will of a single ruler or ruling elite but regard 
themselves as equal citizens whose dignity lies in collective self-rule; that is, in giving the law 
to themselves and, in Aristotle’s formulation, ruling and being ruled in turn (1995a: 200). 
Republican freedom in this broad sense is the value that classical Aristotelian political thought 
sought to further and it remains a foundational value in the liberal democratic societies of the 
modern West (Taylor, 1985b; 1995a).  
Central to the civic humanist accounts of freedom that Taylor considers is an 
affirmation of freedom through patriotic solidarity, where this patriotism can be understood in 
its original classical and early modern sense of fidelity to the interests of a wider historical 
community such as the city state or in its more contemporary usage as dedication to a national 
group (Taylor, 1995a; 2005a). Taylor loosely characterises patriotism as “common citizen 
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identification around a sense of common good” or “a common identification with a historical 
community founded on certain values” (1995a: 194, 199). Appreciating how republican 
freedom is promoted allows us to distinguish between sustainable and self-destructive political 
programmes in general by considering how these are able to defend our freedom (Taylor, 
1995a; 2005: 42). 
The republican thesis argues that freedom demands active citizen commitment to the 
laws and institutions of a political society, which can only be secured if citizens are bonded in 
a shared vision of the common good that at the very least includes an affirmation of patriotic 
solidarity as a fundamental citizen virtue. In its weaker formulation, the republican thesis 
argues for the necessity of committed public service for the maintenance of freedom by 
reasoning that, while despotic regimes are organised by elites and frequently demand low 
levels of citizen participation in the public life of a society, non-despotic societies, by contrast, 
require that the citizenry as a whole assume responsibility for functions that would otherwise 
fall to the lot of their rulers. The demands of citizenship in free societies are more onerous 
than in despotic societies because the gamut of duties is far broader, with citizens called on to 
replace hired mercenaries in the defence of their countries, or to participate actively in 
collective decision-making, or something of the sort (Taylor, 1995a: 193). For this reason, 
Taylor believes that commitment and vitality in the performance of public duty requires a 
strongly valued sense of the worth of patriotic allegiance if people are to be motivated, over 
time, to maintain the exertions that public service demands. Citizens of free republics must 
learn to consider collective participation in public life and the defence of free institutions to be 
an essential, non-contingent condition of maintaining the freedom and dignity of all in society, 
committing individual citizens to locating their own good in the maintenance and defence of 
their shared way of life (Taylor, 1995a).  
Taylor believes that any political advocacy policy has to accommodate or further this 
common good of patriotic allegiance but, importantly, his reasons for maintaining this are not 
purely prescriptive. The logic of the republican thesis is also submitted as a descriptive claim, 
about what in fact sustains the free societies that do presently exist or have existed in the past 
(Taylor, 1995a). Taylor outlines the republican thesis as part of what, in “Cross-Purposes”, he 
calls the “viability objection” to procedural liberalism, which holds that, where procedural 
liberalism builds on an atomist ontology, it describes a political society that couldn’t even in 
principle sustain itself in freedom (Taylor, 1995a: 202).  
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4.1.3 Questioning the republican thesis 
We might pause at this point to note that, thus stated, the republican thesis is still open to the 
criticisms levelled above at the social thesis: we can agree with Taylor’s defence of the 
necessity of public service in a free society without having to follow him in describing this as 
a non-instrumental, particularistic good, thereby still remaining within the instrumental 
framework of allegiance that he attributes to atomistic theories. Taylor accepts that our 
modern notion of the good life and of equality means that we can no longer follow Aristotle in 
viewing a life of political commitment as inherently more elevated than a life given over to 
private pursuits (1995a: 144-45).53 As Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman point out,  
 
most people in the modern world….find the greatest happiness in their family life, work, religion or 
leisure, not in politics. Political participation is seen as an occasional, and often burdensome, activity 
needed to ensure that government respects and supports their freedom to pursue these personal 
occupations and attachments. This assumption that politics is a means to private life is shared by most 
people on the left and right, as well as by liberals, civil society theorists, and feminists, and defines the 
modern view of citizenship (1994: 362).   
 
But if this decoupling of active political life and the good life really is a defining feature of our 
modern western moral sensibility, then it is unclear why freedom and dignity require anything 
more than a defence of free institutions when these are threatened, and why a healthy regard 
by all citizens for their own negative freedoms would not spontaneously move people in such 
defence. 
This is a possible objection that Taylor acknowledges: if, as atomists wish to maintain, 
the social good is in fact decomposable into the several goods of the individuals of which the 
society in question is formed, then there is nothing to prevent us from acknowledging the need 
to collectively support the free institutions of that society when these are under threat by 
viewing such action as a precondition of enjoying our own individual goods (Taylor, 1995a). 
In this case, there is still reason for defending a political society geared exclusively toward the 
defence of negative freedoms from illiberal or undemocratic threats, but the good that we 
appeal to is not the collective good of a particular society but rather the freedom of its 
members to privately define their own good, provided only that these individuals respect the 
similar freedom of others and acknowledge a debt to defending the freedom-promoting 
                                                
53 This belief is one feature of what Taylor refers to as the modern “affirmation of ordinary life”, by which he 
means a rejection of received elite or aristocratic frameworks that privilege supposedly higher activities like 
contemplation, religious asceticism and the public pursuit of honour over the activities associated with the “life of 
production and reproduction, of work and the family” (1995a: 144). The affirmation of ordinary life is an 
important theme for Taylor, and its historical genesis and basic presuppositions are discussed at greatest length in 
SS, Part III. 
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institutions of this society and observe the restraints that this demands. Neo-Kantians, for 
instance, will maintain that individuals appealing to universally acceptable moral values like 
an autonomy-promoting conception of justice will have ample reason to perform such actions, 
and that allegiance to the thinly-defined good that emerges from this will suffice to motivate 
people to act in defence of the societies in which they live when its freedom-promoting 
institutions are threatened (Taylor, 1995a). Alternatively, it could be argued that individuals 
acting out of pure self-regard will perceive that enjoying the affluence or security that they 
value requires them to defend their society when the freedoms it enshrines are under threat. In 
neither case does commitment to a thickly-defined common good appear to be an 
indispensable motivational source of political mobilisation or an absolute requirement of a free 
and dignified life (Taylor, 1995a). 
Taylor finds both alternatives unsatisfactory. In the first case, rational commitment to a 
universal moral principle like a shared conception of justice alone is unlikely to motivate any 
but the most altruistic of people to maintain or defend free institutions; in the second case, 
self-concern will promote only sporadic and limited interventions in defence of these 
institutions which will be incapable of effectively rehabilitating them when they cease to 
channel self-interested behaviour into co-ordinated activity that defends rather than 
undermines liberty (Taylor, 1995a; Hill, 1993: 68). Hoping to outline a more plausible account 
of the motivational foundation of civic virtue, Taylor outlines a third possibility. He believes 
that the citizen virtue of patriotism found in civic humanist thought offers an account of the 
constitutive bond obtaining between freedom and social commitment that best describes the 
motivational foundation of political allegiance in both its pre-modern and early modern forms 
of attachment to a city-state and in modern, liberal versions of nationalism (Taylor, 1995a; 
2005a). As Taylor explains: 
 
patriotism is based on an identification with others in a particular common enterprise. I’m not dedicated 
to defending the liberty of just anyone, but I feel the bond of solidarity with my compatriots in our 
common enterprise, the common expression of our respective dignity. Patriotism is somewhere between 
friendship and family feeling, on one side, and altruistic dedication on the other. The latter has no 
concern for the particular: I’m inclined to act for the good of anyone anywhere. The former attaches me 
to particular people. My patriotic allegiance doesn’t bind me to people in this familial way….But 
particularity enters in because my bond to these people passes through our participation in a common 
political entity (1995a: 187-88).  
 
This returns us to the motivational question raised in the previous chapter. There we 
said that if we are, in practice, to deliberate with one another in a rational manner and be 
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willing to take the views of others not sharing our personal vision of the good into 
consideration, we need some account of what it is that would motivate us to do so. We have 
seen that, for Rawls, this is the sense of justice that motivates people to enter the original 
position. Here Taylor is posing a similar question, only the issue is not about why we would 
assume the moral point of view and endorse a scheme of justification for our policies that will 
prove acceptable to all reasonable persons but rather concerns what moral virtues and 
aptitudes are required of citizens if they are to exert themselves in defence of the freedom-
sustaining institutions of their societies. One way of assessing Taylor’s criticism of the 
understanding of the republican conditions of freedom is therefore to ask whether Rawls’s 
justice-respecting citizens really would behave in this civic-minded fashion.  
This is the question that Allen Patten poses, and he argues the Rawlsian “sense of 
justice” would, despite Taylor’s suggestions to the contrary, draw allegiance to the laws and 
institutions of a particular historical community (Patten, 1996: 39).54 In A Theory of Justice 
Rawls argued that attachment to universal principles of justice can motivate attachment to an 
historical community in which these principles are realised (Rawls, 1991: 472-479; Patten, 
1996: 39). Rawls contends that citizens will bond together when just institutions are threatened 
not simply from pure, principled altruism but because they can learn to view their society as “a 
cooperative venture for mutual advantage” where the pooling of individual talents works to 
the benefit of all (Rawls, 1991: 4, 520-30; Patten, 1996: 39). Rawls clarifies this position in 
Political Liberalism, arguing that political societies can unite around a principle of reciprocity 
that falls between a purely altruistic commitment to the general good and a purely self-
interested regard for one’s present or future individual advantage (1993: 15-16). Patten thus 
believes that Taylor misleads in his neat distinction between the other-regarding and self-
interested motivational bases of public service available to procedural liberals and that this 
weakens Taylor’s contention that a commitment to procedural justice could not inspire the 
prolonged defence of free social institutions (Patten, 1996).  
Patten has, moreover, argued that Taylor, by distancing himself in “Cross-Purposes” 
from the claim that a life devoted to public service is inherently more dignified than a life 
                                                
54 Taylor does not directly name Rawls in “Cross-Purposes” but, as Patten points out, Rawls does implicitly 
appear to be the most direct target of Taylor’s criticisms, which are directed at the “apolitical attachment to 
universal principle…that is central to modern ethics of rule by law” (Taylor, 1995a: 187; Patten, 1996: 39). For 
another defence of Rawls’s understanding of citizen virtue against Taylor, see Greg Hill’s interesting discussion 
in Hill 1993. Hill argues that a theory of citizenship can be distilled from A Theory of Justice that demonstrates 
how citizens bonded in a shared understanding of the right will be motivated to rise in defence of their free 
institutions when these are confronted with illiberal threats. This they will do not exclusively for the instrumental 
individual benefit that comes of such defence but because Rawlsian citizenship inclines citizens to understand the 
political institutions of their community as “the social arrangements through which they both cooperate for 
mutual advantage and express their nature as free and equal citizens” (Hill, 1993: 81). 
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wholly given over to private pursuits, in fact endorses a model of civic participation that is not 
unlike Rawls’s account of the rational grounds for upholding freedom-promoting principles of 
justice and protecting just institutions (Patten, 1996). Patten argues that Taylor, despite his 
protestations to the contrary, is best understood as advancing an “instrumental republicanism”, 
where the value of active citizenship and civic virtue can be defended either because of its 
inherent worth or because it stands as a causal requirement of maintaining a system of equal 
negative liberties that allows citizens to pursue their own individual or collective interests 
(Patten, 1996). As Patten explains,  
 
[i]t is important, for Taylor, that individuals regard citizenship as a (non-instrumental) good, not just 
because it is a good, but because it contributes to the preservation of a free society. The thesis about 
what Taylor calls the ‘viability’ of free institutions is an instrumental claim:…it is a defence of public 
service and civic virtue which is distinct from the more traditional Aristotelian view that citizenship is 
an essential component of the good life (1996: 37; emphasis in original).  
 
As I understand him, Patten wishes to argue, along with Rawls, that rejecting the Aristotelian 
prioritisation of a life of public service as a privileged locus of the good life allows us to 
accept that political participation will be of purely instrumental value to the self-realisation of 
many (though not all) moderns, without this compromising their capacity for living a good life. 
This does not mean that political participation is not good, but just that it does not invariably 
feature in every good life plan (Patten, 1996: 37; Rawls, 1993: 205-06). On this instrumental 
view, civic virtue is up for grabs where our negative freedoms are not threatened, and we 
cannot categorically say that a life wholly given over to private pursuits has failed to live up to 
some generally binding standard of the human good.  
 
4.1.4 The republican thesis II: patriotism as a common good  
Patten may well be correct in maintaining that Taylor mischaracterises the motivational 
account of political participation that neo-Kantian procedural liberals like Rawls must appeal 
to as exclusively other-regarding. Just as, in Chapter Three, we said that the universalism of 
the moral point of view endorsed by Rawls is not some perspective-taking situated outside of 
our shared beliefs but within them, so too the universalistic fellow-feeling that comes of this is 
needn’t be some abstracted, apolitical regard for others but rather occupies a middle position 
between pure altruism and pure self-regard of just the sort that Taylor hopes to outline. We 
could therefore agree with Taylor’s premise that people will only be motivated to demonstrate 
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civic virtue when this is tied to the affirmation of some particularistic good without rejecting a 
neo-Kantian proceduralism like that defended by Rawls.  
 This aspect of Patten’s argument is, I think, compelling. I believe he is nonetheless 
quite mistaken to claim that Taylor defends an “instrumental patriotism”. This is because there 
is a more challenging argument about citizen freedom and dignity to be found in “Cross-
purposes” and elsewhere that Patten fails to consider. Taylor, I believe, wants to challenge 
procedural liberal accounts of the social preconditions of freedom not by presuming a basic 
sense of justice55 and deriving principles of civic virtue from this, but by questioning at a more 
fundamental level what gives rise to the sense of justice and how best we characterise it. Thus 
contrasting Taylor’s account of civic virtue with Rawls’s only takes us so far, and we need to 
consider Taylor’s grounds for rejecting the notion that self-interest will secure social co-
operation in pursuit of the good where a shared conception of justice is generally lacking. 
While Taylor does appear to believe that his non-instrumental account of republican freedom 
is not accommodated by thinkers like Rawls, this is best read as an external criticism that 
points out a gap in Rawls’s theory without necessarily claiming that the theory lacks internal 
coherence. Moreover, the target of Taylor’s polemic here is less the atomistic theories that he 
seldom names56 than the more general atomistic mindset that he believes is characteristic of 
Western modernity. 
Taylor’s position here builds on the contention that patriotic commitment to civic 
virtue and active citizenship may be construed as a common good, in the sense of the 
undecomposable or “irreducibly social” goods discussed in Chapter Two. Because these goods 
are those upon which we build our identities, Patten’s insistence that Taylor’s republicanism is 
inescapably instrumental is misleading. Taylor believes that in explaining what gives rise to 
the sense of justice we must have recourse to affective ties with members of a community 
upon whom we are dependent for attaining the irreducibly social goods we seek and with 
whom we are therefore forced to reach agreement. If Taylor is right to claim that atomistic 
                                                
55 I don’t mean to imply here that Rawls lacks an account of how we derive a sense of justice, and Rawls’s 
discussion of the development of the sense of justice and the principles of reciprocity in Theory, ch.8 clearly are 
intended to work this problem out (Rawls, 1991: 478-96; Hill, 1993: 76-81).  My point here is only that this is not 
where Rawls believes the burden of his theory lies. Rawls’s derivation of his principles of justice presumes an 
ideal situation of what he calls full compliance where, in working out the basic principles of justice in the original 
position, deliberators are presumed to be rational, sincere and without envy (Rawls, 1991: 142-47; 245-46; Patten, 
1996: 43).  
56 Where he does list actual representatives of this atomistic view in passing, Taylor mentions the theories of 
interest group pluralism formulated by David B. Truman and David Easton and elite theories of democracy as 
these have been defended by Jospeh Schumpeter and Robert Dahl (1995a: 143, n.12; 195, n.16). More generally, 
Taylor appears to believe that this view is central to modern forms of utilitarianism such as welfare economics, 
whose intellectual ancestors he takes to be Hobbes, Locke and Bentham (1995a: 127-29, 137-38, 142-144). As 
Taylor feels no compulsion to discuss the details of these theories, I take it that he wishes to read them as, in large 
part, symptomatic of the atomistic common-sense that he considers a definitive feature of the modern Western 
identity (1995a: 188).    
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theories cannot account for irreducibly social goods, and if the account of patriotism that 
Taylor advances, while avoiding Aristotelian doctrines of the superior value of a life devoted 
to public service, describes one such good, then he really does provide an account of political 
commitment and freedom that procedural liberals cleaving to an atomist social ontology are 
incapable of defending.57  
For Taylor, we saw, public goods are not an analytically homogenous category. 
Convergent goods are not goods in the strict sense at all, and are decomposable into the 
individual goods that they make available, while common or irreducibly social goods are 
formed through ever-evolving cultural developments or acts of common focus between people 
or groups and are always nothing less than the common property of all involved. Moreover, 
convergent goods are only instrumentally, contingently valuable, while irreducibly social 
goods are of intrinsic worth. As Taylor puts it in SS, “some of the most crucial human 
fulfilments…are not possible even in principle for a sole human being”; we are brought 
together in society not just for personal advantage but in pursuit of goods that are not realised 
within people so much as between them (1989: 40, n.20). This is a claim not about the 
provision of goods but about their enjoyment. Taylor believes that this is a thesis with 
important political consequences, and that civic humanist theories 58  draw this political 
significance out:  
 
The very definition of a republican regime as classically understood requires an ontology different from 
atomism, falling outside atomist-infected common sense. It requires that we probe relations of identity 
and community, and distinguish different possibilities, in particular the possible place of we-identities as 
                                                
57 Patten acknowledges that there may be a real disagreement between Taylor and procedural liberals, but not for 
this reason. Patten argues that, while we may insist that our brand of patriotism is fused to the particularistic good 
of some historical community in such a manner that it is irreconcilable with the Rawlsian conception of justice, 
this insistence takes us beyond the bounds of liberalism (Patten, 1996: 40). Not only does Patten believe this step 
is unnecessary, because it exaggerates the shortcomings of the procedural account, but he also argues that it is 
also possible to “question whether non-liberal patriotism is really likely to be instrumental to the preservation of a 
free society” (Patten, 1996: 41). However, even if Taylor ultimately advances a model of patriotism that is best 
characterised as “non-liberal” (Patten, 1996: 40), I suspect that this whole way of putting the issue inadvertently 
obscures Taylor’s position. Taylor is less concerned with outlining any particular advocacy position than he is 
with establishing at an ontological level that there is a mode of patriotic allegiance that is not instrumentally 
motivated, and as such possesses a moral quality that atomistic variants of procedural liberalism necessarily 
misrepresent. In so doing Taylor wishes to extend our understanding of the intelligible range of advocacy 
positions that are available to us, without definitively ruling in favour of any one of them.  
58 Taylor also mentions “various socialist theories” and “theories of sex complementarity”, but does very little to 
discuss either of these in the works we are considering here (1989: 40, n.20). While a consideration of these 
issues falls outside the province of this thesis, Ian Frasier discusses Taylor’s relationship with Marxist thought in 
great detail in his informative book Dialectics of the Self: Transcending Charles Taylor (2007). For those 
interested in exploring Taylor’s relationship to feminist thought (or, more accurately, his potential relationship, as 
Taylor in fact has very little to say about feminist theory in any of his works) see Susan Wolf’s “Comment” in 
MPR (Wolf, 1992: 75-85). A lengthier discussion of this issue appears in Melissa A. Orlie’s article “Taylor and 
Feminism: From Recognition of Identity to a Politics of the Good” (Orlie in Abbey ed., 2004: 140-65).  
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against merely convergent I-identities, and the consequent role of common as against convergent goods 
(1995a: 192).  
 
In “Cross-Purposes” Taylor identifies a stronger version of the republican thesis that 
levels a challenge at instrumental accounts of the social requirements of freedom that may be 
difficult for procedural liberals to dismiss, and I believe it is to this stronger version of the 
republican thesis that he generally appeals when criticising procedural liberalism. It is, for our 
purposes, also the more interesting line of argumentation insofar as it builds upon some of the 
central conceptual constructs informing Taylor’s holistic social ontology and in so doing 
illustrates his concern to demonstrate the relevance of ontological reflection to normative 
political debates. The stronger republican thesis shares with the weaker thesis an emphasis 
upon the need for active, participatory citizenship in non-despotic societies but also 
differentiates between free and despotic regimes on what might be called purely moral or 
motivational grounds. “If we call [the] basic proposition connecting patriotism and freedom 
the ‘republican thesis’”, writes Taylor, “then we can speak of narrower and broader forms of 
this, with the former focused on purely participatory freedom and the latter taking in the 
broader gamut of liberties” (Taylor, 1995a: 193). The stronger version of the republican thesis 
defines non-despotism 
 
not just in terms of participation, but by a broader gamut of freedoms, including negative ones. It 
would…argue a link between the solidarity of patriotism and free institutions, on the ground that a free 
society needs this kind of motivation to provide what despotisms get through fear; to engender the 
disciplines, the sacrifices, the essential contributions it needs to keep going, as well as to mobilize 
support in its defense when threatened (Taylor, 1995a: 193).  
 
Even where members of both free and despotic societies are called upon to observe 
similar restraints and sacrifices in the name of the collective good, their motivations for doing 
so will differ (Taylor, 1995a: 193). While conformity to the laws, the paying of taxes, and the 
like can be exacted coercively, civic humanists argue that an essential difference between free 
societies and despotisms is that members of the former have good reason to observe these 
restraints in a self-disciplining fashion out of a sense of dignity rooted in patriotic virtue, while 
in the latter dispensation subjects will only be motivated to act out of fear of punishment 
(Taylor, 1995a: 187, 192-93). Though both behaviours may be outwardly identical, the moral 
quality of the action differs profoundly, with the committed republican acting in an uncoerced 
manner – from an “inwardly generated sense of honour and obligation” – that expresses his 
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freedom, while his counterpart in the despotism will be acting out of submission to externally-
imposed authority (Taylor, 1995a: 193).  
In establishing a connection between patriotism and freedom the stronger republican 
thesis is not only an argument that outlines the extra, participatory dimension of freedom 
corresponding to the second aspect of positive freedom that we isolated above; it offers this, 
but in a manner that Taylor believes is uncommon among liberals. The stronger republican 
thesis argues that citizen participation and sacrifice are indispensable aspects of freedom, 
while also stressing that the motivational quality of such undertakings must be of a certain 
type for them to count as truly promoting freedom. A corollary of this is that even when it 
comes to defending negative freedom alone, the reasons in virtue of which we are motivated 
to do so will also play a part in determining whether or not our actions give expression to our 
freedom and dignity or undermine it. As I understand Taylor, he wishes to claim that even if it 
turned out that procedural liberals could provide a convincing account of how a healthy regard 
for their own negatively-defined individual freedoms could motivate people to engage in 
public service and shoulder the burdens of active citizenship, they would have to say 
something more about why these individuals choose to defend these freedoms if they are to 
meaningfully distinguish between free and unfree activity. Put in the terminology Taylor 
employs in SS, we might say that the defender of negative liberty envisaged here would have 
to move from a mode of argumentation based on action-descriptions alone to a more articulate 
moral psychology that considers also reasons for action (1989: 78-81).  
Critics of Taylor’s republicanism who fail to address the specifically motivational 
dimension of his critique of atomist accounts of freedom will, like Alan Patten, fail to see how 
Taylor’s civic humanist arguments for the defence of freedom might really challenge liberal 
political theories or the common-sense opinions of those that do allow for the need to protect 
free institutions from illiberal challenges (Patten, 1996). Taylor’s concern with distinguishing 
the motivational quality of free from unfree action must be emphasised. His argument is not 
that, in maintaining and protecting the institutions of a political society, the republican will be 
acting to protect the causal guarantors of his (negatively defined) freedom, as opposed to the 
oppressed subject who will be shoring up the power that oppresses him, though this may also 
be true. If this were the extent of Taylor’s critique, then Patten might rightly insist on calling it 
a version of “instrumental republicanism”.  
In setting out the stronger republican thesis Taylor distinguishes between free and 
unfree collective action by appeal to a thesis about human identity that builds on a holistic 
social ontology: 
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Every political society requires some sacrifices and demands some disciplines from its members….In a 
despotism, a regime where the mass of citizens are subject to the rule of a single master or a clique, the 
requisite disciplines are maintained by coercion. In order to have a free society, one has to replace this 
coercion with something else. This can only be a willing identification with the polis on the part of the 
citizens, a sense that the political institutions in which they live are an expression of themselves (Taylor, 
1995a: 187). 
 
Taylor’s argument in favour of the stronger republican thesis develops the claim that, where 
an agent’s self-understanding acknowledges no essential, constitutive bond of identity 
between himself and the broader political community, sacrifices for the good of this 
community must appear, at best, as necessary evils either endured out of a sense of altruistic 
self-sacrifice or undertaken out of enlightened self-interest, and this is the sense of his 
distinction between his own view of civic virtue and the egoistic and altruistic alternatives he 
outlines (Taylor, 1995a: 194-95). Taylor wants to argue that, conversely, where an agent 
views communal belonging as an essential feature of his identity, because belonging to that 
community is an indispensable condition of realising the goods the he acknowledges, and 
where the object of this communal sentiment is a political society constituted of freedom-
promoting practices and institutions, common action that aims to benefit such a collective 
cannot but also benefit the individual agent (Taylor, 1995a).59  
 In order to adopt the second view, it is necessary to concede that, in addition to their 
own singular purposes, people also seek fulfilments that by definition could not be valued or 
realised other than through participating in a particular collective enterprise, where this 
participation is not a precondition of attaining such fulfilments but is itself partially 
constitutive of the fulfilment. This is as true of intimate relationships of friendship and love as 
it is of public relationships of respectful, open exchange between political equals pursuing 
common goals (Taylor, 1995a: 138-39; 190). Such claims are necessarily at odds with liberal 
theories that build on an atomistic social ontology because atomism cannot convincingly 
account for common space created through the collective action of agents sharing we-
identities. For atomists, As Taylor pithily puts it, “the action is collective, but the point of it 
                                                
59 As I understand him, Taylor wishes to argue that in the latter case, commitment to the community is of non-
contingent value and unrepudiable in reason. The agent in question will be willing to sacrifice the pursuit of his 
own individual goods where doing so is required to maintain the free institutions of his society without 
perceiving this as an external impediment to his will because the society will cohere in an understanding and 
pursuit of the good that he shares. What is different in these two cases is that in the former the agent acts in 
accordance with reasons that appeal to the goods constitutive of his I-identity, while in the latter scenario the 
agent possessing civic virtue also factors the goods constitutive of his we-identity into his deliberation. To the 
extent that the identity of the patriot is dialogically constituted, these goods will be harmonious and where they 
do conflict he is able to balance his own individual good against the collective good that he acknowledges and at 
times sacrifice the former for the latter without this necessarily constituting an absolute diminishment of his 
freedom. 
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remains individual….[and the] common good is constituted out if individual goods, without 
remainder” (Taylor, 1995a: 188). Atomistic versions of procedural liberalism will, accordingly, 
not wish to grant Taylor’s conception of common goods validity as an ontological category 
(Taylor, 1995a).60 While an atomistic theory might comfortably concede that the goods it 
affirms cannot, for practical reasons, be secured without an agent belonging to a society of 
some sort that makes provisions for their attainment, it could not concede that an essential 
condition of realising certain goods is co-operative action undertaken out of a shared identity. 
To do so would be a step out of atomism, because it would be to acknowledge that attributing 
freedom to an individual, even where this is negatively defined, requires that the agent in 
question affirms at the very least a patriotism that has as its object the substantive common 
good of a particular community (Taylor, 1995a).  
Taylor’s contention, then, is that collective social action in defence of free political 
institutions, where this is undertaken out of a sense of patriotism, is a good of precisely this 
latter variety. Assuming this patriotism is affirmed through a willing individual identification 
with a greater good, the commitments that come of it needn’t be conceived as a limit upon the 
scope of individual freedom but as an essential component of its expression. In defending a 
society committed to upholding individual rights against internal or external threats to these 
rights, and whatever else might be demonstrated to conform to the demands of justice, we will 
be defending our freedom not simply because we act in accordance with the demands of 
justice that all rational persons are committed to affirming as a condition of realising their own 
life goals. Taylor, I believe, is arguing that we are free because we maintain that in virtue of 
which we will have a love of justice at all. And while liberals like Rawls may be right to say 
that regarding the universal demands of justice will lead us into affirming the value of some 
particular society that is geared toward the fair and co-operative realisation of shared goods, 
Taylor would point out that we have a regard for justice by first possessing a patriotic 
identification with the values of a justice-respecting society.  
 Relating the issue of civic virtue to that of moral motivation this way, I suspect, does 
something to clear up the issue between procedural liberals and Taylor concerning whether 
political commitment is necessarily directed toward a particular society. Taylor believes that 
civic virtue can issue from a collective affirmation of justice or the right, but only because the 
principles of right that we thereby affirm are those that are integral to our identities as 
                                                
60 Taylor’s reasoning here, which has been outlined more extensively in Chapter Two, is that, for an atomist 
committed to methodological individualism, subjectivism and an instrumental understanding of the value of 
social relationships, talk of common goods in the sense of irreducibly social goods is inherently obfuscatory. 
Where all shared goods are understood as good only in virtue of the individual fulfilments that they facilitate, and 
only need to be shared in accordance with whether they satisfy desires and purposes that happen, de facto, to be 
best served by collective action, a picture of shared goods as convergent goods necessarily emerges. 
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members of justice-respecting communities, without which these principles would fail to make 
a strong motivational claim on us. Procedural liberals can accept this, but then they must also 
accept holism. Although Taylor does not explicitly describe it in these terms, he views 
patriotism as an immediately common good. Such goods, as we said in Chapter Two, are good 
in virtue of being constitutive of the political dimension of our identities. If these goods are 
integrally bound up with our identities, we can only value them instrumentally at the cost of 
taking certain features of our identities themselves to be up for grabs. Because patriotism, for 
Taylor, is an essential condition of freedom, in passing patriotic commitments up we could not 
be said to violate a transcendental condition of personhood but we would relinquish an 
essential condition of the unhindered exercise of free agency.  
But if this is so, then Allen Patten’s claim, which we considered above, that Taylor’s 
republicanism is instrumentally valuable must surely be misleading. Still, Patten’s challenge to 
Taylor remains in that Taylor has to give some constructive account of the non-instrumental 
value of patriotism while also steering clear of the Aristotelian claims that he repudiates, and it 
is to this problem that we must now turn. Exploring Taylor’s position on this issue will also 
allow us to reconnect to the observation with which this chapter opened, where we discussed 
Taylor’s fear of a creeping “soft despotism” within procedural republics.    
 
4.2 Taylor’s politics of the common good  
From the ontological foundation set out in the republican theses, Taylor believes that we will 
be inclined to endorse two further advocacy orientations, one concerning the practical political 
culture most conducive to guaranteeing that the dignity we assign to free agents is respected 
and the other concerning the desirable limits of state neutrality in liberal societies. I discuss the 
first of these here, while in the following chapter I examine the issue of state neutrality. 
 
4.2.1 Instrumental patriotism  
We do well to recall here Taylor’s empirical concern with the excessive bureaucratisation of 
modern Western states, which he believes encourages citizen alienation from the vehicles of 
collective mobilisation and in so doing diminishes the freedom and dignity of all citizens. This 
syndrome Taylor takes to be symptomatic of the practice of procedural politics. In the United 
States, which Taylor considers the paradigm of the procedural republic, we find an insular 
mode of politics where mutually unconcerned or estranged groups mobilise diminishing 
popular support in the defence of narrow agendas defined by single-issue campaigns, lobbies 
or petitions (Taylor, 1995a: 200; 1991a; 1992). Using either these institutions or the courts, 
individuals seek to secure their dignity through the retrieval of their individual rights and 
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through measures taken to ensure that the state shows an equal regard for the preferences of its 
citizens. No absolute value is placed on participation in these representative institutions on this 
model, and the co-operative action that they facilitate is only conceived as a good insofar as it 
is instrumental to furthering the individual goods of all participants. Where these goods are not 
threatened, participation is only valuable, at best, as one personal preference among other 
equally worthwhile life choices and, where they are, participation is likely to proceed in an 
adversarial spirit that is inimical to a sense of patriotic solidarity (Taylor, 1995a: 200). Taylor 
believes that, while it may act as a counter-balance to the disempowerment that comes of 
bureaucratic centralisation, this form of political mobilisation doesn’t go far enough in 
providing persons with a sense that they are able to effectively realise their purposes in the 
world. Without this sense of “efficacy”, which undermines our ability to attain the goods 
around which our political identities are built, our self-identification as free and dignified 
subjects is imperilled (1995a; 2005a: 73, 94).61  
 
4.2.2 Participatory patriotism and citizen dignity 
Taylor contrasts the model of association described above, which I will call an “instrumental 
patriotism”, with an alternative model that, following Taylor, we can refer to as a 
“participatory patriotism”.62 On this alternative, citizen dignity cannot be secured unless 
individuals participate, at least part of the time, in co-operative activity, and unless they are 
joined in this activity through a shared sense of common purpose that takes their collective 
participation itself to be part of the good that they seek (Taylor, 1995a: 200). Rights 
reclamation and single-issue campaigning, on this model, are not enough to secure citizen 
dignity; in addition, citizens need to work together in a spirit of solidarity and tolerance within 
shared institutions and practices in order to forge consensus and build majorities when shaping 
the rules defining their common association (Taylor, 1995a; 2005a). This is a normative claim, 
but Taylor does not consider it exceedingly utopian. Within the Western countries outside of 
the United States – and Taylor is concerned chiefly, but not exclusively, with Canada – 
national unity frequently appears to be built around this participatory model of patriotism 
(Taylor, 1995a: 203).  
                                                
61 In places, Taylor also identifies the sense of efficacy with our capacity as producers linked into a technological 
nexus of economic activity through which we are able to collectively transform nature and shape it to our ends 
(1985b; 2005a: 74). I do not discuss this below owing to my concern with the specifically political dimension of 
Taylor’s work, and this is in keeping with Taylor’s own overwhelming concern with the political determinants of 
efficacy alone. Taylor believes that, while threats to a society’s economic capacity can undermine political 
stability, the real threats to stability come through an inability of the state to fulfil the political principles upon 
which it is founded (1985a: 248).  
62 In speaking of a participatory patriotism I am borrowing Taylor’s term of art from Reconciling the Solitudes 
(2005a: 92). There he refers to what I am calling “instrumental patriotism” as a “patriotism of rights”. 
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Taylor holds in “Cross-Purposes” that these two models of patriotism are 
incommensurable, although elsewhere he views them as ideal types which in practice are 
usually found in some admixture within all modern states.63 He is admittedly better disposed 
to the participatory model, but allows that philosophical speculation alone may be insufficient 
to decide the issue. It may well be that the institutional life and shared historical experience of 
the United States makes the instrumental model more viable there while in other countries the 
participatory model will be better suited to securing the dignity of its citizens, but this would 
have to be decided by appeal to empirically-derived criteria (Taylor, 1995a: 200; 2005a: 99-
100). What Taylor does hope to establish definitively, however, is that this advocacy choice 
only arises once we abandon atomism at the ontological level. From within the limits of 
atomism, even where we accept the importance of patriotic citizen commitment, the 
instrumental model of patriotism will seem the only lucid formulation of the grounds of citizen 
virtue, while endorsing a holistic ontology makes the participatory model an intelligible 
alternative.  
 
4.2.3 Deliberative democracy and decentralisation 
Endorsing a positive conception of freedom and a participatory model of patriotism also 
predisposes us, Taylor believes, to endorsing at the advocacy level a thoroughly inclusive 
form of political life within modern, liberal societies that can offset the tendency toward 
centralisation.64 Taylor prefers to consider the ends of common association to be definitive of 
a society’s liberal standing. In “Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere”, Taylor defines liberal 
society as, at the very least, a society that endeavours “to realize in the highest possible degree 
                                                
63 For the latter view, see especially Taylor’s discussion of the “participatory” and “rights” models of society in 
“Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity and Alienation in Late-Twentieth-Century Canada” (2005a: 92) and 
the discussion of “institutions that serve” and “institutions that identify” in “Institutions in National Life” (2005a: 
132), both of which appear in Reconciling the Solitudes.  
64 Taylor’s preferred definition of liberal society makes no direct appeal to the institutional forms and procedures 
that are commonly associated with the liberal democratic state. Representative government, the rule of law, 
regimes of entrenched rights recoverable by judicial review, and mechanisms for the division and decentralisation 
of political power will, in all likelihood, appear in some form in all such societies. So too will the extra-political 
or “extra-parliamentary” bodies of free association that are commonly considered indispensable to developing an 
atmosphere of freedom within society, and which, in post-Hegelian terminology, are discussed under the head of 
“civil society” (1995a: 257-59; 286). These bodies include non-political associations like the market economy 
and the various fora for conducting public debate that constitute the public sphere, and indeed any system of 
organisation facilitating collective action across an entire society independently of the state system (Taylor, 
1995a: 258-59).  
While we would struggle to identify a society that entirely lacked these institutions and practices as 
liberal, Taylor believes that the multiplicity of forms that these take in the diverse liberal societies of today makes 
generalisation at this level insupportable (1995a: 257-59). This is particularly true if we consider the complex 
“alternative modernities” in which many contemporary nations are negotiating unique versions of liberal society 
that diverge in considerable ways from the original Western models (1995a: xi-xii).  
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certain goods or principles of right. We might think of it as trying to maximize the goods of 
freedom and collective self-rule, in conformity with rights founded on equality” (1995a: 258). 
Whatever else it may be, “a free self-governing society…is…a society in which (a) 
people form their opinions freely, both as individuals and in coming to a common mind, and 
(b) these common opinions matter – they in some way take effect on or control government” 
(Taylor, 1995a: 260). Within the modern West representative democracy has become the 
accepted form through which opinions are channelled into a social choice function. Taylor 
considers it vitally necessary that such democratic decisions are uncoerced and well-informed, 
accurately reflecting the opinions and aspirations of the people and free of the distortions of 
misinformation, prejudice and irrational fear (Taylor, 1998b: 273). Modern liberal 
democracies also ideally attempt to realise the principle that political decisions be broadly 
representative, emphasising that such decisions, if they are to be counted as legitimate, must 
be reached through consensus or majority vote by equal and autonomous agents (Taylor, 
1995a: 273; 1998b: 143-44). It is with the latter principle, which underscores the value of 
popular sovereignty and sees inclusivity as the fundamental source of democratic legitimacy, 
that Taylor’s political philosophy is most directly concerned.  
If democratic dialogue is to prove fruitful, all parties must be mutually acquainted, 
capable of understanding one another’s positions and submitting arguments that inter-refer, 
and willing to freely adapt their own original views in accordance with these exchanges. This 
presumes that the members possess a basic set of shared meanings and understand themselves 
to be engaged in common deliberative activity, where this common understanding makes the 
decisions that they reach qualitatively different from those arising fortuitously in the from of 
convergent understandings (Taylor, 1995a: 260-62). Taylor explains:  
 
A democratic state is constantly facing new questions, and it aspires to form a consensus on these 
questions, not merely to reflect the balance of individual opinions. A joint decision emerging from joint 
deliberation requires that each person's opinion be able to take shape or be reformed in the light of 
discussion with others. This necessarily implies a degree of cohesion. To some extent, the members 
must know one another, listen to one another, and understand one another (1998b: 143). 
 
Where such solidarity exists, discussion in common space is capable of yielding decisions that 
belong to a group that have forged what we called in Chapter Two a “we”-identity through 
active dialogue, which will be qualitatively distinct from the decisions emerging from a 
composite body of people possessing “I”-identities. Taylor wants to argue that agreement 
forged among groups of the latter variety can only ride on fortuitously convergent 
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understandings, while groups of the former sort are also capable of reaching decisions 
predicated on common understandings.  
We can, following John Horton, refer to the former scenario as the “instrumental” view 
of democracy (1998: 163).65 On this view, mutual estrangement between citizens is not seen as 
an inherently negative feature of the democratic decision-making process, provided that there 
is enough overlap of individual agreement for a workable majority consensus to form. Here 
the ideal of democratic rule has been met when there has been free political discussion in the 
media and when the casting of ballots has functioned to aggregate individual interests or 
preferences into a collective decision designed to elect representative assemblies and 
executive office-holders in accordance with satisfactory norms of non-manipulation (Taylor, 
1995a: 274; Horton, 1998: 163).  
Taylor does not reject the instrumental view wholesale but rather considers it unduly 
limited, arguing that it fails to adequately consider the manner in which open debate within a 
political community can actively forge alliances among previously unreconciled groups or 
retain civil relations capable of abiding enduring group disagreements (1995a). As Horton puts 
it, Taylor is dissatisfied with the instrumental view’s inability to allow for “the transformative 
possibilities inherent in democratic decision-making” (1998: 163). When engaged in activities 
like voting people needn’t simply act out of individual interest. We frequently understand 
ourselves to be part of a community, and are capable of entering into discussion with others 
and modifying our own conception of the good to accord with that of a community with which 
we identify and with other communities that share this common good (Taylor, 1995a: 277). 
 I have attempted to demonstrate above that Taylor’s dissatisfaction with the tendency 
toward centralisation within procedural republics, which we mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, is best understood within the context of his polemical engagement with the 
instrumental view of democracy that he attributes to procedural liberalism. While he is 
extremely cautious about offering general institutional recommendations for how to remedy 
this situation, he does recurrently argue for the need for political decentralisation that can 
function to stimulate the civic participation that he believes procedural publics sorely lack. 
Taylor argues that collective self-rule in the mass societies of today, both within the 
                                                
65 In “Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere” Taylor calls this the “objective-interest view” of democratic 
decision-making, while in MPR and elsewhere he associates it with neo-Kantian versions of procedural 
liberalism (1995a: 275; 1992). The first appellation refers to the notion that the legitimacy of democratic 
decisions is simply a function of their proportionate fit with pre-determined individual interests. The second 
highlights the idea that an individual’s primary interests are best determined through a monological mode of 
practical reasoning to which communal affiliation is ultimately of only instrumental value. In both cases 
communal belonging, however practically useful, is ultimately external to the determination of our most basic, 
identity-defining purposes.   
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contemporary West and beyond, requires a “double decentralization” that serves to empower 
regional societies and to create what he calls “nested public spheres”, which function to 
channel the voices of multitudes of ordinary citizens into a coherent national debate capable of 
reaching conclusions that will be taken into account in the deliberations of major political 
actors (1995a: 280). The first aspect of decentralisation pictured here entails a devolution of 
key government functions from a geographical centre to more localised units. The second 
aspect entails the parallel development of a multiplicity of local public spheres66 that discuss 
the political affairs of local government bodies, as well as political parties and social 
movements like feminist and ecological campaigns that maintain a lively internal debate that 
is maximally open to the public (Taylor, 1995a: 279-80). Through the formation of such 
bodies it is possible to channel the concerns of large numbers of people toward the political 
centre and in so doing break the hold of elitist lobbies on government decisions and large 
media interests on national debates (Taylor, 1995a: 279-80). Taylor’s ideal is not only of a 
proliferation of participatory vehicles, but “a kind of symbiosis” between them (1995a: 286). 
The discussions carried on in smaller public spheres need to be routed into a larger national 
debate, and all these voices need to have an effect on government.  
 
4.3 Conclusion 
It is important to note that Taylor doesn’t wish to impugn procedural liberalism wholesale. 
Just as, in Chapter Three, we saw that those advocating procedural theories of justification can 
render their ethical positions intelligible by spelling out the meta-theory in virtue of which 
their formal procedures should be accepted, so too we have seen here that Taylor believes 
procedural liberalism can answer the viability objection by forsaking its atomist commitments 
and redescribing itself in holistic ontological categories (1995a: 202). What the above 
discussion points to is that, while Patten is right to claim that Taylor does not directly disagree 
with procedural liberals about the object of our patriotic allegiance, Taylor does suggest that 
                                                
66 Taylor describes the public sphere as “a common space in which the members of a society meet, through a 
variety of media (print, electronic) and also in face-to-face encounters, to discuss matters of common interest; and 
thus to be able to form a common mind about those matters” (1995a: 259). Though composed of geographically 
and temporally diffused exchanges by multiple actors, these actors are, in principle, meant to be inter-
communicating, and it is in virtue of this that the public sphere may be considered a unitary “common space” of 
the sort discussed in Chapter Two (Taylor, 1995a: 259). In addition to the need for constant inter-referral between 
the arguments of the various interlocutors brought into mutual exchange through the public sphere, and for these 
exchanges to function as critical arguments working toward a potentially singular conclusion, it is essential that 
all interlocutors understand themselves to be engaged in an act of common deliberation (Taylor, 1995a: 262). 
Without this element of common understanding, there would be no way of distinguishing between opinions that 
happen, contingently, to converge, and those that have been forged through a process of collective deliberation. 
In doing away with the distinction between common and convergent understandings we lose also the ability to 
morally distinguish the normative values of, say, an opinion poll from that of a lively debate conducted in the 
media or in face-to-face encounters (1995a: 263, n.5). 
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they fail to account for its origins. Moreover, and contrary to Allen Patten’s contentions, 
Taylor does have a serious disagreement with procedural liberals about the value of patriotic 
allegiance, categorically considering it a non-instrumental good that is essential component of 
citizen dignity. We thus do well to foster a participatory patriotism and build decentralised 
democratic practices that empower citizens to shape the conditions under which they will live 
together.    
Taylor admits, however, that arguing for the participatory, communally-oriented 
requirements of democratic decision-making raises problems of its own. A fundamental 
dilemma that all liberal democracies must resolve is that the need for democratic decisions to 
emerge from a body of deliberators that have forged a common identity through uncoerced 
dialogue threatens to undermine another fundamental liberal value: the toleration of difference 
that liberals take to be a fundamental feature of any equal and just society. Modern liberal 
democracy therefore carries within itself a constitutional tension: “democracy is inclusive 
because it is the government of all the people; but paradoxically, this is also the reason that 
democracy tends toward exclusion. The exclusion is a by-product of the need, in self-
governing societies, of a high degree of cohesion” (Taylor, 1998b: 143). Where consensus on 
public policy cannot be secured in reasoned debate, there is a standing temptation to exclude 
dissenting parties from this debate altogether, thereby making a mockery of any democratic 
pretensions to inclusiveness. This problem is aggravated by the increasingly pluralistic nature 
of most modern states, where populations are fractured into groups possessing a multiplicity of 
distinct identities which are either new or which have existed in the past but have gone 
unrecognised. The felt need for democratic exclusion may result in attempts to block 
immigrants from obtaining citizenship, a much-discussed contemporary example of which is 
the treatment of “guest workers” in Germany (Taylor, 1998b: 145). But, aside from such legal 
measures, there may also develop a tendency to discuss public policy issues in sectarian terms 
and to regard newly enfranchised groups as outsiders (Taylor, 1998b: 146).  
Taylor warns against resolving the problem of inclusiveness at the price of sacrificing 
toleration of diversity, which he believes we have seen in both the premodern democracies of 
classical antiquity and the “Jacobin”, “Bolshevik” or “Marxist-Leninist” regimes of more 
recent times (1995a; 1998b). We might refer to Taylor’s characterisation of democracy in 
these societies as instantiations of a “general will” model of democracy with its roots in 
Rousseau’s thought (Taylor, 1995a: 221, 1998b; Horton, 1998). In these societies a rigid 
definition of politics and citizenship is laid down and vigorously defended against all 
challenges in the attempt to secure unanimity in democratic decisions. In such cases, we find 
another form of exclusion at work which “operates not primarily against certain people 
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already defined as outsiders, but against other ways of being. This formula forbids other 
modes of modern citizenship. It castigates as unpatriotic a way of living that does not 
subordinate other facets of identity to citizenship” (Taylor, 1998b: 147). It is to this problem – 
the pressing need to secure citizen participation in self-rule without requiring of citizens that 
they relinquish or downplay vital aspects of their extra-political identities in their public 
dealings – that we turn in the next chapter.   
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Chapter Five 
 
 
5. Cultural recognition, group survival and political fragmentation  
We saw, in the previous chapter, that one of the empirical failings of contemporary procedural 
republics that Taylor identifies is their tendency to undermine citizen participation in self-rule. 
This leads to a bureaucratisation of political life and a centralisation of power and, in the 
process, to a diminishment of the freedom of all citizens. This condition of citizen 
disempowerment is reinforced by an atomistic mindset that views civil participation as, at best, 
an instrumental good, while at the advocacy level it finds expression in a mode of practical 
politics that attempts to ensure respect for the dignity of all citizens by providing mechanisms 
of rights assertion and securing political representation through single-issue campaigns and 
lobbies. Conceptually, this view of social relations overlooks the manner in which active 
citizenship motivated by a patriotic identification with the common good is crucial to any 
fulfilled and dignified life, and practically it blinds people to the need for vigorous 
participatory initiatives to ensure citizen self-rule in a spirit of solidarity.  
 We might say that the problem Taylor identifies in this manner is one of an absolute 
disempowerment of all citizens within a given polity. But, most notably with the publication 
of MPR, another problem comes to the fore in Taylor’s political thinking, which is concerned 
also with the differential effects of disempowerment within a political society. Taylor believes 
that procedural liberalism is frequently insensitive to people’s particularity and, despite its 
attempts to be maximally tolerant, ultimately undermines toleration of group diversity. In this 
connection, Taylor argues that another empirical failing of procedural republics is their 
inability to adequately secure inter-group solidarity. The groups Taylor has in mind here are 
usually “cultures”, although his use of the term is uncommonly slippery. Taylor sometimes 
means by this a group united around a common particularistic identity through reliance upon a 
common set of moral frameworks and evaluative languages as well as through participation in 
shared social and political practices. In MPR, however, cultures are implicitly considered in 
abstraction from these social and political structures, and what unites them is cleavage to a 
common intellectual or spiritual creed (Rorty, A., 1994: 156).  
One of the dangers accompanying the breakdown of inter-cultural solidarity within a 
political society is that democratic legitimacy (and with it political stability) may be 
undermined. Any democratic community worth the name must be a deliberative community, 
and deliberative communities are bonded through a sense of shared identity that cuts across 
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group divisions. Where members of a group feel that they are not included in the democratic 
community’s self-understanding, and are for this reason not adequately represented in 
collective decision-making bodies, productive debate and social co-operation will decline and 
in its place a conflictual mode of political practice is likely to emerge with a zero-sum system 
of benefits and only absolute winners and losers (Taylor, 1991a; 1995a). Another danger 
attendant upon such communal rifts is that members of minority cultures are subject to the 
harm of misrecognition of the cultural dimension of their identities (Taylor, 1991a; 1992; 
1995a). Taylor argues that this misrecognition has damaging psychological consequences for 
these citizens and curtails their freedom. Given the moral harm of misrecognition, he then 
argues for state perfectionism in defence of disadvantaged cultural groups. 
I touch on the problem of democratic legitimacy only in passing here and focus instead 
on Taylor’s treatment of the latter, psychological or moral aspect of the problem, which he 
believes requires that we question the philosophical basis of liberal society. These are, 
however, not entirely distinct concerns for Taylor, who views them as complementary 
elements of a vicious circle. This, I believe, is why Taylor can claim that the psychological 
damage that he believes comes of cultural misrecognition constitutes a form of political 
oppression. The decline of communal solidarity leads to the disempowerment of all groups 
within society, but it is particularly damaging to minority and otherwise disadvantaged groups 
who, lacking numbers or political clout, can only reasonably hope to attain their shared 
cultural ends democratically through participation in a politics of mutual accommodation 
geared toward the pursuit of a good that the entire political community shares. The actual 
schedule of cultural goods sought will differ from one community to the next, but Taylor 
believes that they will be understood in every case by those who pursue them to be essential to 
the more encompassing good of cultural survival (1992; 2005a). Where the common good of a 
political society denigrates or ignores the demands that cultural groups consider essential to 
their survival, members of these groups are confronted with an untenable choice between 
affirming the value of their political attachments and accepting cultural decline or upholding 
their cultural ties at the cost of political alienation and effective disenfranchisement, where 
either choice results in a diminishment of their freedom.  
Where public policies fail to accommodate the needs of disadvantaged cultural groups 
in this way, intra-mural divisions within the political society may be the cause of a third 
empirical problem which Taylor refers to as political fragmentation (1991a; 1995a; 2005a). 
The danger posed by fragmentation is that people lose the ability to build political and extra-
political coalitions capable of influencing the political life of an entire society in accordance 
with a vision of the common good of the whole community. Fragmentation brings about  
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the breaking up of potential constituencies for majority coalitions behind multifaceted programs, 
designed to address the major problems of the society as a whole, into a congeries of campaigns for 
narrow objectives, each mobilizing a consistency determined to defend its turf at all costs (Taylor, 1995a: 
282).  
 
This, at a collective level, returns us to the political problem we encountered in the 
previous chapter, where we discussed Taylor’s fear that procedural liberalism undermines 
participatory patriotism and thereby also deprives people of the motivational foundation for 
securing their republican freedom and safeguarding their dignity through collective self-rule. 
But the problem that concerned us there was of a failure within procedural liberalism to place 
sufficient value on immediately common goods due to an inability to appreciate the non-
instrumental, identity-defining value of patriotic virtue; here, I will argue, the problem 
concerns a similar misunderstanding and neglect, but of mediately common or culturally-
conditioned goods, which are constitutive of what we called in Chapter One the cultural 
dimension of individual identity. Taylor’s dissatisfaction with procedural liberalism concerns 
not only its inclination to undermine patriotic affiliations by accounting for all common action 
in instrumental terms, but also its tendency to subordinate the value of particularistic cultural 
commitments to the pursuit of individual fulfilment or to universally-binding affiliations that 
bypass particularity and lay a direct moral claim upon individuals. Taylor argues that this 
latter advocacy orientation is attributable to an ontologically misconceived ideal of equality, 
which serves as the moral foundation for policies that, despite their best intentions, curtail 
rather than promote human freedom.  
 
5.1 Procedural liberalism, democratic exclusion and ethnocentrism 
In the previous chapter we saw that, faced with the viability objection to the feasibility of the 
rule of right as the foundation of social solidarity in modern Western societies, (neo-Kantian) 
procedural liberals can concede that their affirmation of the good of freedom also commits 
them to affirming the good of patriotism, where this patriotism is a participatory patriotism 
affirming the common good of a particular community. This does not invalidate their 
commitment to the rule of right, but places it on a holistic foundation by portraying this 
commitment as an immediately common good of inherent value. In this chapter I discuss 
another contention made by Taylor, who believes that making such concessions exposes 
procedural liberalism to the charge of unwittingly endorsing an ethnocentric model of practical 
political accommodation. Following Taylor’s usage in “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-
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Communitarian Debate” (1995a) we can refer to this as the ethnocentricity objection to 
procedural liberalism. Here Taylor’s accusation is that even if the cultural neutrality 
procedural liberalism aspires to is in principle realisable it may nonetheless turn out to be 
bogus in practice, and in furthering purportedly culturally neutral procedures designed to 
promote individual autonomy the state may in fact be furthering the substantive good of a 
culturally dominant community, albeit unintentionally. 
Even if state neutrality between rival understandings of the good life turned out to be a 
real possibility in some societies, Taylor argues that it would not to be so in all societies 
(1995a). While the United States may offer a model of a political society bonded in its 
commitment to the defence of free institutions alone, most modern societies, in addition to the 
defence of free institutions, are committed to the defence of a national culture organised 
around a shared commitment to the pre-political substantive good of a majority group’s 
language or historical traditions (Taylor, 1995a). Taylor invariably discusses issues of 
minority language rights in the Canadian province of Quebec in order to illustrate the 
difficulties that that face a country where members of a cultural sub-group within the political 
community generally believe that the grounds of their political allegiance cannot be 
formulated in abstraction from their shared commitment to a cultural good. The ongoing 
defence of French language rights, which many Quebeckers see as indispensable to the 
continued existence of their culture is, however, but one of many instances in which members 
of a disadvantaged or minority culture – in Quebec, the defenders of Quebec as a “distinct 
society” within the Canadian federation who claim to represent the interests of the 
Francophone majority in the province – feel that difference-blind public policies formulated in 
accordance with procedural norms are neglectful of their most basic identity needs (Taylor, 
1992; 2005a). While wishing to remain within the federation, these Francophones aspire to 
benefit from legal protections designed to ensure that French culture within the province of 
Quebec resist assimilation into the Anglophone culture of the national majority, and are 
willing to go so far as advocating secession from Canada if these demands go unheeded 
(Taylor, 1992; 2005a). Because commitment to the flourishing of substantive cultural goods is 
integral to the self-definition of such groups, and thereby places a precondition on their 
affirmation of state legitimacy, public policies cannot be neutral toward the defence of these 
goods without also compromising the solidarity and stability that Taylor believes is 
indispensable to the continued existence of Canada as a democratic state.  
The general problem which the Canadian case illustrates is that, as Greg Hill explains:  
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The citizens of a modern nation-state may share a common fate, but they do not share an understanding 
of the ultimate ends of life. And while people may belong to lesser communities that are united in this 
way, it is oftentimes the conflicts between these communities that give rise to questions of justice (1993: 
82). 
 
Indeed the term “nation-state” is something of a misnomer as most contemporary states are 
inhabited by a multiplicity of cultural groups or nations67 (Kymlicka, 1995: 10-19; 75-80). 
Recent global immigration patterns create conditions of “multiculturalism” by altering 
traditional ethnic alliances of language, ancestry, shared history and culture, calling long-
established group identities into question. Increasingly strident political demands by feminists, 
homosexuals, religious and aboriginal groups and internal cultural minorities suing for respect 
and legal equality from within the traditional bounds of political communities have a similar 
effect, and the inclusiveness that the liberal democratic state seeks to accommodate is pressed 
to the limits by politicised groups contending that democratic debates are incapable of 
accommodating their difference (Taylor, 1996b: 408; 1998b: 149).  
We saw in Chapter Three that it is this condition of pluralism that liberal attempts to 
prioritise the rule of right are intended to address by formulating democratic norms of public 
decision-making that accord with a strict liberal commitment to citizen equality. To meet this 
challenge, the host societies would have to adapt their common understandings to include the 
new arrivals and the newly enfranchised as part of the political community and refashion their 
political practices to be accommodating of the identity needs of the new members (1998b). 
This entails, in the first place, coming to some new understanding of what a viable foundation 
for political unity in contemporary conditions of pluralism could be. And if Taylor is correct in 
identifying cases where cultural impartiality is impossible, where state policies cannot retreat 
to some culturally neutral, difference-blind ground without foregoing their legitimacy, then the 
problem cannot admit of politically neutral solutions (Taylor, 1992).  
Of course, this marginalisation is not in itself harmful, and any interesting objection to 
it has to demonstrate that it eventuates in moral harm of some sort. This is a central 
preoccupation of Taylor’s MPR, where he argues that procedural liberalism curtails the 
freedom of members of disadvantaged groups by discrediting claims for the public protection 
of group difference. In order to make Taylor’s claim more comprehensible I contextualise it 
within his critique of negative conceptions of freedom, and argue that Taylor’s understanding 
                                                
67 I mean to use these terms synonymously here. With all the reservations that I have already registered about 
Taylor’s use of this term, I follow him in speaking generally only of cultures below. For a more fine-grained 
discussion of these terms see Miller, 1988: 654, Kymlicka in Paul E., et al., 1996: 107-14 and Haldane in Paul, E. 
et al., 1996: 76.  
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of the need for recognition draws on a conception of what I will call “expressive freedom”. I 
also attempt to show how this is a moral concern with political significance insofar as Taylor 
believes that endorsing an expressive understanding of freedom will also incline us to 
appreciate the value of securing “attitudinal respect” through a “politics of difference” that 
deviates from strict state neutrality and endorses the ascription of group-specific rights (1989: 
15; 1992: 38). 
 
5.1.1 Negative freedom and expressive freedom 
We said in Chapter Four that accounts of positive freedom insist that freedom cannot only be 
defined negatively, and that something other than the absence of external restraints has to 
enter into our definition of freedom. One common strategy is to stress the necessity of political 
participation in order to secure collective self-rule. This is the essence of Taylor’s social and 
republican theses, which argue for the indispensability of what Isaiah Berlin, in his influential 
essay “Two Concepts of Liberty”, refers to as positive freedom or liberty (Berlin, 1969). But 
we have seen too that advocates of positive freedom also stress the necessity of autonomous 
individual desire and value formation for the attribution of freedom (Christman, 1991: 344). 
Taylor also argues for this conception of freedom, although, unlike Berlin, he does not classify 
this as a positive conception. Taylor argues that distinguishing conceptions of freedom along 
the positive-negative axis in the manner that Berlin does obscures as much as it clarifies. A 
more useful schema is to distinguish between concepts of freedom that rely on an 
“opportunity-concept” and those informed by an “exercise-concept” (Taylor, 1985b: 213). 
Positive theories necessarily rely on an exercise concept because they wish to distinguish 
between the potential for freedom and its actualisation in concrete acts that are an expression 
of self-direction. In distinguishing between self-directed and other acts some substantive 
claims about the nature of freedom have to be made because freedom can only be realised in a 
community that shares an understanding of the common good (Taylor, 1985b: 215-16).  
Thus far, Taylor’s analysis corresponds with Berlin’s, but Taylor takes issue with 
Berlin and his followers by arguing that, while positive freedom requires what Taylor calls an 
exercise-concept, the assumption that negative freedom must rely only upon an opportunity-
concept that abstracts from all substantive claims about the content of the good life is 
misleading. 68  In advancing this claim Taylor attempts to reveal the purely conceptual 
                                                
68 Taylor also disagrees with Berlin that forsaking a pure opportunity-concept of freedom invites the non-liberal 
political consequences that Berlin and like-minded liberals have attributed to it. Advocates of positive freedom 
hold that our judgements of the good are not incorrigible; an agent lacking moral discrimination may unwittingly 
pursue a given end that fails to advance, or even reduces, her freedom, and Berlin has argued eloquently that this 
understanding of freedom opens the door to illiberal and even totalitarian forms of political coercion over the 
112 !
 
limitations of Berlin’s understanding of freedom by demonstrating both that negative freedom 
is compatible with an exercise-concept of freedom and that the political provisions for non-
interference in the life of the individual recommended by Berlin and advocates of negative 
freedom in fact assume such a background.  
One family of exercise views that is inadequately attended to by Berlin conceptualises 
freedom as a good that obtains not only in virtue of participation in collective decision-making 
but also in the individual attainment of self-fulfilment or self-realisation (Taylor, 1985b: 211). 
These self-realisation views draw on a background understanding of freedom that Berlin and 
liberals of his convictions, if pressed, would in all likelihood endorse, that is, “the post-
Romantic idea that each person’s form of self-realization is original to him/her, and can 
therefore only be worked out independently” (Taylor, 1985b: 212). That an individual lacks 
external physical or legal impediments on her will is no guarantee that she will put her 
potential freedom to use because internal restraints such as false consciousness, repression, a 
fear of breaking with authoritative standards of judgement, or a lack of self-awareness that 
blinds her to her own potentials may also hinder her from the effective pursuit of her purposes 
(Taylor, 1985b: 212-13; 215). An individual subject to these and similar internal restraints 
cannot meaningfully be considered free because “the capacities relevant to freedom must 
involve some self-awareness, self-understanding, moral discrimination and self-control, 
otherwise their exercise could not amount to freedom in the sense of self-direction” (Taylor, 
1985b: 215).  
In light of this one may still affirm the value of the opportunity-concept of freedom, 
but it would make little sense to do so without also placing similar value on the need to be 
internally or psychologically free, and this internal freedom is something that by definition is 
only realised in the exercise of certain capacities (Taylor, 1985b: 213-14). Thus Taylor 
believes that, given some fairly uncontroversial claims about fully-realised personhood, we 
may second-guess the freedom of other individuals in accordance with an assessment of what 
they have actually made of the human potentials that their negative freedom protects. Here we 
might note that Berlin never sought to deny that freedom may also be positively defined; 
rather, Berlin believed that positive conceptions of freedom were not to enter into our political 
definition of freedom (Larmore, 1992: 56-57, 57 n.7). Taylor further claims, however, that not 
only can we in principle legitimately judge the degree to which another is expressively free, 
                                                                                                                                                    
individual (Taylor, 1985b: 215-16; Berlin, 1969). I do not explore this disagreement directly below, but the 
discussion of state neutrality that follows implicitly demonstrates that Taylor simply wishes to draw a different 
line around the acceptable forms of political coercion than Berlin does. For Taylor, the state must refrain from 
infringing on the basic liberties that are central to the liberal tradition in which he situates both himself and Berlin, 
but it may, given that a range of other empirical considerations concerning the inequalities within a political 
community obtain, infringe on less basic rights which fall outside of this basic liberal consensus.  
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but that liberal political thinkers typically do so in practice. When we look at the restrictions 
that liberals do in fact place on acceptable action, these appear to make a tacit appeal to the 
self-realisation concept of freedom (Taylor, 1985b: 218; Christman, 2005: 84). Even liberals 
who wish to cling to a pure opportunity-concept of freedom in order to avoid making 
judgements in the third person about which of an individual’s purposes are authentic and 
promote freedom implicitly do so by considering some infringements on freedom more 
significant than others. No liberal would dispute that, for instance, the installation of a traffic 
light at a local intersection constitutes a comparatively minor obstacle to the freedom of those 
affected by it when placed alongside a law forbidding individuals to worship according to their 
desired form (Taylor, 1985b: 218).  
In drawing this distinction the liberal in question would be appealing to “a background 
understanding, too obvious to spell out, of some activities and goals as highly significant to 
human beings and others as less so”; in the terms introduced in Chapter One, the liberal in 
question would find herself strongly evaluating (Taylor, 1985b: 218). For Taylor, the fact of 
strong evaluation has important repercussions for our understanding of freedom. In strong 
evaluation, as we have seen, we isolate some purposes (our second-order desires) as more 
significant than others (our first-order desires) and identify with them. The inhibition of these 
strongly valued purposes is experienced, not as a trivial infringement of our freedom (as in the 
case of being compelled to wait at a traffic light), but as a potentially harmful threat to our 
identity – as something that prevents us from pursuing those ends that further our individual 
flourishing (Taylor, 1985b: 221-22). As Iseult Honohan explains, Taylor’s understanding of 
freedom develops the insight that “people distinguish more or less central purposes in 
pursuing self-development. Freedom is a matter of realising ourselves according to our most 
central purposes, not the absence of interference” (Honohan, 2002: 132).69  
As we shall see in the discussion of authenticity below, Taylor contends that the 
modern understanding of freedom as self-realisation, which I refer to as “expressive freedom” 
in what follows, articulates an ideal of freedom that is so deeply tied up with the modern, post-
Romantic sense of selfhood or identity that contemporary Westerns, for the most part, 
experience it to be unrepudiable. This basic sense of what freedom entails, in other words, is 
an architectonic feature of modern Western culture, part of the shared moral sensibility of our 
                                                
69 Liberals might agree that a cogent account of freedom requires some understanding of self-realisation but still 
refuse to endorse an exercise-concept of freedom by clinging to their reservations about second-guessing 
another’s conception of the good. This sort of anti-paternalism, of which Bentham was an early influential 
exponent, remains deeply entrenched in contemporary liberal thought (Taylor, 1989). But then the defender of the 
pure opportunity-concept would have to establish that there may in principle be alternative forms of freedom that 
are not undermined by the presence of internal impediments of the sort mentioned above if they wish to cling to 
an unalloyed opportunity-concept of freedom, and Taylor argues that no such position would be coherent (1985b).  
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times. It finds its way, if only implicitly, into contemporary liberal positions on freedom, while 
practically it is embodied in the normative orientations of our social and political practices, 
though the specific advocacy commitments that come with it may be, and commonly are, 
interpreted and defended in divergent forms. Taylor believes that our modern commitment to 
expressive freedom gives rise to both politically constructive and destructive moral 
interpretations of individualism, where what distinguishes these individualisms is their ability 
to facilitate or obstruct the realisation of our strongly valued potentials.  
 
5.1.2 Individualism, expressivism and authenticity 
Taylor traces the historical emergence of two distinct forms that modern individualism70 has 
assumed, which, following Vincent Descombes, we can refer to as the “individualism of 
equality” and the “individualism of difference” (Descombes, 1994; Taylor, 1991a: 58-59; 
1998a: 109-10). It is “[t]he paradoxical encounter of these two individualisms” that, for Taylor, 
“constitutes modernity and its internal tensions” (1998a: 110). The individualism of equality, 
Taylor argues, originates with the collapse of the social hierarchies of the ancien régime and 
the corresponding move toward greater social egalitarianism in the form of democratic politics 
in the Seventeenth Century (1991a: 46-47, 58; 1998: 110). This demotic ideal provides a 
moral foundation for respecting all people equally through an acknowledgement of the equal 
value of certain shared human potentialities such as the potential for freely choosing a life plan, 
and typically finds political expression in the defence of equal rights and entitlements for all 
members of a political community (Taylor, 1991a: 46-47).71 To this first individualism a 
second was added. Emerging in Europe toward the end of the Eighteenth Century, the 
individualism of difference presupposes in some measure the conditions necessary for the 
evolution of the individualism of equality, while building on it through the development of a 
moral ideal that Taylor associates with some of the more influential philosophers of the 
Romantic tradition in general, and most closely with Herder (Taylor, 1991a: 25-29; 1998a: 
110). This “ideal of authenticity” gives expression to the belief that through intimate self-
                                                
70  Taylor (following Tocqueville) distinguishes between “individualism” and “egoism”, where the latter 
designates a non-moral outlook and the former a moral ideal (1991a: 21, n.17). I adhere throughout to Taylor’s 
usage, where individualism is understood as an ideal that makes claims about the relationship between the 
individual and those with whom she is dialogically engaged.  For Taylor, “it is a feature of all forms of 
individualism that they don’t just emphasise freedom of the individual but also propose models of 
society….[I]ndividualism as a moral principle or ideal must offer some view on how the individual should live 
with others” (1991a: 44-45).    
71 Taylor believes this institutional change comes along with new individualist ideals, such as the disengaged 
rationalism of Descartes and his followers and the political individualism of social contract theorists like Locke 
(Taylor, 1991a: 25). More importantly for our purposes, it is also bound up with a new ideal of equal citizen 
dignity that replaces the pre-modern, honour-based system of valuation in which people’s identities were largely 
a function of their standing within social hierarchies (Taylor, 1991a: 46-47). 
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contact and self-awareness people may come to a fuller realisation of their human potentials, 
and presses upon us all the need to explore and express our individuality as an essential 
component of human self-fulfilment or self-realisation (Taylor, 1991a: 17, 28-29). Self-
exploration comes to be seen not just instrumentally, as a means to acting morally, but as an 
end that possesses value in itself and which is indispensable to the good life (Taylor, 1991a: 
26). In this the ideal of authenticity functions as a derivative ideal of a more basic ideal of 
expressive freedom. “Expressivism”,72 which is the term Taylor employs to refer to a 
constellation of views about the human person originating before the Romantic period but 
taken up by important romantic philosophers like Rousseau, Herder and Humboldt,73 develops  
 
the idea that each man (and also nation) has a nature within him (it) that has to be explored and revealed. 
This only comes to light in its articulation, and it is entirely original and peculiar to the man (or nation) 
concerned….[N]ot only do we have to turn away from other dependence and false passion; but we have 
to be able to find ourselves, to articulate what we are. In a further development this turns into the notion 
that our fulfilment requires an inner exploration. From the second version emerge the ideas of self-
exploration and fulfilment which play such an important part in our time; the need for self-expression 
which is also self-realization (Taylor, 1985b: 272).  
  
The ideal of authenticity valorises self-fulfilment and self-discovery, but it needn’t 
promote the egoism and self-indulgence that comes of atomistic subjectivism: “self-fulfilment, 
so far from excluding unconditional relationships and moral demands beyond the self, actually 
requires these in some form” (Taylor, 1991a: 72-73).74 A commitment to authentic self-
fulfilment can carry with it an ideal of social and political accommodation that underscores the 
benefit that harmonious dialogical associations confer upon individual life, which Taylor 
                                                
72  This is an adaptation of Isaiah Berlin’s use of the term “expressionism”, which designates both the 
philosophical work that Taylor is interested in and its offshoots in the arts (Taylor, 1988a: 1). 
73 Taylor’s reading of historical developments here and elsewhere is certainly open to challenge. Vincent 
Descombes contends that, while the individualism of equality may owe a great deal to developments within 
Europe in the Seventeenth Century that ultimately led, in the Eighteenth Century to the philosophy of Rousseau, 
the French Revolution and more generally the moral and political democratic levelling of which Taylor speaks, 
the individualism of difference (or which Rousseau is also an important articulator, and which Taylor believes 
develops out of the individualism of equality) had already been expressed in prior philosophical speculations 
among the scholastic philosophers and appears in Reform variants of Christian doctrine (1994). In Taylor’s 
defence, however, he doesn’t deny that some version of these developments in individuality might always have 
existed; his claim is that they were culturally peripheral in earlier times and his historical observations attempt 
only to isolate the points at which they were given influential philosophical or artistic articulations and taken up 
in the cultural mainstream of Western modernity. 
74 As Taylor explains, “authenticity (A) involves (i) creation and construction as well as discovery, (ii) originality, 
and frequently (iii) opposition to the rules of society and even potentially to what we recognize as morality. But it 
is also true…that it (B) requires (i) openness to horizons of significance (for otherwise creation loses the 
background that can save it from insignificance) and (ii) a self-definition in dialogue” (1991a: 66). The 
monological misreading common to atomistic expressionisms comes from privileging (A) over (B) or ignoring (B) 
altogether. It entails decoupling the aesthetic from the moral dimensions of self-making and prioritising the 
former in the mistaken belief that one can only be true to oneself to the extent that one strips away commonly 
held convictions and repudiates generally accepted moral obligations. 
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refers to in one place as “the Herder-Humboldt model of the associative bond” (1998c: 224).75 
This ideal holds that individual human life can be greatly enriched by the mutual interchange 
between diverse ways of being:  
 
Humboldt argues the crucial moral interest that each one of us has in the authentic development of the 
other. Since each life can only accomplish some small part of the human potential – Humboldt accepts 
Goethe’s principle that we have to narrow ourselves to achieve anything – we can only benefit from the 
full range of human achievement and capacity if we live in close association with people who have 
taken different paths. To attempt to force conformity is to condemn ourselves to a narrower and poorer 
life (1998c: 214).  
 
This moral outlook, which subsequent to Herder and Humboldt’s early articulations of it has 
exerted an enormous influence on the self-understanding of Western moderns, makes 
intelligible those models of human association that seek to establish the political grounds upon 
which we can live together as equals in difference, where diversity is not an obstacle to 
overcome so much as a value to be positively affirmed (Taylor, 1998c).  
 
5.1.3 Inclusion and exclusion  
Taylor discusses the ideals of self-realisation and social belonging associated with the 
individualism of difference in order to better appreciate the motivational foundation of many 
political struggles in the present post-Romantic phase of Western modernity. He hopes to 
argue that the extended range of identity needs associated with the individualism of difference 
means that fidelity to a pre-politically defined culture has become a strongly valued dimension 
of individual identity within Western civilisation that cannot be deemed in principle less 
important than other dimensions of identity. Precisely because this mode of belonging has 
                                                
75 The connection between the two ideals is frequently strongly implied in Taylor’s discussions of authenticity, 
and explicitly discussed in the essay “Living with Difference” (1998c: 214-15). This social and political 
extension of the ideal of authenticity, which Taylor also refers to as “the Herder-Humboldt complementarity 
view”, is seen as synonymous with the “Herder-Humboldt tradition”, inviting a more detailed comparison 
between Taylor’s expressivist philosophy of language and the expressivist aspects of his moral and political 
thought than I offer here (1998c: 216, 218). For a fuller consideration of these connections, see Victoria Fareld’s 
“Charles Taylor’s Identity Holism: Romantic Expressivism as Epigenetic Self-Realization” (2007). Nicholas H. 
Smith also explores this topic in Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals and Modernity (2002). Fareld demonstrates 
that in Taylor’s writing of the 1990s, such as in EA and MPR, Taylor usually limits his discussion of 
expressivism to linguistic philosophy and discusses the moral ideals associated with expressivism under the head 
of authenticity. This usage departs from Taylor’s previous and subsequent habit of discussing both moral and 
linguistic orientations in terms of expressivism. While I have separated out these analytically distinct elements of 
Taylor’s thought, I draw them together here under the heading of expressive freedom so as to highlight the 
conceptual continuities between Taylor’s moral and political thought (and, largely by implication, his philosophy 
of language). An alternative, favoured by Smith, would be to refer to these aspects of Taylor’s account of self-
realising freedom as elements of an account of “situated freedom”, following Taylor’s own use of this term in 
Hegel and Modern Society. 
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become an indispensable source of self-fulfilment or self-realisation, demanding that people 
abstract from these needs in their public dealings can be construed as limitation upon their 
expressive freedom. It is in the very nature of these appeals that they require not blindness to 
difference but sensitivity and respect for values and commitments that command less than 
universal allegiance (Taylor, 1992; 1998c).  
But if the individualism of difference is as much a part of the Western self-
understanding as Taylor portrays it to be, and so deeply entrenched in our institutions and 
practices, we may well ask why it is so poorly accommodated. Why do the demands arising 
from individuals and groups seeking to secure their particularistic attachments remain so 
controversial and persist as a bitter cause of political division in contemporary multicultural 
societies? Although he does not separate them out, Taylor offers two distinct explanations for 
this, one owing to a liberal commitment to universal human potentialities that fails to give due 
weight to the particularistic moral claims associated with the ideal of authenticity and another 
from an atomistic misreading of this ideal which locates all human value in the individual 
good alone. In both cases the value of dialogical association is bypassed. 
Considering Taylor’s discussion of expressive freedom, we are now better placed to 
understand his claim, anticipated in Chapter Three, that normatively downplaying the 
demands arising from our particular attachments in public debate will lead members of 
cultural groups that seek special treatment to feel excluded from the democratic interchange 
that free societies require. Disregarding the substantive goods cherished by members of such 
groups tends to undermine political solidarity because, even if there are compelling moral 
reasons for rejecting the demands that these cultural groups make, their grievances tend to be 
dismissed out of hand, without being given a fair hearing. This makes a mockery of the liberal 
commitment to toleration, as well as the democratic aspirations of our contemporary liberal 
societies to function as deliberative communities where common goods are worked out 
through maximally inclusive forums of collective debate (Taylor, 1998c: 220). Where we 
possess an ontological commitment to expressive freedom, holistically understood, and where 
we appreciate the human need for understanding and mutual association in difference in a 
manner similar to the ideal of complementarity defended by Herder, Humboldt and their 
followers, we will be better disposed to pursue a politics of compromise and mutual respect 
that allows members of groups whose demands go unmet to walk away from public debate 
with the knowledge that their claims have been given a fair hearing. Assuming such demands 
don’t fall hopelessly foul of our most basic value commitments, as, for instance, hate speech 
or incitement to murder will do in contemporary liberal societies, they needn’t be dismissed in 
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principle using “one big meat-cleaver principle” but rather can be turned down for reasons that 
all reasonable parties can be made to understand (1998c: 218).  
 
5.2 Taylor on liberal political society  
The move toward greater political inclusiveness is not just a question of changing attitudes and 
ideals; the real challenge of Taylor’s political philosophy is to show how a change is our 
conceptual understanding of issues of identity can lead to a corresponding change in the 
normative political principles we endorse. To this end, a great deal of the argumentation in 
MPR is devoted to revealing political alternatives within the framework of liberal democratic 
values that are opened up by what Taylor distinguishes as “two kinds of politics in Western 
societies”, both premised on an ideal of equal respect for others but interpreting the political 
demands consonant with this ideal in a manner that issues in “two incompatible views of 
liberal society” (1992: 44, 60). These two orientations, which correspond to the two types of 
modern individualism discussed above, he refers to as “the politics of equal dignity”76 and 
“the politics of difference” (Taylor, 1992: 38). The former is the forerunner of what we are 
calling procedural liberalism, which it continues to inform, while the latter designates the 
various theoretical orientations and practical political movements that have in recent years 
emphasised the importance of cultural membership in the construction of identity (Horton, 
1998: 166).  
 
5.2.1 Politics beyond proceduralism and individual rights  
Procedural liberalism, and the rights-based orientation of the politics of equal dignity that it 
builds upon,77 endorses, for Taylor, a compelling but ultimately impoverished normative 
model of liberal democratic political practice. Compelling, because it advocates a mode of 
social co-operation that places great emphasis on the need for fair and equal treatment of all 
citizens and gives great weight to the deeply felt modern need to ground citizen dignity on a 
firm basis of inviolable individual rights and entitlements intended to secure freedom and 
respect for all. Speaking from his own experience as a Canadian with a deep personal 
involvement in the fate of both Quebec and Canada at large, Taylor writes:  
                                                
76 In MPR Taylor also variously refers to this orientation and the procedural liberalism that develops out of it as a 
“politics of universalism”, a “politics of universal dignity”, a “liberalism of equal dignity” and a “liberalism of 
rights”, for reasons that should become apparent in the course of this discussion (1992: 37, 39, 43, 60). I avoid 
these alternative usages below in the interests of clarity.  
77 Taylor consistently opposes the politics of equal dignity to the politics of difference in MPR. Unless 
specifically indicated, however, I refer in what follows to procedural liberalism instead of the politics of equal 
dignity. Despite the terminological discrepancy, I believe that this is fully in keeping with Taylor’s own treatment 
of this theme, which views procedural liberalism as the dominant contemporary expression of the politics of 
equal dignity.  
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As the country gets more diverse, we are more and more acutely aware of the divergences in our 
conceptions of the good life. It then appears that what can and ought to bind us together are precisely the 
procedural norms that govern our interaction. Procedural liberalism not only begins to look more 
plausible in itself, but it also seems to be the only unquestionable common ground (2005a: 178).  
 
But while this commitment to the political values most prized by the liberal tradition is beyond 
reproach, the understanding of how these values are to be furthered that comes to the fore in 
the theoretical discussions of the exponents of procedural liberalism is entirely too narrow. 
In situating Taylor’s arguments, we might recall that the early political thought of 
Rawls and Dworkin has been subject to extensive criticism for, among other things, its failure 
to adequately address issues of cultural membership (Kymlicka, 1989a: 3-5, 137; 1995: 80-94, 
101-06). Related to this is the important question of the status of minority group rights within 
a theory of justice, with the fundamental question being whether awarding group rights 
comports with a basic commitment to individual freedom and equality or necessarily 
undermines this commitment. Liberals tend to argue for or to assume the incompatibility of 
individual and group rights, or hold the latter to be a superfluous extension of the former, and 
to opt for individual rights in the name of a basic commitment to non-discrimination (Taylor, 
1992: 56; Kymlicka, 1989a: 3-5, 140).78  
Taylor has been one of the more influential critics of this liberal position, arguing that 
the central problem besetting procedural liberalism is its inability to accommodate collective 
goals through measures like allowing for group-specific rights (Taylor, 1992; 1995a; 2005a). 
Advocates of Francophone interests in the Canadian province of Quebec, for instance, have 
argued that the good of cultural survival through the preservation of the French language that 
the French-speaking majority within the province are committed to justifies the legal measures 
that were passed in the province compelling Francophone Quebeckers and immigrants to send 
their children to French-language schools, to force businesses with over 50 employees to 
conduct business in a French medium, and for all commercial signage in Quebec to be in 
French (Taylor, 1992: 52-53). These measures were seen by many to violate the spirit of the 
                                                
78 Will Kymlicka argues that the individualism and egalitarianism of Rawls and Dworkin, which views 
individuals as the ultimate objects of moral regard and which champions equal concern and respect for 
individuals, is frequently – if mistakenly, in Kymlicka’s opinion – understood to be inimical to group rights 
(1989a: 140). As Kymlicka explains, “[t]here seems to be no room within the moral ontology of liberalism for 
collective rights….Once individuals have been treated as equals, with the respect and concern owed them as 
moral beings, there is no further obligation to treat the communities to which they belong as equals. The 
community has no moral existence or claims of its own. It is not that the community is unimportant to the liberal, 
but simply that it is important for what it contributes to the lives of individuals, and so cannot ultimately conflict 
with the claims of individuals. Individual and collective rights cannot compete for the same moral space, in 
liberal theory, since the value of the collective derives from its contribution to the value of individual lives” 
(1989a: 140).   
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Canadian Charter of Rights, adopted in 1982, which sets out a schedule of individual rights 
and equal treatment provisions as a foundation for judicial review of legislation at all levels of 
the Canadian government (Taylor, 1992: 52-53). Taylor contends that, precisely because these 
Francophone demands call into question the liberal commitment to equal individual rights for 
all citizens and equal citizen treatment before the law, advocating instead certain restrictions 
on these rights and entitlements in the name of collective cultural goods, they have been 
dismissed by the Anglophone Canadian majority as discriminatory and unjust (2005a). While 
agreeing with the commitment to universal individual rights and non-discrimination measures, 
Taylor believes that dismissal of the Francophone cause, which has been a great cause of 
Canadian division, rides on an inability to perceive how the Francophone demands are 
compatible with a modified commitment to legal neutrality. 
An appeal for Quebeckers to be eligible for differential legal treatment and to benefit 
from group rights was formulated in the Meech Lake draft constitution in the form of a plea 
for Quebec to be recognised as a “distinct society” by devolving certain centralised state 
powers to the province on a federalist model (Taylor, 1992: 52-53; Habermas, 1999: 220). 
Taylor argues that the premise of this demand is that the particularistic good of French cultural 
survival within Quebec trump, in certain exceptional circumstances, the common Canadian 
good of equal citizen treatment before the law (Taylor, 1992: 52-53). Though he provides next 
to no discussion of empirical cases, Taylor believes that analogous concerns about democratic 
exclusion inform the demands of the other “cultural” movements that he mentions. We have, 
in the previous chapter, considered the problem of how individual rights square off with 
collective goals in relation to goods like the maintenance of a system of equal rights to free 
expression, or the property rights and labour laws protecting the individual, where we said that, 
for Taylor, individual rights of this sort must not be allowed to undermine the collective 
political mobilisation that the defence of these rights calls for. But here we must note that 
Taylor believes that this same problem arises in relation to the goods essential to the continued 
flourishing of the cultural values in virtue of which we esteem certain achievements and 
lifestyles peculiar to certain cultural groups. Where cultural values are systematically 
denigrated or undermined, there arises a concern among members of the threatened culture for 
cultural survival that procedural liberals are ill-disposed to accept. Taylor explains:  
 
There is a form of the politics of equal respect, as enshrined in a liberalism of rights, that is inhospitable 
to difference, because (a) it insists on uniform application of the rules defining these rights, without 
exception, and (b) it is suspicious of collective goals. Of course, this doesn’t mean that this model seeks 
to abolish cultural differences. This would be an absurd accusation. But I call it inhospitable because it 
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can’t accommodate what the members of distinct societies really aspire to, which is survival. This is (b) 
a collective goal, which (a) almost inevitably will call for some variations in the kinds of law we deem 
permissible from one cultural context to another (Taylor, 1992: 60-61).  
 
The upshot of these limitations, which undermine appeals for group rights and 
undercut participatory political initiatives, is that procedural liberalism is incapable of 
resolving in a satisfying manner cultural disputes arising within a political community and the 
threat of fragmentation that accompanies these disputes (Taylor, 1991a: 112-13, 115-17; 1992). 
This is not a concern that people form into diverse groups in accordance with common bases 
of identification and interest like gender, ethnicity, race or religion. Taylor’s ideal of the 
modern state is deeply committed to a liberal ideal of toleration that sees unity in difference as 
a goal to be actively furthered. His concern is rather that in a divided or politically fragmented 
society there will be no difference-respecting common basis of identity available to all 
members of a political community that can be appealed to as a foundation for the formation of 
collective purpose and the committed defence of a freedom-respecting society that cuts across 
cultural divides.  
Taylor’s concern with the tendency of procedural liberalism to undercut communal ties 
and collective political action is coupled with a second criticism, which argues that the mode 
of politics it defines is, in practice, frequently homogenising of individual identities that 
incorporate cultural understandings and commitments. This is because procedural politics 
requires of disadvantaged cultural groups that they mute their demands for the accommodation 
of their particularistic values and ways of life at the level of public deliberation and policy 
formation and submit only those claims that find justification in the impartial, universally 
binding norms acknowledged in the countries of which they are citizens. We saw in Chapter 
Three that Taylor is less concerned that impartiality may not be a real conceptual possibility 
than that impartial norms would, in practice, be incapable of inspiring widespread allegiance. 
Here Taylor argues that, again presuming these norms truly are impartial, denying 
disadvantaged groups any claim to differential treatment at the level of public policy 
formation forces marginal cultures to choose between, on the one hand, resisting the thrust of 
assimilation through the formation of dissenting, politically marginal and impotent cultural 
enclaves within the wider political society and, on the other, conforming to the levelling 
demands of participation in procedural politics and thereby entering into a phase of cultural 
decline (1992).  
 One solution to the problem of homogenisation can be found in Taylor’s discussion of 
inter-cultural accommodation through “deep diversity” in the essay “Shared and Divergent 
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Values”, where Taylor argues that political unity within multicultural societies needn’t be 
based on a uniform model of citizenship alone (2005a: 183). Individual citizens can be 
“universally” incorporated into the state by possessing the same moral and legal status as their 
fellows, but they can also belong in a “consociational” fashion, where their incorporation is 
mediated through the distinct rights and norms that apply to a certain cultural group (Kymlicka, 
1989a: 137). Advocates of procedural liberal solutions to issues of justice in multicultural 
states favour the former model of belonging and work with a normative conception of the state 
as a body designed to facilitate the respect of people’s “first-level diversity” through legal 
recognition of autonomy-promoting rights and non-discrimination provisions assigned to 
protect individuals (Taylor, 2005a: 182). These thinkers defend a mode of citizen patriotism 
where all citizens feel a sense of national unity in virtue of a shared political identity in which 
the object of citizen patriotism is the set of shared procedural institutions and norms that their 
societies provide for their defence and flourishing. Citizens may also feel the tug of pre-
political identification with sub-national groups on this model, but this is taken to be external 
to their sense of belonging with others to a single state composed of a multicultural mosaic of 
equal members (Taylor, 2005a).  
Taylor argues that while this form of belonging may be perfectly viable,79 it is also 
possible, and indeed quite common, to belong to the state in a consociational manner that 
“passes through” identification with a cultural community (2005a). People may, for instance, 
feel bonded to a linguistic and/or regional community in the manner that many French 
Canadians feel affiliated to Quebec, where this serves as their primary purchase upon a more 
encompassing sense of Canadian belonging. Something similar holds for many aboriginal 
groups in Canada, and for groups like the Catalans, Basques and Bretons and within France 
and Spain, and indeed for most multicultural Western societies (Taylor, 2005a). In such 
circumstances, instead of requiring that members of these groups submit to the “steamroller of 
the nation state”, we may do better to promote a political ethos of deep diversity that grants 
legal recognition to cultural groups that facilitates their cultural development and is accepting 
of the plurality of forms of belonging that members of such groups will feel (Taylor, 2005a: 
184).  
                                                
79 Taylor, as we saw in the previous chapter, acknowledges that shared commitment to the right may motivate 
citizen patriotism, although with the important caveat that this allegiance is understood as the affirmation of an 
irreducibly social (immediately) common good.  
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5.2.2 The politics of difference: ontological foundations 
Taylor’s deeply diverse solution to the problems associated with multiculturalism in Canada is 
not without some serious problems. Chief among these is the possibility that fostering deep 
diversity, which may require decentralising initiatives of the sort discussed in Chapter Four, 
could render the need to belong to a state a purely instrumental good and thereby undermine 
the far-reaching political unity that Taylor defends as a condition of republican freedom 
(Horton, 1998).80 I do not, however, hope to explore this problem in detail below, and will 
simply note in passing that Taylor’s own observations about communal belonging would seem 
more likely to push him in the direction that Michael Sandel and Alasdair MacIntyre move 
when they express scepticism that abiding communal attachments can, in contemporary 
societies, endure at anything but a local level (MacIntyre, 1982: 221; Sandel, 1984: 93; 
Kymlicka, 1995: 92). Instead I want to discuss Taylor’s belief that the sort of deeply diverse 
mode of political attachment he envisages requires us to alter our understanding of liberal 
society, and in particular the belief that the liberal state must seek to further citizen equality by 
enforcing state neutrality. The two criticisms of procedural liberalism listed above – the claims 
that it undermines solidarity through a common identity and that it is culturally homogenising 
– emerge among those thinkers associated with the political movements that oppose 
procedural liberalism, which Taylor considers together in his discussion of the politics of 
difference (1992). The grounds for Taylor’s dissatisfaction with procedural liberalism and his 
sympathy for (certain versions of) the politics of difference cannot, however, be understood as 
                                                
80 John Horton points out that Taylor’s arguments for the inappropriateness of a procedural liberal solution to 
securing Canadian unity are poorly substantiated. Even granted Taylor’s arguments against the homogenising 
tendency of procedural forms of patriotic allegiance, a lot more would have to be said for deep diversity to appear 
as a workable alternative model of democratic citizenship in multicultural states (1998: 170). Moreover, Taylor’s 
arguments for a deeply diverse mode of citizen belonging in Canada evidence a more general conceptual tension 
within Taylor’s own work which may lead him to resolve the problem of homogenisation at the cost of his 
commitment to inter-group solidarity. Taylor views bureaucratic centralisation, communal divisions and political 
fragmentation as problems to be remedied through decentralising political initiatives of the sort discussed in the 
previous chapter, where we saw that Taylor advocates the political empowerment of regional societies and the 
development of decentralised debate through nested public spheres. The problem here is that there is a danger 
that our primary mode of communal allegiance will shift to regional communities and other localised groupings. 
Regional societies like Quebec in the Canadian federation will, as Taylor points out, always retain a need for 
national belonging for purposes of “law and order, collective provision, regional equality, and mutual self-help” 
but, as Horton demonstrates, these are the sorts of goods that Taylor himself has argued elsewhere only form the 
foundation of an instrumentally valuable union (Taylor, 2005a: 183; Horton, 1998: 170).  
For Taylor’s conception of deep diversity to connect with the understanding of human identity that is the 
central focus of his moral work, then, he would have to show that belonging to a political community at the level 
of the state, and not just at a local level, is an integral, non-instrumental part of the realisation of the common or 
irreducibly social goods that we all must acknowledge. If belonging to a state is not essential to our identities – if 
it is merely a contingently useful mode of securing our freedom – then, for reasons that Taylor himself has 
provided, decentralisation and an ethic of deep diversity threaten to divide political society into competing 
cultural camps and thereby delegitimate the state. In the absence of just such a conception, we might agree with 
Horton that “[i]n seeking to accommodate fundamental rights and the recognition of cultural diversity within a 
polity marked by a genuine sense of a common good, Taylor has posed, rather than resolved, a fundamental 
problem for democratic theory” (Horton, 1998: 171).  
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a simple preference for the advocacy orientation of the latter over the former. While Taylor 
finds fault with what he believes to be the rights-based, litigious and homogenising outcomes 
of procedural politics, his position can only be properly appreciated in light of his reading of 
the divergent “underlying intuitions of value” that undergird the social ontologies of advocates 
of procedural liberalism on the one hand and proponents of the politics of difference on the 
other (Taylor, 1992: 41).  
Pursuing this theme, Taylor hopes to bring to light the background understandings that 
have given rise to the complaint, voiced in recent years by defenders of the politics of 
difference, that over and above accelerating the decline of consensual politics and the break-up 
or political alienation of traditional communities, procedural liberalism defines a mode of 
politics that rejects the claims that members of disadvantaged groups make for the equal moral 
worth of their identities (1992: 64). Exploring the validity or otherwise of this complaint, 
which accuses procedural liberalism not only of promoting communal divisions and cultural 
homogenisation but also promoting cultural discrimination or ethnocentrism, Taylor attempts 
to expose a tension between procedural liberalism and the politics of difference that grows out 
of two different understandings of the principle of equal respect while tracing these tensions to 
an ontological endorsement (or presumption) of two divergent conceptions of human identity 
and agency (Taylor, 1992: 43). 
Though few advocates of procedural liberalism are willing to concede that there is an 
important metaphysical background to their arguments – what Taylor has referred to 
elsewhere as an “ontology of the human” – Taylor believes that these theories are premised on 
strong intuitions of value that must rely upon such a background as a necessary condition of 
their intelligibility (Taylor, 1989: 5; 1992: 41). If proponents of this understanding of politics 
believe that all people are worthy of respect, this can only be because they hold, explicitly or 
otherwise, to a conception of some human capacity we all share that merits this respect 
(Taylor, 1992: 41). While procedural liberalism entrenches the rights-based form of 
recognition that Taylor refers to in SS as “active respect”, Taylor believes that it cannot 
accommodate the need for what he there calls “attitudinal respect” (Taylor, 1989: 15). The 
demand for attitudinal respect is premised on some strongly valued conception of what we 
understand our dignity or moral worth to consist in, as well as a corresponding understanding 
of the appreciation or admiration due us from others to the extent that we have actualised or 
are pursuing the goods that we prize (Taylor, 1989: 15). In his discussion of “recognition” in 
EA and MPR it is, I believe, most often to the conferral of what we are calling attitudinal 
respect that Taylor refers.  
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The normative endorsement of active respect that surfaces in procedural liberal 
theories is premised on the belief in a human potential, common to all, to formulate for 
ourselves a vision of the good life by understanding the human agent as “primarily a subject of 
self-determining or self-expressive choice” (Taylor, 1992: 57). This conception of human 
agency is deeply rooted in the modern Western identity and is integral to the background of 
the individualism of equality. It receives one of its most influential expressions in the Kantian 
ideal of autonomy and has played an important role in more recent neo-Kantian thought, 
though its influence extends far beyond such philosophical circles (Taylor, 1992: 41-42; 57-
58). On this understanding, we all possess dignity, and are worthy of respect, in virtue of 
possessing the capacity to formulate our beliefs and determine our actions independently 
which, we have seen in Chapter Three, Taylor refers to as the universal attribution of moral 
personality. What is to be respected here is not the content of choice (the specific objects or 
goals that we seek to realise or obtain) but rather the capacity to freely exercise it which all 
persons share (Taylor, 1992: 57). 
The politics of difference shares with the politics of equal dignity a universalistic 
understanding of what in people is of value and commands respect – a common “principle of 
universal equality” (Taylor, 1992: 39). But whereas procedural liberalism normatively 
prioritises a universalistic ideal of personality, the politics of difference places greatest worth 
on our ability to create a unique identity at both the individual and the cultural level (Taylor, 
1992: 41-42). This concern for original identity comes of accepting the ideal of authenticity 
that we associated with the expressivist and Romantic form of Western individualism, the 
individualism of difference.  
Given that Taylor has argued at length elsewhere that the formation of identity is 
inseparable from the act of taking a moral stance on important existential questions, we might 
ask how this capacity for individual expression differs from that that which Taylor argues is 
most valued by procedural liberalism and the politics of equal dignity – that is, the ability to 
autonomously define for oneself a conception of the good life (1985a; 1989; 1992: 57).81 
                                                
81Meave Cooke raised this question, arguing that there is no interesting difference between the recognitional 
demands that procedural liberalism and the politics of difference as I have thus far been describing it – which is 
the weaker of two versions of the politics of difference discussed by Taylor – seek to facilitate (Cooke, 1997: 261, 
266-67). This is because both these orientations call for the recognition of a human potentiality for individual 
identity formation shared by all parties to the recognitional encounter (Cooke, 1997: 261, 266-67; Taylor, 1992: 
42). Taylor argues, however, that the politics of difference (in the weaker version he endorses) calls only for an 
initial presumption of equality, which then has to be tested in practice against the substantive values that all 
parties acknowledge. What members of contemporary Western societies want recognised is not just their shared 
potential for self-realisation but, beyond this, what they have made, or are in the act of making, of this potential 
(1992: 66-68). Cooke is aware of this reading of the politics of difference but mistakenly conflates it with the 
stronger version of the claim, which version Taylor explicitly rejects, and so considers the disagreement between 
Taylor and procedural liberals about the moral worth of autonomy largely chimerical (Cooke, 1997: 259-60, 263; 
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Taylor tells us that, for proponents of the politics of difference, this universal potential is only 
realised in the affirmation of one’s particularity: what stands to be realised here – an original 
identity – is not what is common to all, but, by definition, something that each person 
possesses and expresses in some unique way. Where this ideal is read holistically, it calls for 
individuals to affirm or reject the moral understandings that they access through participation 
in a larger cultural community (Taylor, 1992: 38-39). By placing strong value on particularity 
in this manner, the politics of difference is therefore motivated by a range of recognition 
claims that extend beyond those of the politics of equal dignity. It calls for recognition of a 
universally shared human capacity, but now defines this as the ability to form a unique identity 
within a given community, and in doing so forces us to look beyond what is commonly 
possessed by all individuals in abstraction from their cultural embedding to what is peculiar to 
such individuals as members of the cultural groups in which their universally shared potential 
for forming an authentic identity is realised (Taylor, 1992: 38-39). Taylor explains this 
complexity as follows: the principle of universal equality, as interpreted by proponents of the 
politics of difference, 
 
asks that we give acknowledgement and status to something that is not universally shared. Or, otherwise 
put, we give due acknowledgement only to what is universally present – everyone has an identity – 
through recognizing what is peculiar to each. The universal demand powers an acknowledgement of 
specificity (1992: 39).  
 
For the politics of difference, then, due respect is granted when we look beyond the 
universal to the particular by acknowledging a person or a group’s identity to be of value. For 
recognition of any sort to be meaningful, Taylor contends that it must register the 
incorporation of certain moral ideals that are strongly valued by all parties to the recognitional 
encounter into the identity of the person or group seeking recognition (1991a: 35-41, 58, 81-
82). However unique, these ideals must in part refer to non-subjective sources of meaning 
because they can only be intelligibly discussed through the languages and moral frameworks 
that participation in some or other cultural community provides. In this connection Taylor 
writes:  
 
Mere difference can’t itself be the ground of equal value. If men and women are equal, it is not because 
they are different, but because overriding the difference are some properties, common or complementary, 
                                                                                                                                                    
Taylor, 1992: 42, 68-69). Taylor wishes, however, to contrast only the weaker version of the politics of difference 
that he endorses with procedural liberalism, and there is, indeed, a marked difference between the understandings 
of legitimate recognitional demands endorsed by these two political orientations as Taylor describes them.    
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which are of value….To come together on the mutual recognition of difference – that is, of the equal 
value of different identities – requires that we share more than a belief in this principle; we have to share 
also some standards of value on which the identities concerned check out as equal (1991a: 51-52).  
 
Informed by a dialogical reading of the ideal of authenticity, the politics of difference calls for 
the respect of other people’s potential to freely determine which values they will endorse, and 
for them to be treated in a way that recognises them favourably as bearers of these values to 
the extent that we also share and endorse their evaluational frameworks. But it is important to 
emphasise that for Taylor what is valued here is not just a potential: due recognition must 
begin with a presumption of the equal value of the other’s identity, but this presumption must 
be tested in practice, and can be disappointed (Taylor, 1992: 66-68). 82 
 
5.2.3 The politics of difference: political advocacy 
We should, form the above, be in a better position to see how Taylor might accuse procedural 
liberalism of undermining social solidarity by failing to protect disadvantaged cultures from 
decline. But we also said that for this to really count as oppression, Taylor has to demonstrate 
that this political condition eventuates in some sort of moral harm. Here Taylor takes his lead 
from the theoretical framework largely pioneered by Frantz Fanon and later developed by 
prominent thinkers in the feminist movement and multiculturalism debates, for whom 
“misrecognition shows not just a lack of due respect. It can inflict a grievous wound, saddling 
                                                
82 Taylor identifies a stronger version of the politics of difference than the one we have been discussing here, 
which calls for the recognition of the equal value of what people have actually made of this potential as a matter 
of principle. In the intercultural context, where this claim usually arises, this translates into a demand for the 
equal respect of “actually evolved cultures” (Taylor, 1992: 42). Taylor must not be read as defending this 
stronger recognitional claim. If this were the case, then we might well agree with Cillian McBride that the politics 
of recognition endorsed by Taylor is inimical to the ideal of a fusion of horizons through democratic debate and 
the liberal conception of inter-cultural toleration that Taylor wishes to advance (McBride, 2005).  
McBride claims that “the politics of authentic recognition demands that we endorse particular identities, 
regardless of the misgivings we may have about them, which clearly diminishes our freedom to form our own 
view of the matter.” (2005: 502; emphasis in original). But Taylor is dismissive of this stronger claim and the 
idea that we owe other cultures equal respect as a matter unbending principle that informs it. Conferring respect 
entails recognising the value of others, but this recognition must be the freely given outcome of a process of 
open-ended, well-informed and deliberative evaluation. For recognition to be a predetermined outcome of 
interaction detracts from its moral value by making its conferral arbitrary, reducing it to an act of condescension 
rather than an expression of genuine respect (Taylor, 1992: 68-73). While ruling out the possibility of explicitly 
denigrating other cultures, the stronger claim eradicates the distinction between sincere praise of other cultures 
and a patronising gesture of acceptance. It also discourages intimate contact and exchange between cultures, with 
the result that whatever value we do find in another culture can only come of its ability to satisfy our own 
parochially formed standards of value (Taylor, 1992: 70-71). While McBride may very well be correct in arguing 
that “a politics of authentic recognition, divorced from respect for others’ right to form diverging judgements, 
offers us a fantasy of social transparency driven by the demand for total control over my self-understanding” 
(2005: 503), and that “we can only have guarantees that we will receive the recognition we seek if we eliminate 
diversity of perspective” (2005: 504; emphasis in original), this offers nothing as a criticism of Taylor, who is 
numbered among the targets of McBride’s criticism of the politics of difference.  
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its victims with a crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. 
It is a vital human need” (Taylor, 1992: 26).  
Taylor believes that accepting this ontological claim concerning the harmfulness of 
misrecognition has important spin-offs for how political theory needs to normatively 
conceptualise the role of the state. If it is the case that people need to be guaranteed active 
respect through a system of individual rights and liberties due them simply as potentially 
autonomous life-choosers, it might be no less true that safeguarding the conditions required for 
receiving attitudinal respect requires that the state takes measures to secure the requisites of 
authentic identity formation. Assuming Taylor’s thesis about the cultural prerequisites of 
expressive freedom is persuasive, then this protection might also seem to necessitate that the 
state safeguard from perceived threats the continued existence of cultural groups where 
affiliation to such groups demonstrably promotes freedom of the individual. This, at least, is 
the line of reasoning that Taylor follows in MPR to argue from the need individuals possess 
for the positive recognition of their cultural identities to the need for state protection of 
threatened cultures.  
Taylor argues that, given the need for attitudinal respect, measures such as the 
promotion of culturally-specific rights interpretation have an important place within any 
liberal theory that aspires to further the liberal value of toleration (1992). This commitment 
doesn’t undermine the foundational liberal commitment to securing freedom of the individual; 
rather, where members of freedom-respecting cultural groups are subject to systematic 
denigration, or where the dissolution of traditional modes of living threatens to undermine the 
cultural conditions of individual self-realisation, it must be viewed as a vital precondition of 
safeguarding individual freedom. Taylor also believes that measures designed to promote 
inter-cultural awareness and respect, such as modifying educational curricula to include the 
contributions of members of diverse cultures, can function to promote tolerant interchange and 
accommodation between members of diverse cultures (1992).  
Adopting such measures, Taylor argues, requires a modification of the procedural 
liberal principle of state neutrality without completely overhauling it. Considering the 
Canadian issue of group rights for Quebeckers, Taylor envisages a model of liberalism which 
distinguishes truly inviolable fundamental rights to such things as life, liberty, free speech, due 
process, and free practice of religion on the one hand from entitlements to freely choosing the 
language of commercial signage and conduct of business, or to unconstrained access to 
educational facilities, on the other (Taylor, 1992: 59). While these fundamental liberal rights 
appear too deeply rooted in our shared (modern Western) moral sensibility to ever be passed 
up, the others are of the sort that can be weighed against other goods like the survival of 
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French culture and, given a further range of good arguments that engage with the historical 
specificities of both French- and English-speaking cultures in Canada, sometimes be sacrificed. 
But for this other range of empirically informed augments to even gain a respectable hearing 
procedural liberals would have to forsake their atomistic individualism and acknowledge that 
goals like cultural survival that we hold through our participation in particular enterprises are 
in principle legitimate claims, even if, in practice, there turn out to be good reasons for 
rejecting them (Taylor, 1992).  
The liberal state envisaged by Taylor, then, would secure individual recognition for all 
citizens insofar as they are persons possessed of universally shared potentialities by enshrining 
difference-blind principles in its constitution and/or legal practices. At the same time, the state 
might seek to promote “deep diversity” by ensuring that individuals may be recognised as 
bearers of particular cultural identities legally and/or in public institutions and the norms of 
state by actively advancing the conditions required for the continued flourishing of their 
cultural associations (Taylor, 1992, 2005a; Kenny, 2004: 153). This, Taylor believes, would 
be a step beyond the neutral state that ensures only blanket measures defending the active 
respect for its citizens’ negative freedoms to a perfectionist state that aims to safeguard the 
cultural conditions required for members of disadvantaged cultures to receive the attitudinal 
respect that, as citizens of an equal moral standing with their compatriots, is their due.  
 
5.3 Questioning the politics of difference 
In both his therapeutic attempt to highlight the shortcomings of procedural liberalism and in 
formulating his constructive alternative, Taylor advances a number of philosophical and 
historical claims that are not a little contentious. But even granted the reading of moral 
psychology and historical developments in the modern West that inform Taylor’s 
understanding of modern struggles for recognition, there still remain plenty of reasons to 
question why accepting his ontological interpretation of these issues recommends the sort of 
state perfectionism that the politics of difference endorses at the advocacy level. I believe that 
here, more than elsewhere, Taylor’s attempt to work out a normative political orientation from 
a more basic set of ontological considerations about individual identity formation and 
communal belonging moves from ontology to advocacy in a manner that is ultimately 
question-begging.   
Taylor’s contention that many liberal societies of today require a politics of difference 
if they are to remain true to their liberal values and his associated arguments in favour of a 
perfectionist state assume, firstly, that the political decision-making bodies of the state are an 
appropriate locus for discussions of perfectionist ideals. Secondly, even granted this 
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contentious position, Taylor believes that the identity concerns informing the politics of 
difference are such that they could function as standards to guide the state in its defence of 
specific disadvantaged cultures. Thirdly, Taylor believes that these identity concerns are of the 
sort that they may justify the restriction of individual rights in the name of group rights 
without compromising the authentic development of individual identity. While all of these 
positions are, I believe, rather problematic elements of Taylor’s political thought, I do not 
consider the first of these below, which raises concerns that are largely external to Taylor’s 
project, and discuss only the second and third below insofar as they draw attention to certain 
internal difficulties with Taylor’s attempt to derive normative political content from his 
ontological reflections. I proceed below by asking whether, given the appropriateness of state 
perfectionism in principle, we should follow Taylor’s contention that a concern for the 
authentic self-realisation of the individual would offer any determinate content for state 
policies and would be furthered by group rights ascription. 
 
5.3.1 Authenticity of experience as a criterion of state perfectionism  
Taylor’s understanding of the desirable role of the state in multicultural societies may be 
considered a “perfectionist” account of the role of the state in the sense that he believes 
substantive conceptions of the good life shouldn’t only guide our action in our private lives 
but must inform the decisions that the state makes. Unlike liberals like Rawls, who believe 
that the state must refrain from privileging any particular life plan or set of life plans when 
distributing resources, rights and duties, Taylor argues that the state must do just this in order 
to prevent valuable ways of life from being eclipsed by other less virtuous or dignified 
alternatives (Kymlicka, 1989a: 33-34; Mulhall & Swift, 1993: 26-28). This is not just because 
concern for threatened cultures promotes social solidarity and heads off political 
fragmentation but, more fundamentally, because the defence of cultural structures is necessary 
for protecting the expressive freedom of the individual. One particularly vexing problem for 
Taylor’s formulation of the politics of difference, however, concerns the idea, implicit in his 
account of state protection of disadvantaged cultures, that deviation from state neutrality can 
be justified on the grounds of the authenticity of experience that such policies are intended to 
facilitate (Digeser, 1995).  
Taylor argues in EA and MPR that our sense of dignity or self-worth relies upon our 
receiving validation from people within our broader societies of the moral values upon which 
we construct our identities. Where we are truly deserving of this affirmation, its denial 
constitutes a species of moral harm. But there remains a very difficult question of how 
agreement can be reached about such desert. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that 
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deviations from state neutrality may in principle be justified in the name of cultural toleration 
and the defence of cultures that fear systematic denigration or assimilation, how, in practice, 
do we decide when this is to be the case? In terms of the issue of recognition considered here, 
the question would then be: What standards do we have to appeal to in practical reason in 
determining when public recognition is justifiably denied and when it should be granted?  
At this point, I believe, Taylor’s ontological reflections on identity seem unable to 
guide us. Taylor may provide us with reasons for defending freedom-respecting cultures in 
general but not for defending any particular culture from decline. When discussing the 
ontological constants of human identity, as we saw in Section One, Taylor incessantly draws 
our attention back to the holist idea that an integrated and fulfilled identity incorporates a self-
understanding that necessarily passes through a linguistic and moral background that we 
access through our cultural and political associations. Within these very general parameters, 
however, Taylor acknowledges that the individual is free to modify her inherited languages 
and enter into a diverse range of affiliations in pursuing her individual self-fulfilment. This is 
particularly true if we consider that, at least with regard to our cultural affiliations, these 
relationships needn’t be established with the living or those concretely present, but can also be 
formed in thought with the absent or the dead (Taylor, 1989: 37). Thus Taylor allows that 
individuals may criticise or reject the received values of their historical communities and enter 
into associations with others who share and confirm their individual understanding of the good 
life even while retaining their attachment to what he calls pre-given “webs of interlocution” or 
“webs of birth and history” (1989: 36). The only limit upon individual diversity here seems to 
be a civilisational limit beyond which individuals would be incapable of accessing any moral 
framework whatsoever because they would lack the common languages of intelligibility that 
this requires, or else a purely associational limit outside of which we would lack partners with 
whom to realise the immediately common goods that we value.  
The understanding of communal attachment found in the trans-historical claims of 
Taylor’s philosophical anthropology, which highlights what Taylor calls in SS “the 
transcendental embedding of independence in interlocution”, and his arguments for the need 
that people possess to realise common goods through common action, is, however, some 
distance from the far more articulated mode of attachment that Taylor envisages in his appeal 
to communal horizons of meaning as a standard for state perfectionism in his political thought 
(1989: 39). Where, in this latter body of work, Taylor follows Herder in attributing an original 
mode of being to a whole culture, the potentiality for individual diversity allowed by the 
former seems to be grossly diminished (Digeser, 1995). And it would appear that only by 
narrowing the scope of legitimate individual expressivism in just this way can Taylor hope to 
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defend the idea that there are relatively clear-cut interpersonal standards of judgement that can 
be appealed to when reaching political consensus about what constitutes a curtailment of 
human freedom and causes moral harm.  
Taylor’s approach to the issue of recognition and state perfectionism in his political 
writing would thus seem to overlook the complexity and uniqueness of individual experiences 
of moral harm because of a tendency to overemphasise the embedding of individuals within 
cultural communities. Even granted the dialogical formation of our identities and our need to 
belong to larger cultural and political groups, Taylor only establishes at an ontological level 
our commitment to a common history and language. When it comes to debating advocacy 
issues, however, Taylor speaks as if cultures will for this reason share a relatively clear 
common understanding of the good and a common way of life. This seems to overlook the fact 
that individuals in modern liberal societies can, and frequently do, identify with a number of 
sub-cultures existing within and across these historic and linguistic groups and form their 
individual identities by combining desired elements of each (Rorty, A., 1994; Benhabib, 2002; 
Kukathas in Paul E. et al., 1996: 86; McBride, 2005; Redhead, 2004: 128). This is true of 
contemporary Quebec no less than of other societies:  
 
Before the ‘Quiet Revolution’ (1960-1966), the Quebecois generally shared a rural, Catholic, 
conservative and patriarchal conception of the good. Today, after a rapid period of liberalization, most 
people have abandoned this traditional way of life, and Quebecois society now exhibits all the diversity 
that any modern society contains – e.g., atheists and Catholics, gays and heterosexuals, urban yuppies 
and rural farmers, socialists and conservatives, etc. Being a ‘Quebecois’ today, therefore, simply means 
being a participant in the francophone society of Quebec; and Francophones in Quebec no more agree 
about conceptions of the good than do Anglophones in the United States” (Kymlicka in Paul, E. et al., 
1996: 130; cf. Kymlicka, 1995: 87-89).  
 
One consequence of this is that defending and promoting concrete measures deemed to 
accord with cultural survival will be more contested, because potentially more restrictive of 
individual freedoms, than Taylor appears to acknowledge. In this sense Taylor is less heedful 
of the dangers of anything but minimal state interventions geared toward furthering individual 
development than a thinker like John Stuart Mill, whose political thought was also informed 
by a conception individual self-realisation that closely approximates Taylor’s conception of 
authenticity (Digeser, 1995: 186). For Mill it was evident that “the same things which are 
helps to one person towards the cultivation of higher nature are hindrances to another” (cited 
in Digeser, 1995: 186). 
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5.3.2 Ascriptive group identity as a criterion of state perfectionism  
If the meaningful pursuit of individual authenticity is less constrained than Taylor appears to 
acknowledge in his political writing, then his whole approach to the politics of recognition 
may suffer from an unacknowledged tension in the idea that the recognition of individual 
authenticity in pluralistic societies requires the preservation of cultural authenticity (Digeser, 
1995: 187; Descombes, 1994). In this connection, another serious problem accompanying 
Taylor’s defence of the politics of difference is his belief that accepting the ontological 
understandings about the importance of authentic identity formation that inform it will incline 
us, at a normative level, to accept that members of disadvantaged cultures might justifiably be 
legally prevented from integrating into cultures other than those of their birth. It could, 
however, be argued that the commonplace liberal emphasis on free or autonomous individual 
choice, which Taylor accepts, requires that we encourage not only the flourishing of a 
diversity of cultures but that all these cultures be maximally porous. State perfectionism of the 
sort that Taylor defends in the Quebec case might therefore not only be contingently 
undesirable (as Taylor concedes it might be) but unacceptable in principle.  
Taylor’s Herderian talk of group authenticity does little to consider the problem that, in 
cultures founded on ascription where identity is not self-generated but rather imposed, it 
would appear to fit better with the authenticity needs of all that individuals be recognised on 
the terms that they themselves choose (Wolf, 1992: 76; Kenny, 2004: 36-42). Taylor 
acknowledges that collective identities are frequently imposed, and that they can serve to 
entrench political oppression by undermining the expressive freedom of members of 
disadvantaged groups, but his defence of state perfectionism seems to nonetheless presume 
both that communal identities are always internally generated and that they are invariably a 
positive source of self-esteem for their members, while the reverse of either of these 
conditions could, for reasons Taylor himself is at pains to make evident, equally be the case.83 
Individuals might wish to be understood and respected in terms that make their being Muslim, 
                                                
83 As Patchen Markell points out, given that group identity is never stable, and given that it is both internally and 
externally generated, recognition seems an inherently ambivalent affair. It posses a cognitive dimension, through 
which pre-existing, internally-generated identities are recognized (or fail to be), as well as a creative, politically 
charged dimension in virtue of which identity is an ongoing locus of normative contestation traversed with social 
power dynamics. Attending to the first dimension with the aid of a concept like authenticity allows us to sensibly 
distinguish between successful and failed recognitive transactions. Similarly, the motivational force behind 
political struggles for recognition only becomes apparent when we consider the second dimension, which 
underscores our mutual vulnerability by appeal to a conception of the inter-subjective or dialogical aspect of 
identity-formation (Markell, 2000). Put in Markell’s terms, my claim is that, without explicitly drawing these 
distinctions, Taylor highlights the interplay of both cognitive and political dimensions of recognition in his 
ontological accounts of identity formation, while his advocacy of state perfectionism appears to factor in only the 
cognitive element. Moreover, we could add that even if Taylor could rightly presume some mechanism to ensure 
that political acts of recognition are benign and steer free of externally recognitional forms of oppression, he 
seems unconcerned that internally-generated identities within a group may be stifling of the authentic 
development of its individual members.  
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or a woman, or homosexual, or an immigrant, or whatever the case may be, a relatively 
peripheral aspect of their identity just as much as they may wish for these to be regarded as 
central foci of allegiance and promoted or praised in the public life of a wider political 
community (Wolf, 1992: 76; Kenny, 2004: 41, 157). As Michael Kenny explains:  
 
Underpinning Taylor’s argument for recognition is the dubious proposition that members of 
subordinated groups are inherently prone to moral harm because of the process of misrecognition that 
liberal culture produces. Such a claim radically underplays the degree to which individuals forge a sense 
of themselves as much by rejecting and refining collective identity as by immersion within it (2004: 
157).  
 
 Taylor’s ontological conflation of individual and cultural authenticity needs in this 
fashion creates problems for his advocacy of state perfectionism in the form of group rights 
ascription. Discussing Taylor’s own example of prohibitions on English-language schooling in 
Quebec, Peter Digeser argues that the defence of individual authenticity would allow 
Francophone parents to send their children to a school of the parents’ choosing, or for children 
of a suitable age to choose their schools for themselves. The demand for cultural authenticity, 
as this is expressed in the Francophone demands for cultural survival, always threatens to run 
counter to the requirements of ensuring individual authenticity, and Taylor’s ontological 
reflections on human identity provide no adequate grounds for why the state should decide 
against the individual and in favour of the group through measures like group rights ascription 
(Digeser, 1995).  
Of course, Taylor’s project in MPR is not a defence of specific policies. While Taylor 
frankly confesses his sympathy for the Francophone cause in Quebec, he only intends to 
establish that measures such as legally restricting free access to schooling are in principle 
defensible where they would promote toleration of disadvantaged groups and social solidarity 
within a political community by taking the demands for cultural survival that members of 
these groups make seriously, and only where truly fundamental human rights are not 
threatened. But Digeser uses this example to illustrate a more general point, which appears to 
undermine Taylor’s argument from individual authenticity needs to state perfectionism: if 
authenticity can apply equally to individuals and groups, then we can always appeal to 
authenticity as an argument against group rights, and legally privileging the demands of the 
group over the individual may therefore constitute a standing threat to individual freedoms 
(1995). 
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5.4 Conclusion 
We must agree with Jürgen Habermas that, while cultures may reproduce themselves by 
convincing their members to creatively reappropriate their cultural traditions, the decision to 
do so must, for modern liberals, always remain a freely-chosen option for the individual. In the 
societies of the contemporary West, which are inescapably pluralistic and given to innovation,  
 
the only traditions and forms of life that can sustain themselves are those that bind their members, while 
at the same time allowing members to subject the traditions to critical examination and leaving later 
generations the option of learning from other traditions or converting and setting out for other shores 
(1999: 222; emphases in original). 
 
This is not just a condition of avoiding cultural ossification but a basic requirement of human 
freedom.  
Of course, the liberal view that modern societies must make the acceptance of tradition 
a matter of individual choice is not in itself a value that Taylor would dispute provided only 
that we give due consideration to the dialogical contexts within which this choice is 
meaningful and rich. As we saw in Chapter Three, Taylor is deeply committed to furthering 
the transformative power of uncoerced and respectful debate among deliberators of different 
cultural orientations who, through open-ended conversation, may learn from one another and 
reshape their cultural understandings and political and social practices accordingly. But this 
ideal of mutually yielding, reciprocal cultural exchange fits uncomfortably with the idea that 
states must protect existing cultures by ensuring their indefinite perpetuation through policies 
that “actively seek to create members of the community” (Taylor, 1992: 58; emphasis in 
original).  
While Taylor might be right to argue that disadvantaged cultures require difference-
sensitive measures to defend imperilled practices from decline, doing so through perfectionist 
state policies that operate outside of a framework of equal individual rights always threatens to 
slide into what Habermas calls “a kind of preservation of the species by administrative means”, 
and it is not certain that Taylor manages to steer round this problem (1999: 222). This is 
because accepting Taylor’s interesting account of expressive freedom and his exciting 
historical reading of struggles for recognition of authentic identity as a major driving force 
within the political life of the modern West might as easily decide us against a perfectionist 
state committed to upholding group-specific rights as for it.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
If the discussion that has occupied us in the foregoing chapters has been at all successful, it 
will have demonstrated that Charles Taylor’s political philosophy is a search for moral and 
political principles that will serve to guide us in our pursuit of solidarity and just reconciliation 
in the pluralistic societies of the contemporary West. This project proceeds best, Taylor 
believes, if we take into account the identity needs that we possess both as human beings and 
as members of modern Western societies for whom freedom will have negative, republican 
and expressivist dimensions.  
I have tried, in Section One, to reconstruct Taylor’s account of human identity 
formation and communal belonging. Taylor believes that the naturalist understanding of 
human agency is inescapably given to reductionism because it fails to appreciate that strong 
evaluation is a capacity both peculiar to and inescapable for persons. Naturalism gives rise to a 
constructivist notion of selfhood that emphasises the indispensability of individual choice and 
subjective evaluation in the formation of human identity at the expense of the equally 
indispensable determinations within which this choice and evaluation may be meaningfully 
exercised. For Taylor, we are neither simply the thralls of our desires, nor are we limitlessly 
free to invent and reinvent ourselves at will, as theories of radical choice and a widespread 
tradition of modern individualism would have it. This is because all moral choice is governed 
by background conditions that are not fully subject to individual determination, and in 
acknowledging these conditions we will opt for holism over atomism in our description of 
social life.  
Because we are situated in the world in such a way that we practically engage with our 
surroundings through interpreting the meaning that situations bear for us, Taylor believes a 
minimally coherent self-understanding or identity is an inescapable feature of all human 
agency. Taylor’s holism is built on the notion that individual self-understanding requires 
cultural frameworks of meaning that render our individual choices intelligible. This view, we 
said, is best appreciated in light if Taylor’s philosophy of language. Taylor believes that, like 
George Steiner, we must understand man as above all the “language animal” (1985a: 217). 
Language not only expresses our most basic purposes but orders and shapes them, and as such 
is partially “constitutive” of human agency. But if, as expressivist views of language affirm, a 
language is located outside of individual minds, within a speech community, then our 
linguistically formed identities will situate us, as individuals, in a relationship with this larger 
! 137 
 
community and to have an identity is to be able to express one’s position in the world to these 
other interlocutors. It is these others who induct us into communities of speech and shared 
value and we remain inescapably within a space of interlocution with concrete or symbolically 
present others throughout our lives (Taylor, 1989: 29, 35-36). These others are not only 
intimate acquaintances but those with whom we share both the mediately common goods of a 
culture and the immediately common goods internal to the practices and institutions through 
which a society co-ordinates its collective activity. This, at any rate, is the meaning that Taylor 
assigns to Wittgenstein’s maxim that “to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life” 
(1985a: 281). 
But what, if anything, do these reflections on identity formation and language use 
mean for political theory? This is the question that runs throughout Section Two, where I have 
attempted both to expand on the ontological arguments explicitly or implicitly informing 
Taylor’s political claims and to assess whether the normative content that Taylor draws from 
these reflections does indeed succeed in structuring the field of available advocacy positions in 
the manner that Taylor believes it will. To this end I distinguished three basic normative 
political claims that Taylor makes; he argues that the grounds upon which we justify public 
policies must not of necessity be culturally neutral, that we endorse a model of civic virtue that 
assigns a non-instrumental value to public service, and that appeal to perfectionist criteria by 
state actors may, in multicultural societies, be a prerequisite of securing citizen equality.  
The first of these claims, considered in Chapter Three, holds that social solidarity 
within pluralistic societies is best advanced if we adopt a model of public deliberation that 
does not seek to abstract from difference when justifying socially prevailing norms and laws 
but rather seeks to identify or create difference-sensitive measures that all deliberators will 
deem acceptable. There we saw that, while Taylor might be right to claim that neutral 
agreement cannot be forged around universal principles of the right or justice formulated in 
total abstraction from the good, this observation appears to offer very little as a critique of 
contemporary procedural liberals like Rawls. Rawls, as well as formalists like Habermas, do 
acknowledge that their theories are informed by an understanding of the good, only they do 
not see it as a particular good. But we also saw that even if we construe liberal justificatory 
neutrality as the endorsement of those universally cherished goods that all reasonable people 
are likely to require as a precondition of whatever other goods they strongly value, Taylor 
believes that procedural liberals fail to account for why we should infallibly choose these 
goods when they square off against other goods that we hold in virtue of our attachments to 
particular cultural communities or out of a desire for personal self-realisation. We might, of 
course, be obliged to do so by adopting the moral point of view, and the moral point of view 
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might be usefully defined through a set of formal testing procedures, but this still begs the 
question of why the moral point of view should claim deliberative priority. While this may not 
be a problem that procedural liberals feel their theories are required to address, Taylor believes 
that this theoretical oversight will predispose political actors defending procedural liberal 
practices to downplay the demands of local justice in principle, and this will frustrate attempts 
to reach rational consensus about public goods. Thus, while seeking to further toleration and 
social solidarity within pluralistic societies, procedural liberals might, in practice, unwittingly 
endorse an exclusionary creed that undermines their most laudable ends.  
Yet another of Taylor’s claims, which was the subject of discussion in Chapter Four, 
was that freedom requires patriotic commitment. Procedural liberals, Taylor maintains, tend to 
view the political requisites of freedom simply as the absence of constraints. Assuming this 
negative view of freedom overlooks the much-neglected liberal value of collective self-rule, or 
else downplays this value by considering self-rule through collective action a purely 
instrumental good. Taylor believes that the wide diffusion of this outlook throughout the 
societies of the West eventuates in the decline of participatory politics that he observes in 
contemporary procedural republics and that in doing so it opens the door to bureaucratic 
centralisation. He argues that political commitment must not be seen as a burden we undertake 
out of self-interest, and it cannot only be seen as that which we do from altruistic devotion to a 
universal ideal or set of ideals, though it may also encompass such ideals.  
Taylor holds that we are, for the most part, patriotic out of a love of the particular, and 
we are justifiably patriotic when this attachment to particularity comes from an awareness that 
our freedom as individuals is expressed in collective acts that work to maintain or fortify the 
institutions of a freedom-protecting culture that enable us to realise vital human goods that we 
couldn’t otherwise seek. In its most theoretically interesting form – the stronger republican 
thesis – this is an ontological claim that acts of public service, when performed by agents 
whose individual conceptions of the good are essentially linked to the collective good of a free 
society, are valuable not only as instrumental guarantors of negative freedoms but also as 
integral expressions of freedom through which they exercise a form of self-determination that 
would not otherwise be open to us. Where this is understood, Taylor believes that we will, at 
the advocacy level, better appreciate the need for broad-based citizen mobilisation facilitated 
by decentralised forums for collective debate and common action, and in so doing we can 
offset the soft despotism that procedural politics promotes.  
The concern with working out the political conditions required for the fullest possible 
realisation of human freedom and dignity that leads Taylor to endorse participatory patriotism 
as an essential citizen virtue also leads him to defend state perfectionism. This advocacy 
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position, as we saw in Chapter Five, Taylor considers a working out of the need to secure from 
threats the cultural conditions for the realisation of our expressive freedom. This is a 
particularly urgent problem in procedural republics that wish to uphold the liberal commitment 
to safeguarding cultural pluralism but which, by seeking to resolve disputes through 
difference-blind legal practices, render the state incapable of addressing the systematic 
inequalities that threaten the very survival of minority groups united in their commitment to 
sustaining in perpetuity a common language or set of historical traditions. This is regrettable 
not just because it threatens to undermine the state’s legitimacy and promote cultural 
enclavism, but also because it constitutes a form of oppression.  
To appreciate the moral complexity of these claims, which he believes is self-evident 
to those voicing them but may be quite opaque to outsiders, Taylor argues that we benefit 
from reflecting upon the nature of the modern Western understanding of individualism. This 
shows us that we have come to view ourselves as equals, not only through our possession of 
universally shared moral capacities like the capacity for autonomous choice, but also insofar 
as we all possess the ability to realise an authentic identity that is true to us as individuals and 
reflects our singularity. The needs accruing to the exercise of autonomous choice are widely 
recognised in our political cultures and are accommodated within procedural republics through 
difference-blind schedules of negative individual rights designed to ensure that all citizens 
have a legally defensible claim to active respect of their human dignity, but the second range 
of needs, in virtue of which we demand attitudinal respect, is largely neglected. The need for 
attitudinal respect, which is what Taylor refers to when discussing demands for “recognition”, 
is misunderstood by those who interpret the ideal of individual authenticity in an atomistic 
fashion. While atomists correctly see that authenticity is partly an aesthetic ideal that requires 
of us an originality and self-discovery that may lead us to reject moral obligations and 
communal ties to a broader culture, this can slide all too easily into a self-indulgent 
understanding of human identity formation that disregards the essentially dialogical contexts 
in which integrated and expressively rich identities are worked out.  
In MPR and other works Taylor is chiefly concerned with emphasising the 
indispensability of cultural contexts of shared meaning and experience, as well as the 
languages that embody these cultural formations, to the healthy formation of individual 
identity. Because our cultural commitments are considered by procedural liberals to be 
derivative of universal moral demands, or because they may be understood by atomists as 
obstructions to authentic self-development, such demands are normatively downplayed as 
valid political objectives and calls for cultural survival, like those expressed by the French-
speaking majority in Quebec, will accordingly go unheeded. I have argued, however, that 
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while all this may be true, and while it may indeed explain the persistence of major political 
divisions in culturally plural societies, it doesn’t follow at all unproblematically that state 
perfectionism will remedy the problem. The appeal to individual authenticity of experience as 
a regulative norm informing state policies will always be less determinate and potentially 
more oppressive than Taylor seems to acknowledge. I have tried to argue that this is not so 
through any oversight on Taylor’s part so much as a failure to establish compelling 
continuities between his complex and, I believe, deeply insightful views on identity formation 
and the normative political positions that he wishes to recommend on the strength of these 
ontological claims.  
In his political thought as much as in his moral work Taylor hopes to oppose what he 
calls a “rage for reduction” in contemporary Western culture (1994a: 262). By seeking to 
finesse moral conflicts through procedures and the universally valid goods that such 
procedures are designed to further, Taylor believes that we evade the moral dilemmas that 
confront us and obfuscate the real issues in contention. We do better to realise that “following 
one good to the end may be catastrophic, not because it isn’t a good, but because there are 
others which can’t be sacrificed without evil” (Taylor, 1989: 503). We might say that, for 
Taylor, we can’t escape tragedy; we can only hope to limit it by reconciling as many of the 
legitimate goods that make a strongly valued claim upon us into a more or less coherent, 
though always provisional, whole. This is what is entailed in forming an identity, both as an 
individual and as a political society. Thus Taylor hopes that in pursuing the private goods that 
we rightly cherish we don’t overlook the common goods that both facilitate the provision of 
our private goods and those that possess an inherent human worth. These goods are given to 
us through social and political associations that safeguard our human dignity as well as 
through immersion in the thought and common sensibility carried in the expressive languages 
of cultural traditions.  
It is of course an open question whether the discursive receptivity to non-universal 
goods in public debate, the active model of citizenship and the perfectionist state defending 
group-specific rights that Taylor recommends really will remedy the political malaises that 
afflict procedural republics. This is a question I have largely avoided, as conviction here 
would have to follow on from a range of empirically informed arguments that take cognisance 
of the political conditions prevailing in particular countries. Instead I have posed the more 
modest question of whether, or to what extent, Taylor’s political thought can be viewed as a 
working out, at the advocacy level, of his ontological reflections on identity. Throughout 
Section Two I have attempted to argue that Taylor may have an interesting argument with 
atomists, or at least with those of us who endorse the atomistic social outlook that he 
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polemicises against, and that he has something important to say to non-realist holists like 
Rorty. As a critic of procedural liberalism, however, Taylor may offer less than he promises. 
This is particularly true of his arguments for state perfectionism, which shift from ontology to 
advocacy a little too assuredly.   
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 1: Taylor’s narratively unified moral subject 
Although, in discussing strong evaluation, we have spoken about the indispensable conditions 
of identity formation, Taylor believes that this way of putting the issue may be somewhat 
misleading if it were taken to mean that an identity is created in one decisive act, or isolated 
series of acts, of self-interpretation (Taylor, 1989: 36-37; 47). Taylor believes that the unity of 
self is not something that can be established definitively; human identity may solidify at some 
important developmental stages, but it is always vulnerable to challenges that our interlocutors 
or, in another form, our engaged situation in the world, are constantly throwing up (1989: 47). 
“We live in time”, writes Taylor, “not just self-enclosed in the present, but essentially related 
to a past which has helped define our identity, and a future which again puts it in question” 
(1985b: 182). Because of this temporality and mutability of identity, Taylor’s claim that 
people exist in a space of questions that only practical deliberation guided by strong evaluation 
can suffice to answer also entails that a healthy or coherent identity has to be actively 
sustained throughout our lives as we respond to the challenges or questions that arise for us 
out of our strong conceptions of the good.  
Viewed from this perspective, identity is more in the nature of a perpetually unfolding 
project of self-interpretation than a possession or achievement that can be definitively secured. 
But if identity is a project unfolding in time, and if it is vulnerable to challenge and disruption, 
then it makes sense to inquire into what lends this project its coherence as a temporal sequence 
of inter-related judgements and actions. Taylor believes that philosophical discussions of 
personal identity of the sort that Locke and Hume initiated, in which the unity of life or lack 
thereof turns on whether we can reflexively apprehend our lives as a unified succession of 
events, and where discerning this unity this is understood as a purely cognitive operation of 
disengaged self-reflection, provide an inadequate framework for conceptualising what is at 
stake in discussions of identity (1989: 49-50; 1991c: 306). If the issue of the unity of self arose 
only out of disinterested reflection, or out of concern only for our relationship towards the 
weakly valued or goods that we contingently happen to desire at certain times and in varying 
intensities, then there would be no a priori need for an integral sense of self. Whatever unity 
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we attributed to the self would depend on what the inquirer happened to be looking for; a point 
which Taylor believes Dereck Parfit has persuasively argued (1989: 49-50; 1991c: 306).  
The act of self-inquiry that Taylor envisages in his discussion of strong evaluation is, 
however, one that necessarily seeks to find, or to establish, a unified and minimally coherent 
sense of self. Taylor believes that the search for a cohesive self is one that, in some form, must 
be undertaken by all competent persons. It is spontaneously posed as the question of whether 
or not we, in our lives as a whole, have realised, or are striving toward, the goods that we have 
integrated into our frameworks of strong evaluation. This “aspiration to fulness” or “aspiration 
to connection” is, like strong evaluation, an inescapable human constant arising from the fact 
that we cannot be indifferent to the good (Taylor, 1989: 43, 45). Our relation to the strong 
goods we identify defines a mode of self-concern which, because it is that by which we define 
the self and exercise our agency, we can never regard with indifference. While strong 
evaluation points us in the right direction by allowing us to determine what the good is at any 
one time, this does not exhaust our concern. Our concern embraces our lives as a whole, and 
because we can fail to live up to our conception of the good, or lose contact with it, or have 
our understanding of what it consists in challenged or undermined, we require some faculty 
for tracking our progress or failure across our entire lives (Taylor, 1989: 50). As Taylor 
explains, 
 
My sense of myself is of a being who is growing and becoming. In the very nature of things this cannot 
be instantaneous. It is not only that I need time and many incidents to sort out what is relatively fixed 
and stable in my character, temperament and desires from what is variable and changing, thought that is 
true. It is also that as a being who grows and becomes I can only know myself through the history of my 
maturations and regressions, overcomings and defeats (1989: 50).  
 
This understanding of ourselves as beings who are what we have become is also that by which 
we gauge our potentialities and plan future courses of action. By sequencing our past and 
present sense of self we also develop an orientation towards an anticipated future (1989: 48, 
50).  
Taylor claims that only by viewing our lives in narrative – by seeking a meaning in 
our pasts, determining what goods are available to us in the present, and projecting out of 
these possibilities for the future – can we effect this unity of purpose, and that this is in fact 
what healthy agents do throughout their lives (1989: 47). Grasping identity in narrative terms 
entails principled selection among, and an ordering of, life events in relation to the good. In 
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practice this understanding of life finds expression either in living by a pattern or standard that 
gives expression to our vision of the good, or else by linking our lives up to some greater 
meaningful reality or “story”, or some combination of both. In the former case, people may 
strive to devote themselves to their family lives, or to mastering some mode of artistic or 
intellectual expression, or to living by some principle of rational self-control, and so on. The 
latter mode of “contact” or connection may take the form of ritual or religious devotion to 
some cosmic order, participating in or witnessing great public events, committing to a 
collective cause, or something of the sort (Taylor, 1989: 43-44).   
Taylor’s account of narrative reason clearly points toward an important human faculty 
but, as Nicholas H. Smith argues, it is contestable whether it qualifies as a transcendental 
condition of identity (2002: 99-101). Taylor’s position would be more compelling if he 
managed to demonstrate that in the absence of narrative unity our sense of self would 
disintegrate entirely, as he contends it would were we to be unable to strongly evaluate. Even 
if we were to agree with Taylor that a life without narrative unity would be pervaded by a 
sense of condemnation, failure, or worthlessness, this doesn’t necessarily amount to the sort of 
identity crisis that lacking a framework of strong evaluation would entail (Taylor, 1989: 44-45; 
Smith, 2002: 99-101). Indeed, Taylor’s own praise of modernist literature in SS, which he 
believes explores meaningful ways in which narratives of biographical identity break down 
and fragment, suggests that his commitment to the narrative unity of identity may not be 
immune to the criticism that imposing a narrative unity on our lives may amount to a 
falsification of, or at least an overly rigid constriction upon, our authentic experience of the 
self (Taylor, 1989: 456-493; Smith, 2002: 100-01). 
Galen Strawson has recently argued this case, contending that construing one’s life as a 
narrative is a dispensable, individual character predisposition and one, moreover, that is likely 
to distort our perception of the self (2004). Strawson writes: “My guess is that…the Narrative 
tendency to look for story or narrative coherence in one’s life is, in general, a gross hindrance 
to self-understanding: to a just, general, practically real sense, implicit or explicit, of one’s 
nature” (2004: 447). His criticisms explicitly target Taylor, as well as Alisdair MacIntyre, Paul 
Ricoeur and a host of others who adopt some version of the narrativity thesis, especially where 
(as is the case with Taylor) this is indebted to Heidegger’s views on temporality and authentic 
self-concern in Being and Time. 
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Appendix 2: Taylor and Rorty on value 
The disagreement between Taylor and Rorty over value realism ultimately centres on their 
different understandings of what is means to reject foundationalism. Taylor and Rorty both 
agree that we need to do away with or supplement the foundationalism of traditional Western 
epistemology, which builds on a “representationalist” model of human beings as subjects who 
negotiate the world through framing thoughts that either correspond with a subject-
independent reality or fail to do so, with the peculiar dignity of human life residing in our 
capacity to construct knowledge built on more accurate symbolic representations of reality 
than non-humans. But Taylor disagrees with Rorty that we must for this reason also reject 
“realism” and assume that the truth of a belief can only ever be its correspondence with 
another belief (Rorty, R., 1991; 1994a; Taylor, 1985a, 1990; 1995a; Dreyfus in Abbey ed., 
2004: 54-55).  
Working with an account of language use that he attributes to Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein, among others, Rorty holds that the inability of our language to refer to any 
subject-transcendent reality confines us to moving between world-views in a fashion that suits 
our individual preferences or which conforms to some set of commonly accepted pubic norms, 
but we cannot justify these moves by appeal to any better fit with an objective reality that 
might come of doing so (Rorty, R., 1991). Taylor, for his part, believes that these same 
theories point to a conception of language use in which language is not (as it is for 
representationalists, as well as for Rorty) a screen between us and the world, but an 
ontologically basic opening onto the world without which we could not exercise our agency in 
any recognisably human form at all. Taylor builds on this claim, which we considered when 
discussing the expressive functions of language in Chapter One, to further argue that if our 
engagement with the world about us is defined by the linguistic descriptions of our selves and 
our worlds that we adopt, then by considering the sort of engagement that our descriptions 
facilitate we are provided with a measure for weighing competing beliefs and selecting from 
among rival goods in our practical deliberations (Taylor, 1990; Guignon in Hiley et al. eds., 
1991). Thus while both Taylor and Rorty agree that the inherent reliance of persons upon self-
interpretation through a shared communal language means that we have to understand human 
beings in holistic terms, as related to a community in a manner that is definitive of their 
identities, Rorty believes that we can and must have this holism without value realism while 
Taylor wishes to maintain both (Rorty, R., 1991; 1994a; 1994b; Taylor, 1990). Taylor argues 
that the anti-representationalism that both he and Rorty defend entails that some forms of 
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understanding will be truer than others, where this means not only that these understandings 
are more internally coherent but also more capable of orienting us within our worlds relative 
to our purposes (Taylor, 1990).  
Taylor argues that Rorty’s position demonstrates an incomplete break with the 
representationalism that they both repudiate:  
 
[Rorty’s] notion of what it is to reject representationalism still seems commanded by the doctrine being 
rejected. So to learn that our thoughts don’t correspond to things-in-themselves is to conclude that they 
don’t correspond to anything at all….Rorty seems to be operating within the logic of the old 
[epistemological] system that linked us to transcendent reality through a screen of representations, even 
while distancing himself from it (Taylor, 1990: 271).  
 
This leads Rorty into the belief that people with different understandings are 
 
situated behind incompatible representations, without there being anything these representations are 
about which can arbitrate. They are not seen as situated in a common world, with a framework 
understanding developed partly dialogically, which defines for them the constraints and demands on 
their representations (Taylor, 1990: 271).  
 
As I understand him, Taylor wants to argue that we can view our beliefs to be true or 
false, or more and less perceptive, not in accordance with their fit with a reality that could ever 
be known independently of our representations of it, but rather by determining whether these 
beliefs enable us to engage with the people and things in our worlds in a manner that 
constitutes an improvement upon some previous mode of engagement, relative to a 
background of our most basic purposes and consonant with the shared understandings through 
which these can be intelligibly expressed. It is only in relation to a pre-given background of 
this sort that we can speak of truth and degrees of truth and in relation to which we will have 
anything but the most capricious of motives for choosing one set of beliefs over another but, 
within these limits, doing so is perfectly sensible. Thus accepting the cultural context of 
interpretation in no way commits us to non-realism a priori. We may struggle to understand 
the move from one interpretation of our experience to another as a gain or a loss, but such a 
move is in principle possible; likewise, people from different cultures may lack a shared 
vocabulary in which to contrast their beliefs but, at least in principle, there are common 
criteria that all might appeal to in such undertakings.  
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Appendix 3: Taylor and Habermas on justification and application 
Georgia Warnke offers an insightful discussion of the relationship between the justification of 
liberal norms and their practical implementation by contrasting Habermas’s ideal of just 
political association that emerges through the discourse ethical approach to practical reason 
articulated in The Theory of Communicative Action (1984) and elsewhere with Taylor’s 
substantive model of practical deliberation and asks what these two approaches might dictate 
at what we have been calling the advocacy level of political discussion (Warnke, 1995). This 
issue has also been taken up directly by Habermas in “Struggles for Recognition in the 
Democratic Constitutional State” (1999).  
When applying rationally justified norms, Habermas acknowledges that an agreement 
on universal principles can dictate a number of distinct practical solutions. He therefore insists 
that “any universalistic morality is dependent upon a form of life that meets it halfway” 
(Habermas in Warnke, 1995: 129; emphasis in original). Habermas agrees with Taylor that 
justificatory discourses need to be supplemented by discourses of application, but he rejects 
the idea that deliberation of the latter sort proceeds best when guided by an Atistotlean notion 
of phron!sis because of the unreflective and partisan nature of the solutions that such a 
deliberative approach is likely to produce. Rather, concrete actors in situated contexts must 
learn to follow established principles of application such as considering all relevant aspects of 
a case and fitting the means to the ends (Warnke, 1995: 130-31). Warnke argues that this 
issues in a “top down” conception of the relationship between justification and application in 
the sense that the relevant question at the level of application is how specific cultural groups 
must adapt their moral understandings and institutions in order for the application of rationally 
justified norms to proceed (Warnke, 1995: 133).  
 In contrast to Habermas, Taylor demonstrates a “bottom up” approach to application 
insofar as the question he appears to be asking concerns how rationally justified norms and the 
legal processes governing their implementation may be adapted to best accommodate the 
institutional and cultural life of agents within existing societies (Warnke, 1995: 133). This is, I 
believe, what Warnke is gesturing at when she argues that, for Taylor, “cultural values and 
orientations must be acknowledged not just as elements of the concrete situations to which 
principles of justice apply but as codeterminers of their meaning” (Warnke, 1995: 135).  
This approach is exemplified, as we shall see in more detail in Chapter Five, in 
Taylor’s discussion of the political aspirations of minority groups like Francophone Canadians 
pressing for group-specific interpretations of language laws in Quebec. Taylor believes it can 
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be argued that respecting the commitment to cultural survival that he attributes to the 
Francophone majority in the province allows us to apply rights not only to individuals but also, 
in some cases, to such groups. Such arguments do not require a rejection of liberal principles 
of freedom and equality but rather call into question the notion that difference-blind public 
policies across an entire spectrum of social issues necessarily further these values (Taylor, 
1992).  
 Habermas has highlighted these differences between himself and Taylor while 
contending that Taylor’s challenge to the system of individual rights upheld by modern liberal 
societies is unnecessary because this system bears within itself the resources for protecting 
minority or threatened groups (1999). This owes to the fact that democratic legislative 
decisions, while upholding an ethically neutral system of law, are informed not only by 
universally valid moral norms and principles but also by practical discourses concerning how 
best to actualise these principles in accordance with the needs of concrete political actors 
whose demands express the ethical values of particular communities possessing unique self-
understandings and traditions (Habermas, 1999). Thus legal systems are “ethically permeated”: 
“every legal system is also the expression of a particular form of life and not merely the 
reflection of the universal content of basic rights” (Habermas, 1999: 217, 227; emphasis in 
original). Taylor and Habermas clearly agree on this point, but unlike Taylor, who believes 
that this constitutes a compelling argument for modifying legal systems in culturally plural 
political societies, Habermas concludes from this that legitimate challenge to the legal system 
should be channelled not at the ethical neutrality of the law but at the ethically patterned 
fashion in which the law is inevitably interpreted and applied (Habermas, 1999).  
Habermas contends that this misguided belief that the legal system itself (as opposed to 
the legal experts and legislative authorities that interpret it) is inherently hostile to group 
difference leads Taylor to endorse a model of practical reasoning where the goal of 
understanding is not to ensure equal respect for all individuals through granting individual 
rights but to preserve the existence of particular cultures through provisions such as awarding 
group rights (Habermas, 1999). Taylor takes as his hermeneutical starting point a presumption 
of the equal value of all cultures and, provided this presumption is confirmed in the course of 
close engagement with the culture in question, seeks to establish how practical deliberation 
can best secure the flourishing of such a culture, which includes its reproduction across 
succeeding generations (Taylor, 1992). Habermas objects to this approach, which “represent[s] 
a kind of preservation of the species by administrative means” (1999: 222). The sort of 
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cultural preservation envisaged by Taylor closes down individual choice by preventing 
members of certain cultures from engaging with other cultures and challenging or abandoning 
their own traditions, and this ultimately leads to the ossification of cultural structures and 
understandings as they become incapable of adapting to the ever-changing conditions of 
modern life (Habermas, 1999).  
This second objection, to the effect that Taylor’s presumption in favour of cultural 
survival promotes sectarianism and intolerance, may well be overstated. While measures taken 
to secure cultural survival do restrict individual choice, they do not of necessity foster 
contempt and disregard for other cultures and modes of being or a complacent attitude towards 
one’s own cultural milieu. At any rate, the sort of parochialism Habermas warns against is the 
very opposite of the model of open exchange that Taylor endorses, where every advance in the 
understanding of the other necessarily involves a corresponding advance in self-understanding 
(1992; 2002). As Warnke points out, Gadamer’s model would seem to imply that cultural 
groups have an investment in promoting the survival and flourishing of other cultures as a 
condition of their own self-development (1995: 140).  
Habermas’s top-down and Taylor’s bottom-up approaches to discourses of application 
needn’t, however, be configured as irreconcilable opposites. The differences and also the 
possible complementarities between these approaches come into view when considering that 
both are animated by a fundamental commitment to furthering political tolerance (Warnke, 
1995). For Habermas, the political accommodation of diverse cultural groups requires fairness 
and flexibility in the application of universally valid and legally impartial norms to concrete 
situations. This entails interpreting the nature of the practical political measures required in 
open, non-discriminatory democratic debate that channels the demands of diverse cultures 
(1999). For Taylor, however, the democratic receptivity to cultural values envisioned by 
Habermas must extend beyond discourses of application to discourses of justification 
themselves. Taylor’s dissatisfaction on this score is best understood, I believe, in light of his 
arguments to the effect that universal commitments should not trump particularistic 
commitments as a matter of course and that frequently what appear to be culturally impartial 
moral norms or principles turn out upon closer philosophical probing to be intelligible only in 
relation to the practices and evaluative frameworks of particular cultural groups. This does not 
entail the non-realism and the inescapable cultural parochialism of which Rorty speaks, but it 
does mean that properly self-aware practical deliberation must therefore proceed from within a 
basic substantive framework of value worked out by all parties to the deliberation and not, as 
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proceduralists like Habermas would have it, by sequestering a realm of culturally neutral 
moral values believed to command the universal assent of all rational agents. While Taylor’s 
preferred model of practical reasoning confronts deliberators with great obstacles toward 
reaching mutual understanding and ensuring co-operation, he holds that it is inherently more 
accommodating of the identity needs of members of minority or disadvantaged groups because 
it is willing to assume at the outset that their particularistic values may square off against the 
purportedly universal values of other deliberators.  
But, as Taylor stresses, this receptivity to diverse goods must be a presumption and not 
a foredrawn conclusion: toleration must have a limit and liberalism will always be “a fighting 
creed” (1992: 62). While toleration of groups like Francophone Quebeckers might, in unique 
circumstances and supported by compelling arguments, allow governments to legally restrict 
important privileges and immunities in the course of regulating the operations of businesses 
and education policies, it must never allow for compromise on fundamental rights to life, 
liberty, free speech, due process, free practice of religion and the like (Taylor, 1992: 59). What 
Warnke suggests is that, given Taylor’s claims about identity and his ideal of practical 
deliberation through a fusion of horizons, we might usefully appeal to a modified version of 
Habermas’s procedurally defined understanding of the ideal conditions of discourse when 
determining through deliberation the contours of this substantive boundary to tolerance. 
Habermas’s discourse-ethical approach to mutual understanding and co-operation holds that 
agreement between deliberators will only be fair to all parties if the basic conditions of 
rational discourse are adhered to. An architectonic presupposition of rational discourse is that 
the force of the better argument, and not relationships of power or overt coercion, must 
determine the outcome of deliberation (Warnke, 1995: 139-40). This entails that exclusion, 
discrimination and manipulation of any sort will be unacceptable to all deliberators, and for 
this formal reason they will be motivated to take whatever concrete measures are needed to 
ensure that basic conditions of tolerant deliberation prevail (Warnke, 1995: 139-40). Warnke’s 
argument fits well with Taylor’s own belief that a proceduralist ethics – of which Habermas’s 
stands out as “the most interesting and rich such theory ever produced” – may considerably 
advance political thought provided it comes clean about its own substantive value orientations 
(Taylor, 1993: 349, n.2). 
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Appendix 4: Taylor on practical reason and freedom 
In Hegel and Modern Society Taylor argues that to avoid vacuity or arbitrariness in our 
choices people must realise that “the individual is part of, inheres in, a larger life, and…he is 
only what he is by doing so” (Taylor, 1988a: 87). To the extent that that the modes of 
experience that we understand to be essentially constitutive of human agency are sustained by 
language, and granted too that languages are sustained by speech communities, “what we are 
as human beings we are only in a cultural community. Perhaps once we have fully grown up in 
a culture we can leave it and still retain much of it. But this kind of case is exceptional….” 
(Taylor, 1988a: 87).  
These passages, taken from Taylor’s Hegel and Modern Society, might suggest that 
Taylor plays down our capacity for moral autonomy, construed in the Kantian sense of 
rational revisability of our most basic ends. But insofar as Taylor might accurately be said to 
endorse some version of Michael Sandel’s criticisms of rational revisability, I believe that one 
would have to reject this position on both descriptive and normative grounds. Descriptively, 
people clearly are capable of separating themselves from their communal ends and denying 
this is exceedingly counter-intuitive. It may be impossible to conceive of oneself as capable of 
forming beliefs and making choices in isolation from all communal ends, but it is certainly 
possible to envisage ourselves in isolation from our present ends, and this is all that rational 
self-determination requires (Kymlicka, 1989a: 47-53; Carse, 1994: 191; Mulhall & Swift: 
1992: 177; 2003: 465). To fail to appreciate this is to commit a genetic fallacy; to reason from 
the ontological priority of particular communal relationships in the formation of individual 
identity to a normative commitment to defending the values of this same community is to beg 
important questions about the moral value of particular identity-defining goods and says 
nothing about how these square off with other possibilities (Carse, 1994). Taken as a 
normative thesis, the denigration of this voluntaristic capacity is no more appealing as it 
threatens to discredit rational agency per se in favour of an “unreflective herd solidarity” and 
nullify the moral distinction between principled social commitment on the one hand and 
“blind obsession” or “wholly non-rational attachment” on the other (Buchanan, 1989: 871, 
872).  
Taylor’s associated claims or suggestions that the only alternative to this mode of 
belonging is a radically unattached or (in Sandel’s lexicon) “unencumbered”84 form of social 
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prior to and independent of purposes and ends” (1984: 86). For a subject so conceived “[n]o role or commitment 
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belonging that rules out meaningful social commitment and tends towards nihilism, and that 
liberals endorse such a mode of belonging, are undoubtedly misleading, and neither Rawls nor 
any other of the more influential thinkers in the contemporary liberal tradition affirm, or need 
to affirm, this view of the self (Taylor, 1988a: 159; Sandel, 1982: 150-165; 1984: 86; 
Buchanan, 1989; Kymlicka, 1989a; Digeser, 1995; Mulhall & Swift, 2003).  
There are, however, places where Sandel does allow for rational revisability, and Will 
Kymlicka argues that the difference he claims to find between himself and Rawls is to that 
extent overblown (Kymlicka, 1989a: 55-56; Sandel, 1982: 152, 179; Carse, 1994: 195). Much 
the same, I believe, is true of Taylor. While Taylor comes very close, at points, to endorsing 
an understanding of communal belonging in Hegel and Modern Society that resembles 
Sandel’s, he silently drops it in those of his works that I focus upon. In these works Taylor 
makes it clear that, while we derive our identities from our participation in the practices of 
particular communities, we are always capable of critically revising the beliefs and norms that 
are constitutive of our identities both as individuals and through collective deliberation. Taylor 
only wishes to establish that whether conforming to or rejecting received practices – the 
common “roles, offices, statuses, rules, laws, customs” and the languages that partly constitute 
them, of which we spoke in the previous chapter – we necessarily do so within the limits of 
what our shared expressive languages render intelligible (1995a: 130). Our identities are 
always related to this background, but this does not prevent us from assuming a critical stance 
toward it; indeed, Taylor’s holism establishes no more than that one could neither intelligibly 
affirm nor negate social practices without first being situated within or closely studying the 
shared linguistic traditions that are essentially bound up with them.  
In Hegel and Modern Society Taylor stretches this concept by arguing that certain of 
our paradigm purposes are set for us by our communal embedding, and that free choice is only 
meaningful and responsible in relation to these pre-given purposes, while downplaying the 
capacity that individuals possess to distance themselves from these communal ends and 
rationally redefine their most fundamental commitments. As this approach is unconvincing 
and morally unappealing, and as he dispenses with it in the works that I have chosen to focus 
upon, I will largely overlook it in what follows. We will nonetheless see that Taylor continues, 
in places, to argue as if something like this held, but this I consider an inconsistency in his 
work. 
                                                                                                                                                    
could define me so completely that I could not understand myself without it. No project could be so essential that 
turning away from it would question the person I am” (Sandel, 1984: 86).  
